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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores how Kenyan Christians perceive Islam and Muslims. The thesis 
approaches the problem by examining various Christian writings. Substantial and 
representative Christian literature was found in the form of scholarly writing, produced by 
Kenyan mainline Christians, and in the form of popular literature, produced by Kenyan Neo-
Pentecostals.  
The historiography of Islam entering into Kenya; and a historical look at Christian-
Muslim relations in Kenya, with particularly an examination of the recent debate over the 
inclusion of kadhi courts in the constitution, were also examined. The combination of the 
historical and the literary approach provides breadth into the examination of how Christians in 
Kenya perceive Islam and Muslims. 
After an analysis of the history and the texts, several themes that emerge from this 
analysis are examined from two perspectives. One, politically oriented themes are examined 
to understand how Kenyan Christians symbolically contest with Muslims over public space. It 
is seen that the symbolic contestation concerns the legitimacy to occupy roles in the nation-
building project. Two, emerging theologies of religion are teased out of the writings to gain 
insight into the deeper theological structures from which Kenyan Christians operate as they 
seek to understand and interact with the religious Other (Islam). 
The thesis claims that the Kenyan cultural/religious context contributes significantly 
more so than traditional Christian-Muslim dynamics from outside of Africa. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Africa is the only continent with roughly equal populations of Muslims and 
Christians.
1
 While North Africa is predominantly Muslim, Sub-Saharan Africa contains large 
numbers of adherents from both religions. Nearly 60% of Sub-Saharan Africans are Christians 
and 30% are Muslims.
2
 It might be said that Africa is performing an experiment in Christian-
Muslim relations that is not only unprecedented, but that may also contain lessons for the rest 
of the world.  
Jenkins in his influential book, The Next Christendom, seems to believe that the future 
of Christian-Muslim relations in Africa may have disastrous global consequences. In a chapter 
titled, The Next Crusade, he poses “plausible African scenarios”3 in which religious wars lead 
to “the war of the end of the world.”4 Violent conflicts between Christians and Muslims have 
occurred in Africa, most notably the long civil war in Sudan and interreligious/interethnic 
violence in northern Nigeria. Huntington, who Jenkins follows in his analysis,
5
 makes the 
questionable claims that Kenya and Tanzania have experienced similar conflicts between 
Christians and Muslims.
6
 It may be asked if Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis and 
                                                          
1
 Information obtained through the World Christian Database. 
http://www.worldchristiandatabase.org/wcd/ accessed 19 July, 2006. 
2
 Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa,  (Washington, D.C.: Pew 
Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2010), 1. 
3
 Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 188. 
4
 Ibid., 188-190. This is a title of a section in the chapter. 
5
 Ibid., 163-190. Jenkins uses Huntington’s idea of fault line wars in his description of potential 
crusades and religious wars in Africa. 
6
 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 
Touchstone, 1996), 256. 
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Jenkins’ “next crusade” prognostication are truly the lessons that Africa’s experiences 
convey. 
This thesis does not attempt to directly respond to the pessimistic, and rather dramatic, 
prognoses of Jenkins and Huntington.
7
 Instead it will carefully examine Christian-Muslim 
relations from a Christian perspective in one African nation, which should contribute to a 
better understanding of the lessons that Africa may offer, as well as provide a more accurate 
representation of Christian-Muslim relations in one African nation that may prove to be a 
corrective to their more negative predictions. 
1.1 Purpose of the Study 
The aim of this study is to listen to voices of Kenyan Christians
8
 as they write about 
issues concerning Islam and Muslims in order to better understand their perceptions of Islam 
and Muslims as these perceptions are influenced by the African religio-cultural heritage. An 
examination of Christian scholarly literature on Islam and popular Christian writing that 
addresses this subject will be used to gain access to these perceptions. The historical and 
cultural contexts are also examined. These contexts contribute to a better understanding of the 
texts, as well as enhancing an understanding of Kenyan Christian perceptions of Islam.  
These perceptions will be then analysed through two different frameworks. First, 
Christian perceptions of Islam are analysed in the contestation over public space. This is a 
symbolic contestation that is used to maintain an upper hand in contesting for dominance in 
public space. The contested stakes concern who determines the identity of Kenya and the role 
of each religion in the on-going process of nation-building. Second, assumed, underlying 
                                                          
7
 Voll has written a more detailed refutation of the ‘clash of civilizations’ as a relevant theoretical 
framework by which to understand Christian-Muslim encounter in Africa. John Voll, "African 
Muslims and Christians in World History: The Irrelevance of the "Clash of Civilizations"," in Muslim-
Christian Encounters in Africa, ed. Benjamin F. Soares, (Leiden: Brill, 2006). 
8
 However, due to the fact that the vast majority of the writing is produced by Kenyan Protestant 
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theological positions concerning a Christian understanding of Islam will be analysed. These 
theologies of religion have neither been explicitly stated nor presented. These emerging 
theologies of religion are teased out of the Christian literature and a preliminary exposition of 
these theologies is proposed.  
1.2 Methodology 
In this section the methodological approach of the thesis will be explained by first 
looking at the importance of taking the local Kenyan context as primary. An approach to 
selecting and reading the texts will be explained in the following section. Then the concept of 
symbolic confrontation, engaged by Kenyan Christians and Muslims, is examined. Finally, 
implicit theology is examined as a methodology for better acquiring an understanding of the 
theological assumptions implicit within the popular Christian writing. 
1.2.1 A Contextual Approach 
The thesis proceeds with the understanding that the local Kenyan context is primary in 
the production of meaning in matters concerning local Kenyan Christian perceptions of Islam. 
To say this does not indicate that the Kenyan Christian response to Islam is any less 
‘Christian’ than Christian responses elsewhere, nor does it mean that external sources of 
influence are absent from the Kenyan situation. It does, however, pose questions concerning 
the relationship between external messages and local reception, interpretation and use of the 
messages. In this particular case, since the thesis examines the views of Kenyan Christians, 
who are adherents to a religion that has its origins outside Kenya, it is necessary to look at 
theoretical issues concerning the interrelationship between African religion and culture and 
Christianity. First, a theological perspective on a contextual approach to Christianity 
becoming an African religion will be examined, and then an anthropological approach using 
the concept of ‘cultural flow’ to understand local reception of external messages will be 
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examined. These two perspectives shape the theoretical background that informs the manner 
in which the scholarly and popular texts are examined. 
Christianity spreading to Africa is often understood as the invasion of a Western 
religion.
9
 However, Lamin Sanneh and Kwame Bediako argue that Christianity has become 
an African religion.  Sanneh, in particular, emphasizes the reception of the message by 
Africans over against those who brought it,
10
 saying “the African, as the agent of religious 
adaptation, has played a more critical role than his missionary counterpart.”11 The primary 
means by which this has happened is through the translation of the Christian scriptures into 
African vernaculars, through which the missionary transmitter loses control of the “proper” 
interpretation of the religion.
12
 The use of the vernacular incorporates “indigenous 
conceptions and idioms”13 into Christian thought and life. As Bediako has commented, “it is 
through the vernacular that the living forces of the primal imagination are perpetuated and 
carried forward into Christian usage.”14 The use of local names for God, for example, meant 
for African people that the God of the Bible was in fact the same God that had been known 
before the arrival of missionaries.
15
 
For both Sanneh and Bediako, this vernacular aspect is of the theological essence of 
Christianity. Sanneh writes that Christianity is always a “translated religion,” “original 
Christianity” being “nothing more than a construct,” but that its message is always “received 
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 See for example the scathing indictment of colonial era missions by A.J. Temu, British Protestant 
Missions (London: Longman Group Limited, 1972). 
10
 Lamin Sanneh, Encountering the West: Christianity and the Global Cultural Process: The African 
Dimension (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), 74. This is emphasized througout his writing. 
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 Lamin Sanneh, West African Christianity: The Religious Impact (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
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 See Lamin Sanneh, Translating the Message: The Missionary Impact on Culture (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1989). 
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 Sanneh, Encountering the West, 74. 
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 Kwame Bediako, Christianity in Africa: The Renewal of a Non-Western Religion (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1995), 175. 
15
 Ibid., 55, 213. 
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and framed in the terms of its host culture.”16 As such, Christianity in Africa should not be 
understood as a Western religion and the Westernisation of Africans through Christianity.
17
 
One implication of this understanding is that African Christian approaches to various issues, 
including interreligious relations, should not be understood uniquely in terms of traditional 
(i.e. primarily Western-derived) Christian theological categories. Instead, the African 
Christian approach is shaped by a complex interaction between the African religio-cultural 
heritage and Christianity in which this African heritage shapes Christian thought and action, 
and the African heritage is also re-shaped by Christian faith. 
In addition Sanneh addresses the issue historically, indicating that the primary agents 
for the spread of Christianity in West Africa were African catechists, colporteurs, teachers, 
etc.
18
 Spear also notes that Africans played a central role in the spread of Christianity in East 
Africa.
19
 Though Christianity arrived on the shores of Africa (and Kenya in particular) 
through the efforts of Western missionaries, their historical and theological role in the 
formation of African Christianity is frequently overstated in comparison to the importance of 
African agency, reception and assimilation. This is as true for present manifestations of 
African Christianity as it was for the earlier era.
20
 
Kalu discusses the more recent phenomena of African Pentecostalism and its relation 
to Pentecostalism in the West in terms of the globalization discourse. This discourse raises 
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 Lamin Sanneh, Disciples of All Nations: Pillars of World Christianity., ed. Lamin Sanneh, Oxford 
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two issues: “how globalization impacts local cultures and how local cultures respond.”21 For 
Kalu the local appropriation, domestication and transformation of the global (i.e. Western 
Pentecostalism) explains African Pentecostalism better than theories emphasizing the external 
influences. Therefore, concerning this recent African Christian movement, he arrives at a 
similar position to Sanneh and Bediako regarding African response and agency through the 
use of theories of globalization rather than translation. 
Gifford, on the other hand, is one of the leading proponents of the view that Western 
(and primarily American) influence is operative throughout African Christianity, though 
especially in its Evangelical and Pentecostal varieties.
22
 A brief look at Gifford’s thesis may 
clarify the contrasting methodology used in this present study. Gifford wishes to use 
“concepts taken from political and social analysis” (especially the concept of African socio-
political systems as neo-patrimonial) to “examine the public role” of the church in Africa.23 In 
this way, he regards African churches as dependent upon external “resources, expertise and 
power.”24 For example, in describing two Liberian Pentecostal churches he uses expressions 
such as “this Christianity is totally Western,” the “teaching was totally American,” “there was 
not a single African element,” and “there was absolutely nothing African in either of these 
churches.”25 (The emphasis is added.) 
While the absolutist language is toned down in his recent writings, Gifford continues 
to understand developments of Christianity in Africa as resulting from principally American 
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initiatives.
26
 He writes, for example, that to assess “recent religious trends in Africa” one 
needs to understand “North American developments”.27 However, as Freston writes, 
“American influence has to be demonstrated rather than presumed.”28 It seems that Gifford 
understands African churches to be almost fully dependent upon the patronage of primarily 
American Christians, whom they imitate structurally, liturgically and theologically. Africans 
become principally passive recipients of a globalizing American gospel, rather than agents, 
interpreters and transformers. 
Anthropologist, Ulf Hannerz, uses the concept of cultural flow in the global ecumene 
to understand local reception of external cultural messages. Cultural flow can be understood 
as both the “externalization of meaning,” which can refer to a wide variety of forms (e.g. 
speech, bodily expressions, material production, art, etc.) and the “interpretation” that one 
makes of these externalizations.
29
 In other words, culture does not flow directly from mind-to-
mind but from one individual to another through various means, which must then be 
interpreted. The global ecumene refers to the “complicated overall entity”30 within which 
global cultural forces influence local cultures. 
Hannerz shows that cultural flow between centre and periphery (the West would be a 
centre and Africa a periphery) is asymmetrical as Gifford insists, however the centre-
periphery relations are complex. Within the periphery, centres form further centre-periphery 
relationships resulting in multiple local centres, which interpret and then re-externalize the 
‘original’ cultural message in altered fashion, as well as produce their own cultural 
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messages.
31
 In addition, the periphery is never passive, but receives the message as an 
additional cultural resource rather than as displacement of its own cultural resources.
32
 For 
our purposes, Christianity can be seen as a resource added to African religious and cultural 
resources, rather than as a replacement. The centre’s messages also arrive via media that 
allows for little or no feedback, nor control, and the closer contacts of “face-to-face 
interactions”33 that people experience in everyday life carry more influence than messages 
from a distant media. It can be seen that strong cultural messages are communicated from 
centres, but that their influence, while not discounted, is mitigated by the nature of the media 
and the local cultural circumstances. 
Applying Hannerz’s theory of cultural flow to the concerns of this thesis, one can 
recognize that Western Christianity influences Christianity in Kenya, occurring principally 
through written media, television and missionary personnel in the pattern of centre-periphery 
relations. However, the receptions, interpretations, adaptations, and uses of the message by 
Kenyan Christians from their various institutional, cultural and social contexts within Kenya 
as they produce new meanings form the significant places from which to analyze religious 
perceptions in Kenya. Hannerz’s anthropological theory confirms the theological insights of 
Sanneh, Bediako and Kalu.
34
 Therefore, this thesis will analyse the writings of Kenyan 
Christians concerning Islam, not as reflections of globalized influence from the West, but as 
local, creative, Christian responses. It is recognized that Kenyan Christians live within the 
global ecumene, although the additional cultural resource that arrives in Kenya from Western 
Christian ministries does not overpower local cultural resources. Kenyan Christian 
perceptions are produced by Kenyans within the plurality that makes up modern Kenya.  
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1.2.2 Analytical Approach to the Texts 
In order to access the broadest view of Kenyan Christian perceptions of Islam, I 
decided that a widespread collection of published writing by Kenyan Christians would be the 
principle focus of the research. I had recently relocated to Nairobi after having lived for 
several years in the Horn of Africa.
35
 Having had a long-term interest in African Christian 
theological issues, I was already familiar with the vibrant Christian theological production in 
Kenya. It was this scholarly and theological material that I intended to study to gain insight 
into Kenyan Christian perceptions of Islam. However, as I became more familiar with Nairobi 
and its Christian community, I began to notice the significance of both the popular Christian 
literature and the Pentecostal/Charismatic movement.
36
 Even in discussions with Anglicans, 
Presbyterians, Catholics and Mennonites,
37
 I found that popular Pentecostal magazines were 
being read and that the Pentecostal/Charismatic movement had made important inroads. I, 
then, decided to begin collecting these popular Christian magazines to include in the study.  
An attempt was made to gather as much published material by Kenyan Christians 
concerning Islam as could be found. As might be expected, locating and acquiring the 
scholarly material proceeded with very little difficulty. The vast majority of this material is 
available at the Catholic Bookshop, Keswick Bookshop,
38
 or in the libraries of local 
theological schools. Therefore, it can be reasonably claimed that a nearly complete collection 
of Kenyan Christian scholarly writing concerning Islam from 1998 to 2010 was made. 
However, the nature of popular Christian publishing in Kenya means that a claim to 
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completeness cannot be made. One, finding back issues to popular magazines is difficult.
39
 
Two, the publication and distribution of these magazines can be sporadic, which makes 
regularly locating them difficult. Three, some large Pentecostal churches publish a popular 
magazine, but do not make them easily available to the public. Therefore, the popular 
Christian literature that was collected can be said to be representative, but it is not exhaustive 
of the genre. This type of literature and the collection process is described more fully in 
chapter 7.1.  
From among the large number of magazine articles, journal articles, book chapters and 
books collected, the texts used in this study were then chosen due to their references to Islam. 
In scholarly texts references to Islam were direct and were identified by the use of the terms, 
Islam or Muslim, in the text. In popular writing the references were often indirect and terms 
such as mosque, Allah, and eastern gods (which was used to indicate either Indian religions, 
Islam or both, possibly because some prominent Muslims in Kenya are from the Indian 
community) were used to identify references to Islam. Popular writers also used specific 
geographical regions to indicate a reference to Islam, and those identified were the coast, 
northern Kenya, North Eastern Province, Mombasa, Middle East, and Asia(n). Typically 
Muslim names, as well as broader themes related to Islam (without directly using Islamic 
terms) could also indicate references to Islam.  
The texts were read with careful attention given to both their underlying theological 
assumptions concerning Islam and their socio-political representations of Christian and 
Muslim presence in Kenya. Then they were classified as either primarily religious/theological 
or socio-political; a few texts combined both theological and socio-political themes. As 
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examined in detail above (1.2.1), the local Kenyan context was primary in analyzing the texts. 
Categories for analysis were allowed to arise from the texts within their local Kenyan context 
informed by their historical, cultural and religious heritage. The most salient Kenyan 
religious/theological concept found in the writings in regards to Christian perceptions of Islam 
was ‘community’. A key role of religion is understood to be the ability to create healthy forms 
of community. In these texts, Islam is then judged by Kenyan Christians according to how 
Islam is perceived to be capable of creating its own healthy community. This is explained 
more in sections 9.3, 9.3.2 and 9.3.3. The theological writings of Kenyan and African 
theologians such as Mbiti, Mugambi, Magesa and Bujo
40
 confirmed community as a valid 
religious/theological category in the local Kenyan context. Therefore, the texts classified with 
religious/theological themes were read with careful attention to the idea of community. 
Questions asked of the texts were: What is community? Who comprises the community? 
What inhibits healthy community formation? What is the relation of the community to 
Muslims? Is Islam considered to be capable of creating healthy community?  
The ‘theology of reconstruction’ by Mugambi provided a helpful framework for 
analyzing texts of a socio-political nature. The theology of reconstruction, using the story of 
Nehemiah as its Biblical inspiration, calls for African people to come together to find African 
solutions to their problems in socially, economically and politically building the nation (see 
sections 6.3.1 and 8.4.1). While all of the scholarly and popular writers may not be in full 
agreement with the theology of reconstruction, the concept of religious participation in 
building the nation socially, economically and politically was shared by all (see 8.1). Thus 
these texts were read giving careful attention to the idea of nation-building; the writers 
evaluate Islam in its capability of appropriate nation-building. In addition, Bourdieu’s concept 
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of symbolic contestation through the use of symbolic capital proved helpful in analyzing the 
manner in which these Kenyan Christian writers sought to impose their vision of nation-
building upon Muslims (see 1.2.3). Through the use of a metaphor borrowed from economics, 
symbolic capital provides a means to understand the manner in which groups create and use 
power through the manipulation of symbols in order to affect change by imposing meaning on 
the social order. Questions asked of the texts were: What are the symbolic meanings that 
Kenyan Christians attempt to impose in the public space? What types of symbolic capital do 
Christians use most commonly in symbolic confrontation with Muslims? How do they 
employ these various forms of symbolic capital? What place is expected for Christians and for 
Muslims in the public space? Are Muslims accepted as equal participants in the public space? 
1.2.3 Symbolic Power and Symbolic Confrontation 
 In examining the scholarly and popular texts by Kenyan Christians, it was found that 
Kenyan Christians are engaged in symbolic confrontation with Kenyan Muslims. In order to 
better theoretically understand these symbolic contestations, some concepts from Pierre 
Bourdieu’s sociology will be used. One of his central ideas is that power “finds symbolic 
expression in cultural forms and practices.”41 This symbolic power is “a power of ‘world-
making,’” through which “the world itself” can be truly organized.42 “Symbolic power entails 
the capacity to impose symbolic meanings and forms as legitimate” and “to shape perceptions 
of social reality.”43 Within the context of this study, Kenyan Christians seek symbolic power 
to impose their definition of a Kenyan nation as the legitimate vision for nation-building.
44
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Symbolic power may be understood through the concept of capital, which Bourdieu 
extends beyond economics to include “a variety of cultural, social, and symbolic resources.”45 
“Symbolic capital”, then adheres to the “same laws of accumulation, inheritance, and 
exchange that govern material forms of capital.”46 There are different types of symbolic 
capital, such as “cultural capital, linguistic capital, scientific capital, and literary capital;”47 
and in the context of this study religious capital and spiritual capital are important notions. 
These various types of capital may be exchanged for (or transformed to) other types of capital 
so that an individual or group may gain symbolic capital in a different field.
48
 For example, 
educational capital and cultural capital may be interchanged
49
 (i.e. an individual who obtains a 
high degree of education may also become a ‘cultured person’, or someone who succeeds as 
an artist may become accepted as an ‘educated person’.) The notion of exchanging or 
transforming symbolic capital from one type to another will be important for understanding 
the ways in which Kenyan Christians contest the public space. 
‘Habitus’ is another concept that will be helpful in understanding the manner in which 
symbolic power functions in Kenya. Collins writes, “The habitus is, briefly, a set of embodied 
dispositions – a propensity to do things in certain ways in certain contexts.”50 Bourdieu calls 
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Sociological Theory 21, no. 2 (2003): 152. 
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combinations of capital.” Swartz, Symbolic Power, Politics and Intellectuals, 56. The term, space, will 
be used in this study in a manner similar to Bourdieu’s use of field (champ in French). 
49
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habitus “a structuring structure” and a “structured structure.”51 Maton explains this as follows: 
“Habitus is structured by one’s past and present circumstances” (i.e. family, education, 
religion, cultural group, urban/rural, etc.), and “it is structuring in that one’s habitus helps to 
shape one’s present and future practices.” The structure, itself, can be understood as a “system 
of dispositions which generate perceptions, appreciations and practices.”52 Habitus tells 
people who they are and where they belong in the larger social order. It “involves an 
unconscious calculation of what is possible, probable, improbable, or impossible for people in 
their specific locations in the stratified social order.”53 In the context of the present study, 
Christian perceptions of Islam, understandings of Kenyan nationhood and the manner of 
symbolic confrontation are “mediated by habitus,”54 and not the unique results of the creative 
thoughts of isolated individuals. 
It should be noted that Bourdieu stressed the manner in which the modern state 
monopolises symbolic power
55
 and legitimates distinctive social classes and inequality. As 
such, other sources of symbolic power did not receive much interest in his works, especially 
religion.
56
 When he did write on religion, Bourdieu focused upon religious institutions within 
a closed religious system (i.e. marginally related to other fields and types of capital).
57
 
Considering the importance of religion in Africa, and the manner in which religion tends to 
permeate all aspects of life (and thus every field or space), the entirety of Bourdieu’s theory is 
of only marginal interest. Therefore, while using some of Bourdieu’s concepts in the analysis, 
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the thesis should not be understood to represent a specifically Bourdieusian analysis of 
religion. 
The thesis will specifically examine the contestation over public space, which may be 
characterised as symbolic confrontation. At its most basic, symbolic confrontation can be 
contrasted with direct physical or political confrontation.
58
 Bourdieu says that symbolic 
confrontations are “over the power to produce and impose the legitimate vision of the 
world.”59 It must be kept in mind that the symbolic is significant in modern nationalism;60 and 
as Cruise O’Brien writes, “The state in Africa enters the imagination along a religious path.”61 
In the particular case under study, the contestation for the “legitimate vision of the world” 
concerns who can impose their vision of the nation upon Kenya. Symbolic confrontation can 
change realities in the socio-political world. 
The Christian-Muslim contestation is only one of several such symbolic 
confrontations that attempt to define the Kenyan nation. Other important symbolic contests 
include: Western versus African, and secular versus religious. Even though this thesis is only 
concerned with the Christian-Muslim contestation, these contests are not isolated and each 
one has influence upon the others. For example, the Western-African contest impinges upon 
the Christian-Muslim contest in that Christians question if Muslims are truly committed to the 
African cause.
62
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Harrison finds “four proto-typical forms”63 of symbolic confrontation. While his 
classifications are not of particular interest in this thesis, they provide some insight into how 
symbolic confrontations work. The symbols of one group may be elevated as more prestigious 
than that of a competing group.
64
 Groups may dispute the control of commonly held symbols, 
such as those of the nation.
65
 A group may create new symbols to enhance its identity.
66
 A 
group may also attempt to displace the symbols of its opponent and replace these with its own 
symbols.
67
 From these four types it can be seen that symbolic confrontation, according to 
Harrison, concerns each group attempting to gain symbolic power by asserting control over 
symbols and naming one’s own symbols as significant.  
Bourdieu points out that the “symbolic power does not rest in the ‘symbolic 
system,’”68 but that it exists in the relationship between those who exercise this power and 
those who accept it. In other words, this power is not intrinsically found in the symbols 
themselves, but it is located in the cooperation between those who have authority to create 
and promote the symbols and those who recognize the symbols as legitimate and meaningful. 
This means that a symbolic confrontation not only involves manipulation of the symbolic 
system, as understood by Harrison,
69
 but this confrontation may also include attempts to 
weaken the relationship between those wielding symbolic power and those accepting it. 
Cruise O’Brien, in his study of Senegal, says that the Mouride brotherhood calls the 
state Satan in symbolic confrontation.
70
  He also writes that Tijani Sufis use symbolic 
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confrontation against the Mourides by declaring their own commitment to the morality of the 
Qur’ān and calling the Mourides, morally lax.71 These examples show that the relationship 
that establishes symbolic power may be attacked through attempts to discredit the authority of 
the opposing group.  
Bourdieu views the results of successful symbolic confrontation to be an increase in 
symbolic capital, which confers more legitimacy to successfully compete symbolically.
72
 
Therefore, whether through the manipulation of symbols or the discrediting of rivals, 
symbolic confrontation aims to increase one’s own symbolic capital for further confrontations 
and to gain the symbolic power to define the vision of the social world, thus maintaining or 
changing that world.  
It will be seen in chapter eight, Contesting Public Space, that both manipulation of the 
symbolic system and attempts at discrediting Muslim authority to wield symbolic power form 
the manner of symbolic confrontation that can be found in Kenyan Christian literature. The 
symbolic power that may be accrued through these contestations is sought as a form of 
political power that enables the Christian communities to impose their socio-political visions 
of Kenya. 
1.2.4 Implicit Theology 
As the underlying theological assumptions concerning Islam of popular Neo-
Pentecostal writers will be examined, it is helpful to briefly look at the concept of implicit 
theology. Percy writes, “the primary materials of theology are often not so much the formal 
statements of ecclesial bodies, but rather their operant practices, beliefs and interpretations.”73 
The implicit theology may then be deduced from these more popular expressions of “story 
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knowledge”.74 Cartledge examines the implicit theologies of Pentecostal groups through the 
use of sermons, stories, prophecies, songs, etc.
75
  
Cartledge also introduces the concept of ‘rescripting’ in order to supplement and 
correct popular material “by doctrinal theology for a richer, integrated and ultimately 
orthodox account.”76 Rescripting aids in the interpretation of the more popular narrative 
through social and theological categories that are appropriate to that particular narrative. The 
theology found in the popular Kenyan Pentecostal literature can be considered incomplete; it 
lacks the sophistication and more thorough reflection of scholarly writing. However, the 
scholarly theological and sociological writing on African Pentecostalism by Ogbu Kalu and 
others are used to rescript these popular accounts, and a fuller description of the theology 
implicit within the popular writing is developed in chapter 9. In this way the underlying 
theological assumptions (or the implicit theology) of the popular writings may be deduced 
and subsequently analysed. 
The present thesis also offers critiques of the interreligious positions of the Kenyan 
mainline scholars and the Kenyan Neo-Pentecostal popular writers (primarily in the 
concluding sections of chapters eight and nine and in the conclusion chapter). However, the 
critiques attempt to respond to these viewpoints by recognising inconsistency between the 
theological and social tradition of Kenyan mainline scholars and Kenyan (Neo)Pentecostals,
77
 
and their respective approaches to interreligious relations with Muslims. In other words, I 
have attempted to critique the viewpoints that are expressed without imposing either Western 
or personal theological and socio-political views upon the situation. Instead questions are 
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asked concerning particular attitudes toward and perceptions of Islam and Muslims and their 
correlation with the respective communities’ more general theological convictions concerning 
inter-human relationships. 
1.3 Defining Christian Groups in Kenya 
Two contrasting corpuses of writing are studied in this thesis. The scholarly literature 
is produced primarily by Kenyan Christians of the mainline Protestant churches of Kenya, 
though a few book chapters are written by scholars from Evangelical churches. The popular 
literature is produced primarily by Kenyan Neo-Pentecostals. These groups need to be defined 
within their local national context. 
Kenyan churches may be categorised as follows:
78
 the Catholic Church, mainline 
Protestant churches, Evangelical churches, classic Pentecostal churches, Neo-Pentecostal 
churches, and AICs (African Instituted Churches).
79
 The vast majority of the Christian 
literature concerning Islam produced in English by Kenyan Christians comes from mainline 
Protestant churches, Evangelical churches and Neo-Pentecostal churches;
80
 therefore, this 
section will focus upon these groups. In this thesis one article by a Kenyan Catholic lay 
missionary is examined,
81
 and the Kenyan Catholic Church’s position vis-à-vis the inclusion 
of kadhi courts in the constitution is also included in the general examination of the Kenyan 
Christian perspective on this debate.
82
 In addition, no published literature in English 
concerning Islam written by Kenyans from an AIC was located, thus the views of AICs are 
not included in this thesis. Therefore, though it was not the original intention, this thesis 
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studies principally the perspectives of Kenyan Protestant Christianity, because Kenyan 
Protestants have produced the Christian writings concerning Islam.  
Distinctions between mainline Protestant churches, Evangelical churches and Neo-
Pentecostal churches (NPCs) can be made historically, institutionally, politically and 
theologically. While these groups differ from each other, significant overlap exists between 
them in each of the above aspects. These distinctions will be discussed, beginning with 
historical differences. 
Mainline Protestant churches, which are referred to as “well-established” churches by 
Karanja,
83
 were founded as the result of European, and less-frequently American missions, in 
the early years of British colonial expansion in the region. Some of these churches can claim 
well over a century of history,
84
 such as the most prominent among them: the Anglican 
Church of Kenya (ACK), the Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA), and the Methodist 
Church in Kenya (MCK). Prior to independence the missionaries representing these churches 
often had close relationships with the colonial government. Karanja remarks that the Church 
of the Province of Kenya (CPK), now the Anglican Church of Kenya (ACK), was the “quasi-
official” church of the colonial regime.85 Early Kenyan political leaders, both before and after 
independence, frequently had connections to these churches, also.
86
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It may be helpful to contrast the origin of classical Pentecostal churches in Kenya with 
that of Neo-Pentecostal Churches (NPCs). Classic Pentecostalism began in Kenya as early as 
1912 with the arrival of Finnish missionary, Emil Danielsson.
87
 Classic Pentecostal churches 
may be defined by their founding by Pentecostal missionaries from mostly North America 
and Scandinavia.
88
 Some prominent classic Pentecostal denominations in Kenya are: 
Pentecostal Evangelistic Fellowship of Africa (PEFA), Full Gospel Churches of Kenya, and 
the Pentecostal Assemblies of Kenya. In contrast, Neo-Pentecostal Churches “have been 
instituted by Africans for Africans”89 leading Anderson to include NPCs with older AICs as 
AICs themselves.
90
 NPCs in Kenya have also been linked with the East African Revival 
(EAR),
91
 further indicating their indigenous roots. The EAR had its origins in the early 20
th
 
century in the Anglican churches of East Africa, and from there it has had a great influence 
within many different churches.
92
 The point to be made is not that NPCs have a unique claim 
to the EAR, but that early Neo-Pentecostal leaders and churches grew out of the revival 
movement. 
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The first NPC to be founded in Kenya was Deliverance Church by Joe Kayo in 1970.
93
 
Other early Neo-Pentecostal leaders were Henry Mulandi, Margaret Wangari
94
 and Arthur 
Kitonga.
95
 Ministries frequently grew out of Christian student movements and NPCs attracted 
(and continue to attract) urban youth in Kenya. While NPCs have strong indigenous roots, 
their beginning can also be linked to the preaching and healing campaigns of American 
Pentecostal evangelists, such as T.L. Osborn and Oral Roberts.
96
 Some scholars emphasize 
the Western influences at the beginning and in continuing contacts between NPCs and 
American Neo-Pentecostals, claiming that Kenyan NPCs are in reality Western imposed 
forms of Christianity.
97
 However, Anderson argues that the relationship between NPCs and 
American preachers is “eclectic”,98 and Parsitau and Mwaura in a study of the Deliverance 
Church find that it is a “local church founded locally by local people as a result of local 
initiatives.”99 While Western influences should be recognised, it must also be recognised that 
NPCs, unlike classic Pentecostal churches, mainline churches and Evangelical churches, are 
African initiated. These churches, having grown considerably during the 1980s and 1990s,
100
 
now make up a significant part of the Kenyan Christian scene. 
Evangelical churches in Kenya may be easily located historically, now that mainline 
churches, classic Pentecostal churches and NPCs have been looked at. Kenyan Evangelical 
                                                          
93
 Gathogo, "Some East African Pentecostal Churches," 142. Damaris Parsitau and Philomena Njeri 
Mwaura, "God in the City: Pentecostalism as an Urban Phenomenon in Kenya," Studia Historiae 
Ecclesiasticae 36, no. 2 (2010): 105. 
94
 Kalu, African Pentecostalism, 12. 
95
 Gathogo, "Some East African Pentecostal Churches," 144. 
96
 Parsitau and Mwaura, "God in the City," 105. Kalu, African Pentecostalism, 96. 
97
 J. N. K. Mugambi, "Evangelistic and Charismatic Initiatives in Post-Colonial Africa," in 
Charismatic Renewal in Africa: A Challenge to African Christianity, ed. Mika Vähäkangas and 
Andrew A. Kyomo, (Nairobi: Acton Publishers, 2003). Gifford, Christianity, Politics and Public Life 
in Kenya, see especially 136-139. 
98
 Anderson, African Reformation, 183. 
99
 Parsitau and Mwaura, "God in the City," 106. 
100
 Yvan Droz, "The Local Roots of the Kenyan Pentecostal Revival: Conversion, Healing, Social and 
Political Mobility," Les Cahiers de l’IFRA, no. 20 (2001). www.ifra-nairobi.net/cahiers/anthropolog-
20/a20droz.pdf (accessed July 4, 2007). Parsitau and Mwaura, "God in the City," 98. 
23 
 
churches generally have been founded by American missionaries and they have rejected 
Pentecostal manifestations of the spirit.
101
 Some of the more prominent Evangelical churches 
in Kenya are the Africa Inland Church, Baptist Churches of Kenya and the Church of God in 
Kenya. 
Currently, there are four separate Protestant ecumenical associations in Kenya that 
bring different church denominations together. The Kenya National Congress of Pentecostal 
Churches and Ministries (KNCPCM), which only began in May of 2013,
102
 did not exist 
during the period under examination. This organisation, as the name implies, attempts to unite 
Pentecostals (primarily small NPCs) under a common umbrella for mutual accountability and 
empowerment.
103
 The Federation of Evangelical and Indigenous Christian Churches of Kenya 
(FEICCK) was founded in 2005.
104
 The FEICCK claims to represent 78 churches and 
denominations in Kenya,
105
 though a list of member churches could not be found. It can be 
deduced from the list of board members and trustees that the FEICCK aims primarily to unite 
NPCs for mutual accountability and to share resources.
106
 Neither association appears to have 
yet established themselves as a major presence in Kenya’s socio-religious-political scene. 
The National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCK) and the Evangelical Alliance of 
Kenya (EAK) are the most important Protestant ecumenical associations in Kenya. The 
NCCK grew out of the Kikuyu Conference of 1913, which established cooperation between 
missionary societies in colonial Kenya.
107
 The NCCK currently unites 27 member churches 
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and 17 Christian organisations in Kenya.
108
 Most of the member churches would be 
considered mainline churches or AICs, though a few classic Pentecostal churches and NPCs 
are also members. The NCCK relates with the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) 
and the World Council of Churches (WCC). The NCCK focuses its activities on the socio-
economic improvement of communities in Kenya.
109
 
The EAK was founded in 1975 as the Evangelical Fellowship of Kenya (EFK)
110
 to 
bring together evangelical churches (i.e. those not wishing to be associated with the larger 
ecumenical movement). The EAK promotes both evangelism and economic development,
111
 
and is part of the Association of Evangelicals in Africa (AEA) and the World Evangelical 
Alliance (WEA). The organisation claims to represent 52 denominations in Kenya,
112
 though 
only 23 are listed on its website.
113
 Most of the listed members are large, established NPCs 
and a few large evangelical denominations, such as Africa Inland Church. 
The above demonstrates that mainline churches, Evangelical churches and NPCs are 
differentiated institutionally. The mainline churches are members of the NCCK and associate 
themselves with the world ecumenical movement. Most of the large Evangelical churches and 
the large NPCs are members of the EAK and associate with the conservative world 
Evangelical movement. Small, less-established NPCs have tended to find a home in the 
FEICCK. There are also many churches, especially small NPCs, that have not joined any 
ecumenical-type association of churches.  
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Political differences between churches came to a head in the late 1980s over the use of 
the queue-voting system by the Moi government.
114
 The CPK (now the ACK), led by a few 
bishops, spoke out against the use of this system of voting instituted by the Kenyan 
government. They were soon joined by leaders from the PCEA and the Roman Catholic 
Church.
115
 Their actions eventually led towards a more general support of multi-party 
democracy and opposition to the Moi government.
116
 The NCCK took up the task of 
coordinating the advocacy for multi-party democracy among its churches.
117
 President Moi 
was able to induce some churches, such as the African Inland Church and the Redeemed 
Gospel Church, to support his government.
118
 It was at this time that the Africa Inland Church 
left the NCCK and joined the EFK (now the AEK).
119
 Many other churches associated with 
the EFK also supported Moi.
120
 In this way, mainline Protestant churches in Kenya came to 
be seen as willing to criticise unjust government practices, and Evangelical churches and 
NPCs came to be viewed as acquiescent to the government.  
Karanja shows, however, that though this distinction is valid, it has never been 
absolute. Several CPK leaders continued to support Moi and his government.
121
 Bishop Lawi 
Imathiu of the mainline Methodist Church in Kenya (MCK) long supported Moi and a one-
party state, possibly because Moi had donated land for a Methodist university in Meru. 
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However, when he was succeeded as head of the church by Zablon Nthamburi, the MCK then 
advocated for a multi-party system.
122
 There were also examples of NPCs who supported 
multi-partyism. Although Arthur Kitonga, head of the Redeemed Gospel Church (RGC), was 
one of Moi’s biggest supporters, Alan Nyaga, a RGC bishop, won a parliamentary seat as an 
opposition candidate in 1992.
123
  
Nevertheless, between especially the NCCK and EAK it can be said that an approach 
to politics plays an important part in their differences.
124
 The NCCK tends towards a critique 
of government based on the prophetic traditions of the Bible,
125
 while the EAK tends to view 
government as God-ordained according to Romans 13.
126
 Having found themselves on 
opposing political sides during the tense years leading towards multiparty democracy, these 
groups remain somewhat suspicious of each other politically. Since 2002, when opposition 
candidate, Mwai Kibaki, became president of Kenya, all churches (including mainline 
Protestant and NPCs) have come to be seen less as prophetic, and more as ethnically 
compromised.
127
 
The three Protestant groups (mainline, Evangelical and Neo-Pentecostal) hold to 
similar theological positions in relation to traditional Christian theological orthodoxy, such as 
the divinity of Christ, the Trinity, the Resurrection, the inspiration and authority of Scripture, 
miracles in the Bible, etc. In fact, Karanja refers to all three groups as Evangelical because of 
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the conservative theology that they share.
128
 However, there are significant theological 
differences between each group, though these must be understood within the local African 
context.
129
 
These theological differences centre primarily upon various approaches to the 
relationship between Christian faith and African culture and religion. One of the better 
expositions of this theological phenomenon is offered by Kwame Bediako in Theology and 
Identity, in which he compares two mainline Protestant theologians, a Catholic theologian and 
an Evangelical theologian (all 20
th
 century Africans) with second century Christian writers on 
the question of Christian theological identity in a new culture.
130
 Unfortunately, as Bediako 
examines the writings of African scholars, the voices of AICs and NPCs (both of whom have 
produced few scholars) are missing. As Bediako describes the writings of the mainline 
Protestant African scholars, Bolaji Idowu and John Mbiti, they find degrees of continuity and 
discontinuity between Christianity and African Religion.
131
 On the other hand, the African 
Evangelical scholar, Byang Kato, claims a nearly absolute discontinuity between African 
Religion and Christian faith.
132
 These theological approaches to Christian identity in an 
African religious and cultural context continue to be true for both the scholars of the mainline 
churches in Kenya
133
 and Kenyan Evangelicals.
134
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While much mainline Protestant (and Roman Catholic) theological discussion 
surrounds the issue of continuity and discontinuity between Christianity and African 
Religion,
135
 there is sharp disagreement over the actual theological position of NPCs on this 
matter. Scholars, such as Mugambi,
136
 Gifford,
137
 and Lonsdale
138
 understand NPCs to be 
primarily American driven and opposed to “African cultural norms and values.”139 However, 
other scholars
140
 argue that Neo-Pentecostalism is growing because of its connection with 
“pre-colonial religious practices.”141 It would seem that NPCs are also involved in a 
theological debate (albeit less academic and sophisticated than mainline churches) over the 
continuity and discontinuity between African Religion and culture and Christian faith. As 
Gifford suggests, the element missing from the mainline discussion, the “enchanted 
worldview”,142 is central to the NPCs’ theological debate. Rather than mainline churches and 
NPCs having differences concerning whether there is continuity between African Religion 
and culture and Christianity, they differ on which aspects of African Religion and culture are 
essential for the debate. 
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To summarise, the differences between mainline Protestant churches, Evangelical 
churches and NPCs have been seen to be historical, institutional, political and theological. 
Mainline Protestant churches have a longer history and historical connection primarily to 
British mission societies and churches, whereas Evangelicals and NPCs generally have a 
shorter history in Kenya
143
 and varying degrees of connection with American churches. 
Mainline Protestant churches are members of the NCCK (and thus connected with the WCC), 
whereas Evangelical churches and NPCs are members of the EAK, the FEICCK or non-
affiliated with ecumenical associations. Mainline Protestant churches and Evangelicals and 
NPCs found themselves opposing each other politically during the movement towards 
multiparty democracy as the NCCK promoted multiparty democracy and many Evangelicals 
and NPCs supported President Moi and the one-party system. Theologically, both mainline 
Protestant churches and NPCs are involved in debate over the continuity and discontinuity 
between African Religion and culture and Christianity, though each group approaches the 
issues very differently. Evangelicals have tended to side more strongly on the position that 
there is a lack of continuity between Christianity and African Religion and culture. 
It must be noted that among ordinary Christians the situation is much messier. Most 
mainline Protestant and Evangelical churches have been affected by Charismatic
144
 
movements. A Pew Forum survey from 2012 found that 23% of Christians claim to be 
Charismatics.
145
 There is also the common phenomenon of a person being an Anglican, 
Presbyterian, Methodist, etc. in the village, and a Pentecostal (usually Neo-Pentecostal) in 
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Nairobi.
146
 Many members of mainline Protestant and Evangelical churches, therefore, share 
similar theological and political understandings with classic Pentecostals and Neo-
Pentecostals. Of course, mutual influence occurs within these various churches, so that the 
cultural-theological project of the mainline Protestant scholars influences Charismatics and 
evangelicals within mainline Protestant churches. For example, an evangelical Charismatic 
Presbyterian may participate in a church-sponsored initiation rite that is patterned on Kikuyu 
tradition, including circumcision, in a program called ROPES (rite of passage experiences).
147
 
In this study the term, Pentecostal, will be used to refer in general to all individuals, 
groups, and movements that share a Pentecostal spirituality (e.g. emphasis upon experiencing 
the Holy Spirit, works of the Spirit, and spiritual gifts).
148
 The term Pentecostal, or 
Pentecostalism, will also be used in reference to their theological outlook. The term, Neo-
Pentecostal, will be used more narrowly to describe independent African-initiated churches 
and individuals associated with them. The term, mainline Protestant, will often be shortened 
to mainline, and Evangelical will also be employed to designate individuals and churches as 
described above in this section. Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, Catholic views are 
underrepresented so that the thesis concerns principally the views of Kenyan Protestant 
Christianity.  
1.4 The Texts 
A brief word concerning the texts that are analysed in this thesis is in order. All of the 
texts have been written by Kenyans who profess Christian faith. Both the scholarly texts and 
the popular literature were written for the benefit of the church. While scholarly texts have 
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been prepared in the pursuit of knowledge, they have also been written with an eye on the 
Kenyan church and its faith. The purposes of the writing vary, but include furthering the 
understanding of Islam (and Christian relations with Muslims), developing theology, 
enhancing missiology, teaching, admonishing, encouraging, etc.  
Most of the scholarly texts were originally presented at seminars, conferences, 
colloquiums, symposiums, etc., and later included as chapters in books (or articles in journals) 
consisting of the proceedings. The texts were, therefore, prepared with a very particular 
audience in mind, usually Christians and academics. A few texts were first presented in the 
context of interreligious dialogue, thus before an audience of both Christians and Muslims. 
Though a few texts were initially written for publication (i.e. not to be presented at a 
meeting), they seem to have been produced with primarily a Christian readership in mind. 
These texts are written in a scholarly style (i.e. footnotes, bibliography, dispassionate, 
objective, etc.). 
Texts of popular Christian literature were found primarily in popular Christian 
magazines that were purchased in Nairobi, though a few popular-style books have been 
included in the analysis, also. Testimony is one of the more common literary genres found in 
the popular Christian literature. Testimonies are written to entertain, encourage and inspire 
readers. They most frequently take the form of conversion narratives, in which the principle 
protagonist must experience difficulties in life that are surmounted through conversion to faith 
in Jesus Christ and the power of the Holy Spirit. Another popular genre is the sermon, which 
is usually condensed for the purpose of publication in the magazine. The sermon may be 
either prophetic (i.e. offering warnings and/or blessings for the individual’s or the nation’s 
future) or didactic. An interview with a prominent Christian leader is another common genre 
that offers the magazine (and the Christian leader) an opportunity to comment on current 
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national issues. These are the principal genres – found in popular Christian magazines – that 
address topics dealing with Islam. 
All of the texts studied were published between 1998 (the bombing of the American 
Embassy in Nairobi by al-Qaeda) and 2010 (the ratification of the new constitution, which 
includes kadhi courts). These are significant dates in Christian-Muslim relations in Kenya; 
before the 1998 bombing the issue of Christian-Muslim relations was barely a subject of 
interest for Kenyan Christians. The ratification of the new constitution, which maintained the 
status quo concerning kadhi courts, also marks the end of a highly contested chapter of 
interreligious relations in Kenya. 
1.5 Literature Review 
A variety of approaches have been taken in researching Christian-Muslim relations in 
Africa. Some of the more common approaches have been: examinations of incidents between 
Christians and Muslims within a particular African nation, theoretical explanations for why 
conflict and tensions exist between African Christians and Muslims, discussions of shari’a 
and its implications for African Muslims and Christians, histories of Christian missions 
among African Muslims, and analysis of the influence of African Religion on interreligious 
relations between Christians and Muslims. These approaches intersect with each other at 
certain points so that researchers frequently use multiple approaches. The present thesis, while 
incorporating a few of these approaches, primarily focuses upon the last one – an analysis of 
the influence of African Religion on interreligious relations between Christians and Muslims. 
The essays in Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa,
149
 however, “concentrate on the 
notion of encounter”150… locating “Muslims and Christians within a common analytical 
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frame,”151 which Soares claims has not been a common approach. Ficquet, for example, looks 
at how Muslims and Christians are socially separated in Ethiopia by practices concerning 
meat (i.e. how the animal is slaughtered).
152
 Shankar explores the way in which boundaries 
between Christian and Muslim were constructed by colonialism through the story of an early 
Christian convert from Islam, who easily interacted across religious boundaries that British 
authorities deemed rigid and impassable.
153
 Chesworth compares competing strategies of 
proselytism in East Africa using the analytical framework of fundamentalism.
154
 Other essays 
discuss different aspects of history and shari’a in Muslim-Christian encounter in Nigeria,155 
examine increasing exclusivism among South African Muslims and Christians,
156
 refute the 
‘clash of civilisations’ paradigm for understanding interactions between Muslims and 
Christians in Africa,
157
 and study how Protestant missions in Egypt and Sudan fuelled 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
150
 Benjamin F. Soares, "Introduction: Muslim-Christian Encounter in Africa," in Muslim-Christian 
Encounter in Africa, ed. Benjamin F. Soares, (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 3. 
151
 Ibid., 13. 
152
 Éloi Ficquet, "Flesh Soaked in Faith: Meat as a Marker of the Boundary between Christians and 
Muslims in Ethiopia," in Muslim-Christian Encounter in Africa, ed. Benjamin F. Soares, (Leiden: 
Brill, 2006).  
153
 Shobana Shanker, "A Fifty-Year Muslim Conversion to Christianity: Religious Ambiguities and 
Colonial Boundaries in Northern Nigeria, c. 1906-1963," in Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa, 
ed. Benjamin F. Soares, (Leiden: Brill, 2006). 
154
 John A. Chesworth, "Fundamentalism and Outreach Strategies in East Africa: Christian 
Evangelism and Muslim Da'wa," in Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa, ed. Benjamin F. Soares, 
(Leiden: Brill, 2006). 
155
 Franz Kogelmann, "The "Sharia Factor" in Nigeria's 2003 Election," in Muslim-Christian 
Encounter in Africa, ed. Benjamin F. Soares, (Leiden: Brill, 2006). Philip Ostien, "An Opportunity 
Missed by Nigeria's Christians: The 1976-78 Sharia Debate Revisited," in Muslim-Christian 
Encounters in Africa, ed. Benjamin F. Soares, (Leiden: Brill, 2006). Patrick J. Ryan, "In My End is 
My Beginning: Muslim and Christian Traditions at Cross-Purposes in Contemporary Nigeria," in 
Muslim-Christian Encounter in Africa, ed. Benjamin F. Soares, (Leiden: Brill, 2006). 
156
 A. Rashied Omar, "From Resistance to Reconstruction: Challenges Facing Muslim-Christian 
Relations in Post-Apartheid South Africa," in Muslim-Christian Encounter in Africa, ed. Benjamin F. 
Soares, (Leiden: Brill, 2006). 
157
 Voll, "African Muslims and Christians in World History." 
34 
 
nationalist and Islamic movements.
158
 These essays contribute to the historical and social 
understanding of the encounter between Muslims and Christians in Africa. The current thesis, 
however, takes a different approach by analysing the perceptions that Kenyan Christians have 
of Islam in order to better understand the local religious and theological context as it 
influences interreligious relations. 
 Much of the writing resembles what might be called a country report, in which 
interactions and events involving Muslims and Christians within a specific country are 
examined. Magesa sees increased intolerance between Muslims and Christians in Tanzania 
due to outside influences.
159
 Rukyaa concurs with Magesa and offers improved religious 
instruction as a possible solution.
160
 Some Muslim voices are also heard: Mwakimako 
catalogues events as Christian bigotry against Muslims in Kenya,
161
 Ahmed describes 
Christian injustice towards Muslims in Ethiopia,
162
 and Bezabeh writes of historical Christian 
discrimination against Muslims in Ethiopia.
163
 However, Haron found that South African 
Christians have moved to a more pluralist and accepting perspective concerning Islam.
164
 
Omenyinma, in contrast to the Muslim viewpoints above, claims that Islam is a “threat to the 
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Christian identity of the Igbo people,”165 finding resurgent Islam to be at fault for 
interreligious violence in Nigeria. Kenya is added to the discussion as Aguilar,
166
 Mbagara,
167
 
and Nnyombi
168
 catalogue incidents between Muslims and Christians – often the same 
incidents are repeated in each essay.  
Frederiks cautions that when talking of Christian-Muslim relations in Africa, one must 
be cognizant of which Christians and Muslims one is talking about, as attitudes vary 
according to different groups.
169
 Ojo
170
 and Kalu
171
 add to this discussion by focusing on 
Pentecostal views of Islam in Nigeria, described as being primarily negative. These various 
reports contribute to the writing and understanding of the history of Christian-Muslim 
relations in Africa; however, the nature of this format lends itself to an emphasis on conflict, 
as situations of conflict provide more interest for readers and more material for writers. Bias 
also enters into the reporting, writers generally favouring their own religion.
172
 To avoid this 
type of emphasis on conflict, the current thesis analyses the writings of Kenyan Christians on 
Islam, rather than focusing on specific incidents. The notion of conflict also emerges in these 
various Christian writings, thus this literary method does not conceal the presence of conflict 
in the nation. 
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Closely related to the country report format – and sometimes in combination with it – 
are examinations of why interreligious conflict exists. Here authorial bias readily becomes 
apparent. Most commonly conflict is blamed on ‘fundamentalists’ within certain Christian 
and Muslim groups.
173
 Mbillah and Chesworth expand on this by understanding 
fundamentalism to be an influence external to Africa.
174
 Contrary to the fundamentalist 
account, Turaki looks to the colonial era for an explanation, claiming that the roots of current 
interreligious conflict in Nigeria are due to colonial policies that favoured Islam.
175
 In 
contrast, Bunza argues that the conflict in Nigeria is due to colonial favouritism towards 
Christians.
176
 Some writers find non-religious reasons for the conflicts and tensions. Kukah 
sees economic inequality, the failure of African states, and manipulation by political leaders 
as primary causes for interreligious strife.
177
 Similarly, Yusuf understands interreligious 
conflict to be connected to issues concerning scarce resources, power and identity.
178
  
Two essays offer analysis – explaining the reasons behind conflicts – by critiquing 
approaches to dialogue in Africa. Nkulu-N’Sengha looks at why true interreligious dialogue is 
absent from Africa, concluding that exclusivist theologies are prevalent.
179
 Also discussing 
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dialogue, but with more fruitful analysis and suggestions, Yahya
180
 finds that interreligious 
dialogues have frequently consisted of papers similar to the country report format above, in 
which atrocities committed by the other are enumerated. He proposes instead a practical 
dialogue of conciliation with working together as the goal. While theoretical explorations of 
reasons for conflict and improved dialogue are welcomed, it seems that authorial bias often 
plays an important a role in determining causes. The reasons found in the essays are 
frequently generic, simplistic, and essentialist. For example, religious groups with exclusivist 
theological positions that seem to demonstrate negative attitudes towards the religious other 
are said to have these positions and act in this way, because they are fundamentalists. And 
they are known to be fundamentalists because of their theological position and negative 
attitudes. This is not to deny that fundamentalism can provide an appropriate analytical 
framework;
181
 it can, however, become an easy answer to a more complex situation. By taking 
the popular literature (i.e. Pentecostalism, which is one of the fundamentalist groups) 
seriously, this thesis attempts to examine more deeply the reasons behind the perspectives of 
these Kenyan Christians, rather than relegating complexity to a simple (essentialised?) 
explanation. 
The implementation of shari’a in northern Nigeria is often discussed by Christians as 
a problem that will lead to Muslim domination.
182
 Oyelade provides more depth by looking at 
the history of shari’a in northern Nigeria and being more understanding of the Muslim 
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position,
183
 while introducing the concept of dhimmi status for Christians.
184
 Chesworth, at the 
same conference, more fully elaborates on the historical concept of dhimmi with a sense of 
urgency for the situation in Nigeria.
185
 Jarra suggests that introducing shari’a in Africa 
destroys previously harmonious relations.
186
 Speaking of Sudan, Mahmoud says the 
introduction of shari’a has led to Christians being represented as the “other par 
excellence”.187 Ludwig adds to the discussion by demonstrating how the shari’a debate is 
shaping religious identities in northern Nigeria.
188
 The Christian contributions to this 
discussion tend towards a certain fearfulness of Islam, not recognising the symbolic 
importance of shari’a for Muslims in Nigeria. In the present thesis the Christian contestation 
over the inclusion of kadhi courts in the Kenyan constitution is discussed. By carefully 
examining the history of kadhi courts in Kenya, the constitutional process, and the history of 
the kadhi courts debate before looking at the debate itself, a clearer picture should emerge of 
the issues involved and the Christian responses. 
Several studies have looked at the history of Christian missions among Muslims in 
Africa. Dubois and Soumille tell the story of mission-colonial relations and unsuccessful 
missions among Muslims – from the perspective of conversions – in Djibouti.189 Frederiks 
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adds to this story, looking at Gambia, where lack of success among Muslims led missionaries 
to engage with the freed slave population.
190
 Sanders also shows that the CMS (Church 
Missionary Society) in Kenya preferred to work among freed slaves, rather than among 
Muslims.
191
 Haron, examining the mission of the NGK (Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, or 
the Dutch Reformed Church) amongst Cape Muslims, also finds their attempts to be 
unsuccessful over centuries.
192
 Bunza looks at missions in northern Nigeria by SIM (formerly 
Sudan Interior Mission) from a Muslim perspective, contrasting the tolerance of Muslims 
with the intolerance of Christian missionaries.
193
 Shankar takes the discussion into greater 
depth in her examination of conversion among Muslim children (usually in leprosariums) by 
SIM in northern Nigeria and of the way in which these few conversions have established the 
relational frames that influence current Christian-Muslim tensions in the region.
194
 Cooper 
looks at SIM and a Pentecostal church in Niger in a rich study that examines religious and 
cultural similarities and differences among Hausa-speaking Muslims and Christians.
 195
 In a 
different vein Chesworth analyses Swahili-language tracts used by Muslims and Christians in 
East Africa, finding that polemics is the primary method used.
196
 Dovlo and Asante also 
examine current African missions among Muslims, showing that a few Christian ministries in 
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Ghana are actively pursuing Christian missions among Muslims with some success.
197
 In one 
chapter the current thesis has examined the attitudes towards and perceptions of Islam and 
Muslims that emerge from the writings of early missionaries to Kenya. Christian mission is 
not, however, a primary focus of this thesis. 
Several writers discuss the influence of the African cultural and/or religious heritage 
on Christian-Muslim relations. Typical of this approach, Mbillah claims that African 
religiosity is plural and tolerant, and the introduction of Islam and Christianity has introduced 
religious intolerance.
198
 Falola expresses similarly that African indigenous religions are 
tolerant, but now Christianity and Islam have brought increasing intolerance.
199
 Sanneh 
changes the discussion by associating tolerance with African traditions of hospitality. He then 
proposes that African Christianity and African Islam are potentially more tolerant than non-
African expressions of these religions.
200
 Ammah confirms Sanneh’s viewpoint from a 
Muslim perspective.
201
 Akinade takes a deeper look into the history of a particular practice – 
the use of Yoruba clergy for interreligious disputations by the CMS in Nigeria – that led to 
more conciliatory discussions and openness towards the other than had previously occurred 
when White missionaries led the disputations.
202
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The studies of Sarbah and Wijsen will be looked at more closely, as their approaches 
more closely approximate that of the current thesis. Sarbah examines Christian-Muslim 
relations among the Akan people of Ghana with an understanding that their traditional values 
aid them in having more harmonious interactions.
203
 He specifically outlines which traditional 
values are involved and how these values have produced a more harmonious and pluralist 
outlook. He uses the methodologies of the social sciences: questionnaires, interviews and 
participant observation with the belief that his cultural insider status permits him to have an 
“unbiased interpretation”.204 Despite his claims that Akan traditional religio-cultural values 
have produced harmonious relationships within religious diversity, the text contains many 
hints (e.g. prescriptive language, references to groups engaged in polemics, etc.) that 
interreligious relations may not be as harmonious as claimed.
205
 In contrast, the present thesis 
examines the writings of Kenyan Christians. This approach should provide broader access to 
the picture of Christian-Muslim relations in Kenya, than focus upon a particular group. I also 
cannot claim insider status, but an outsider viewpoint is not necessarily more biased than an 
insider one. It is probably most accurate to say that they are differently biased. Sarbah seems 
to idealise the influence of Akan values on interreligious relations, while the current thesis 
attempts to neither idealise, nor degrade, the influence of African religio-cultural values, but 
to understand them and their influence upon interreligious relations. 
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Wijsen is concerned with the development of a “theory of interreligious relations from 
an African perspective,”206 which he believes is lacking. He proposes that such an African 
theory must be both socio-scientific and theological, seen as compatible with the African 
empirical and pragmatic perspective. Wijsen also says that this theory “should be based on 
values from the African cultural heritage.”207 He does not attempt to explicate such a theory, 
but to search for one, to outline the necessary requirements for a theory, and to discover why 
such a theory has not been produced. His methodologies include interviews,
208
 reflection on 
his own African experience, and literature review of African theologians.
209
 In contrast to 
Wijsen, the current thesis has examined texts (written by Kenyan Christians) that address 
Islam, rather than searching for theoretical writings. From these texts and analysis of relevant 
history, this study has made an initial effort towards Wijsen’s proposal,210 by uncovering the 
working (yet undeveloped) theories of interreligious relations among Kenyan Christians. It 
shares Wijsen’s concerns that such a theory must accord with African cultural values. 
1.6 Outline of the Study 
The study is organised into three major parts. The first part provides context and 
examines the historical questions concerning Christian-Muslim relations in Kenya. The 
second part, which forms the core of the thesis, analyses the writings of Kenyan Christians 
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pertaining to Islam. The third part, taking into account the findings of the previous sections, 
discusses certain themes that arise. 
The first part begins with chapter two, which briefly looks at the religious 
demographics of Kenya. Population figures are contested as larger numbers can translate into 
more political power. Muslim and Christian use and invention of statistics is first critiqued, 
then the chapter attempts to provide an objective look at these demographics through four 
recent surveys carried out in the country. 
Chapter three looks at the African religious heritage as it influences Christianity in 
Kenya, especially in ways that it impacts upon relations between Christians and Muslims. 
Aspects of this religious heritage to be examined are the goals of African Religion, vital force, 
the existence of a spiritual world, the concept of evil, and community. A brief introduction to 
Kenyan Christianity is then provided. 
Chapter four discusses the historiography of Islam in Kenya. It does so by examining 
how Islam entered Kenya, and by looking at the way in which Islam in Kenya has been 
portrayed. While Islam is often depicted as Arab and foreign, it is shown that it has been 
indigenised into certain African communities. 
The fifth chapter scans the history of Christian-Muslim relations in Kenya from a 
Christian perspective. First, European Christian mission as it interacted with Muslims is 
examined. Then Kenyan Christian perceptions are studied through the issue of the inclusion 
of kadhi courts in the constitution. 
In part two, chapter six analyses the writings of Kenyan mainline Protestant scholars. 
Four scholars: Maina, Kubai, Wandera, and Mutei are specialists in Islamic studies. While an 
analysis of their writings form the bulk of this chapter, the writings of other prominent 
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Kenyan scholars as they touch upon Islam are also analysed. The writings of two Kenyan 
Evangelical scholars are also looked at. 
The seventh chapter analyses popular Christian writing that addresses Islam. Most of 
these writings are found in popular Pentecostal magazines. The articles consist of conversion 
narratives, extracts from sermons, and various church reports. While a systematic presentation 
of views on Islam cannot be found, these writings provide a window into the theological 
world of Kenyan Pentecostal Christianity and its perception of Islam. 
In part three, the eighth chapter examines themes dealing with Christian contestation 
with Muslims over public space. The themes, arising from the earlier chapters, are contesting 
mythical space, moral space and spiritual space. These themes are contested to establish 
legitimacy in roles as leaders in the socio-political project of nation-building. Kenyan 
mainline scholars and popular Kenyan Christian writing are found to represent different 
approaches to contesting these public spaces. 
Chapter nine looks at the emerging Christian theologies of religion in Kenya, 
especially as they relate to Islam. The theological questions that arise concern God, the goal 
of religion, community, and the human problem. Kenyan mainline scholars and popular 
writing differ on their answers, but they ask the same fundamental questions when evaluating 
Islam. 
Chapter ten concludes the study, providing a brief exposition and critique of the two 
theories of interreligious relations that may be discerned within the Christian literature that 
was analysed.
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PART ONE 
HISTORICAL AND RELIGIO-CULTURAL BACKGROUND 
CHAPTER 2 
MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN POPULATIONS IN KENYA 
A variety of numbers concerning the population statistics for Muslims and Christians 
in Kenya are thrown about, often without indicating how the particular figure was attained. 
These numbers sometimes become political issues, especially as the Muslim community 
frequently claims to be underrepresented politically. Despite the numerous unsubstantiated 
figures given by diverse sources concerning the Kenyan population by religious adherence, 
reliable surveys have been conducted that provide reasonably accurate data. These surveys 
will be looked at after Muslim and Christian sources have been examined and their 
methodologies critiqued. 
2.1 Population Statistics as Contested Spaces 
Similar to other African countries the “patron-client relationship is understood to be 
the principal mechanism regulating political and economic life”1 in Kenya.2 In this system3 
regional politicians are able to procure development funds for their political district to 
improve infrastructure, schools, health systems, etc., in exchange for loyalty to the central 
                                                          
1
 Leonardo R. Arriola, "Patronage and Political Stability in Africa," Comparative Political Studies 42, 
no. 10 (2009): 1343. 
2
 See especially Daniel Bourmaud, Histoire Politique du Kenya: Etat et Pouvoir Local., Hommes et 
Societes. (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1988). Bourmaud describes the patron-client relationship in detail, 
though his work does not include analysis of the past two decades. 
3
 The patron-client system most likely arises out of the form of government employed during the 
colonial era. See especially the thorough study of Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: 
Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1996). 
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ruler.
4
 The power relations between the centre and the periphery inherent within the patronage 
system are also partially managed through “ministerial appointments to the cabinet” of elites 
from different regions, ethnic groups and religions.
5
 As Young has demonstrated, democratic 
elections have altered the relationship between the patron and clients, who are now voters. He 
found through an examination of voting behaviour in Kenya that local elections are not 
decided by ideologies, nor by bribery, but by the amount of development services that an 
elected official can bring to the district.
6
  
Population statistics become important due to expectations that development funds be 
distributed somewhat equally among the various regions, ethnicities and religions.
7
 An ethnic 
or religious group, or a region, that can lay claim to a large population can demand more 
funding for improving schools, roads, etc. Expectations for proportionate representation in 
parliament and in the cabinet are also present.
8
 An ethnic group, for example, that claims to 
make up 20% of the total population would expect that roughly 20% of the MPs and cabinet 
ministers represent that ethnicity. In these ways population figures become part of the public 
political discourse. 
Population statistics in Kenya are contested primarily by the Muslim community, 
which forms a significant minority. Bakari and Yahya, for example, claim that the numbers 
are kept low for the Muslim population resulting in fewer resources for development in 
                                                          
4
 Bruce Berman, "Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism," 
African Affairs 97, no. 388 (1998): 335. 
5
 Arriola, "Patronage and Political Stability in Africa," 1347. 
6
 Daniel J. Young, Is Clientelism at Work in African Elections? A Study of Voting Behavior in Kenya 
and Zambia (Afrobarometer, 2009), 9. 
7
 Mohamed Bakari and Saad S. Yahya, "Introduction," in Islam in Kenya, ed. Mohamed Bakari and 
Saad S. Yahya, ([Nairobi]: Mewa Publications, 1995), x. Yakub O. Ibrahim, "The Muslim Population 
of Northern Kenya: an analysis of the last population censuses," in Islam in Kenya, ed. Mohamed 
Bakari and Saad Yahya, ([Nairobi]: Mewa Publications, 1995), 266. 
8
 Abdulkadir Hashim, "Muslim-State Relations in Kenya after the Referendum on the Constitution," 
AASR Bulletin 24, no. (2005). 
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Muslim-dominated areas.
9
 Ibrahim published an article disputing the census data concerning 
the Muslim population of northern Kenya, arguing that the population is much higher than 
reported.
10
 
2.2 Muslim Sources on Population Statistics 
Muslim sources for the Muslim population of Kenya often cite numbers without 
references, so that one is unable to determine how the particular statistics were attained. For 
example, The Cultural Atlas of Islam lists the Muslim population of Kenya as 26%;
11
 
however, there are neither explanations nor footnotes to indicate how this figure was reached. 
Mazrui makes a similar claim in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World,
12
 
with a similar lack of references or explanation. 
Muslim politicians also make claims about the Muslim population in Kenya. In 2002, 
while President Moi was in Mombasa showing appreciation to the Muslim community for 
rejecting a proposed new constitution, six Muslim MPs responded in a speech by asking the 
president to ensure that Muslims were properly represented in the new cabinet, reflecting their 
30% of the total population.
13
 Sharif Nasser, late KANU (Kenya African National Union) 
leader on the coast, claimed in 1995 that Muslims numbered eight million, or 32% of the 
population at the time.
14
 These claims are best understood as political statements. 
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 Bakari and Yahya, "Introduction," x. 
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 Ibrahim, "The Muslim Population of Northern Kenya," 260-268. 
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 Isma'īl R. Al Fārūqī and Lois Lamya' Al Fārūqī, The Cultural Atlas of Islam (New York: MacMillan 
Publishing Company, 1986), 267-270. 
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 The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
s.v. "Islam: Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa." He writes that the Muslim population is around six million, 
which represents a quarter of the total. 
13
 Hashim, "Muslim-State Relations in Kenya," 27. 
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 Cited in Arye Oded, "Islamic Extremism in Kenya: The Rise and Fall of Sheikh Khalid Balala," 
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Bakari in 1995 attempted to establish reliable percentages for the Muslim, Christian 
and African Religion populations of Kenya.
15
 It is appropriate to quote his reasoning in full. 
The Muslim statistic is supported by the data on population distribution 
in the country. Muslims predominate at the Coast and the North Eastern 
provinces of the Republic. The Coast has also one of the highest birthrates in 
the country and a low mortality rate. The Western Province of Kenya had 
Kenya's highest birthrate. It also happens to have a significant Muslim 
Population. Virtually all the major urban centres have a strong Muslim 
presence, as indicated by a proliferation of Muslim institutions there. Also, 
over half the Asian population of Kenya is made up of Muslims of Indian and 
Pakistani origins, though now fully Kenyan in nationality.
16
 
It should be noted that his conclusions are arrived at without the collection of, or 
apparent analysis of, any relevant data. He also makes some unsubstantiated assumptions, 
such as the significance of the Muslim population of Western Province,
17
 the statistical 
significance of the Asian population,
18
 and even the predominance of Islam in the Coast 
Province. The Coast Province includes large geographic areas, which have not been 
traditionally Muslim, such as Taita-Taveta and the Mijikenda territories. In addition, there has 
been a large influx of non-Muslim Kenyans to the coast for employment in the tourist and 
shipping industries, so that the most recent census data shows that the Muslim community 
forms about 1/3 of the population of Coast Province.
19
  
Bakari also claims that Christians make up 50-55% of the population,
20
 which is much 
lower than most reports. He says that many supposed Christians actually practice African 
Religion, which he claims forms 20% of the population, thus reducing the Christian 
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 Mohamed Bakari, "Muslims and the Politics of Change in Kenya," in Islam in Kenya, ed. Mohamed 
Bakari and Saad Yahya, (Nairobi: Mewa Publications, 1995), 234-235. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Kenya Census 2009: Detailed Census Analysis, ed. Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 
http://www.knbs.or.ke/detailed_population_results.php (accessed March 31, 2012). 
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 Bakari, "Muslims and the Politics of Change in Kenya," 234. 
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percentage appropriately. While recognising his creative approach, it can again be noted that 
no actual data has been analysed.  
Ibrahim analyses and compares the 1979 and 1989 census data for heavily Muslim 
populated areas in northern Kenya.
21
 While he also makes some assumptions about the 
percentage of the Muslim population in each district,
22
 he does identify what appear to be 
problems in the census data. For example, while there was a reported population increase of 
over 60,000 people, the Muslim population is said to have increased by only 10,000.
23
 He also 
claims that the birth rate is high in the region and the projected growth of the population was 
therefore high; however, some districts are even reported to have had a net loss of population. 
There were also problems in the ratio of men to women, which seem to indicate that serious 
problems occurred in either the collection or the reporting of the data.
24
  
He doesn’t propose corrected population statistics, as the purpose of his research and 
article was to raise questions about the accuracy of the 1989 census, which he says affects the 
amount of development resources that the region receives.
25
 His arguments concerning the 
census, however, seem valid, and Christian sources for citing the Muslim population are 
frequently based on the 1989 census.
26
 
2.3 Christian Sources on Population Statistics 
In general Kenyan Christians have not been concerned with making claims about 
numbers for the Muslim population. During the constitutional review process and the debate 
over the Kadhi courts, this issue did arise briefly. An association of churches, calling itself 
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‘The Kenyan Church,’ released a statement in 2005 opposing the inclusion of the Kadhi 
courts in the constitution, which included the phrase: “… Muslims who are only 6% of the 
population of Kenya.”27 The Kenyan Church also claimed that Christians form 80% of the 
population.
28
  
Barrett listed the Muslim population in 2005 at 7%, and the Christian population at 
80%.
29
 However, he acknowledges that the survey is based on estimates and approximations, 
as well as other data when it is available.
30
 It appears that the Kenya Demographic and Health 
Survey
31
 of 2003 may have been used.  
While it is difficult to find written material in which Christian writers address the 
statistics for the Muslim population, from personal conversations in Nairobi it seems apparent 
that most Christians assume one of these lower percentages, which differs significantly from 
Muslim estimations. According to the most recent Kenyan census of 2009, the population of 
Kenya now stands at around 38 million.
32
 Using the lower Muslim estimate of 25% would 
mean a population of 9.5 million Muslims, while using the higher estimate of 7%, as accepted 
by Christians, would yield a population of 2.7 million Muslims. This is a significant 
difference. As indicated above, the statistical difference has implications for development 
funding and political appointments, therefore making the statistical gap a politically important 
issue. 
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2.4 Non-Religious Sources on Population Statistics 
There have been four recent surveys carried out by governmental and non-
governmental organisations that have recorded religious demographics in Kenya.
33
 The 
figures concerning the Muslim population for each survey are not the same, and this can be 
explained by the difficulties that were experienced with their process in North Eastern 
Province. The specific difficulties will be examined shortly; however, it seems pertinent to 
clarify why this province poses such problems.  
The population of North Eastern Province, where ethnic Somalis predominate, is 
almost completely Muslim. According to the most recent census (which will be discussed 
later in this section), more than half of the Muslim population of Kenya consist of Somali 
people.
34
 Therefore, errors in the data from this province are significant when considering the 
percentage of the Muslim population of Kenya as a whole. The province is hot, arid, 
geographically large, sparsely populated and underdeveloped with few roads. Many of the 
Kenyan Somalis who live in the province continue to herd camels in a nomadic lifestyle. The 
borders between Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia are porous; ethnic Somalis of the same clans, 
sub-clans and families live on all sides of the borders, so that people regularly travel and live 
irrespective of national boundaries. More recently, the collapse of the Somali state and the 
ensuing violence has brought a large influx of ethnic Somalis from Somalia into North 
Eastern Province, making it difficult to know who are truly Kenyan citizens. All of these 
factors have made accurate data collection difficult in this province. 
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 While other population sources may be available, I have chosen to use only those that have openly 
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Two relatively small surveys were conducted in Kenya between 2008 and 2009: one 
by Afrobarometer
35
 and one by Pew Forum.
36
 These will be examined first. 
Afrobarometer
37
 is a research project that investigates political, social and economic 
attitudes in various African countries by conducting surveys every few years.
38
 From October 
through November 2008 interviews of a “nationally representative, random, stratified 
probability sample of 1104 Kenyans” 39 were conducted. Due to the relatively small 
population of North Eastern Province an oversample was used to provide a sample large 
enough to permit statistical comparisons with other regions. When national results were 
recorded, the results of North Eastern Province were “weighted to reflect their actual share of 
the national population.”40 This means that a larger number of inhabitants of North Eastern 
Province were interviewed compared to their actual statistical representation; however, an 
appropriate adjustment was made in calculating national averages. According to this survey 
Christians formed 85.9% of the population and Muslims 9.2%. 
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Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life
41
 conducted a major survey from December 
2008 through April 2009 throughout Sub-Saharan Africa to gauge religious attitudes of 
Christians and Muslims in this part of the world. Approximately 1500 Kenyans were 
interviewed in December 2008 for the project.
42
 A representative sample from all seven 
provinces of Kenya was sought “with a Muslim oversample.”43 For reporting national results 
the data was weighted to more accurately reflect true percentages. The survey found that 
Christians formed 88% of the population and Muslims 11%.
44
 An additional finding was that 
conversion from one of these major religions to the other is statistically negligible.
45
  
The important Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS) was undertaken in 
2003. The purpose of the survey was to provide health related information for the 
implementation of policy.
46
 More than 11,000 men and women
47
 in 10,000 households
48
 were 
interviewed throughout Kenya. This survey found that 7% of the population was Muslim and 
nearly 90% were Christian.
49
 However, the report acknowledges the “difficulties in travelling 
and interviewing in the sparsely populated and largely nomadic areas in the North Eastern 
Province,”50 which led to fewer interviews being conducted in the province than would be 
appropriate for proportionate representation. The reported results for the national level are not 
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weighted to reflect this;
51
 therefore, the figure of 7% for the Muslim population is 
undoubtedly low. The gathering of religious data was not the primary goal of KDHS. 
Kenya conducted a major census in 2009, which attempted to count the “complete 
population” by “where they spent the night” on August 24th to 25th 2009.52 More than 100,000 
field personnel were trained to canvas and take census data,
53
 which included questions 
concerning religious adherence.
54
 The North Eastern Province again provided some 
difficulties, as anomalies were discovered on examining the data from the province.
55
 Among 
the reported issues was a higher men-to-women ratio than is normally found in a population 
and an extremely large population increase without a corresponding increase in the number of 
households.
56
 The suspected cause of the anomalies is the increasing movement of ethnic 
Somalis from Somalia into Kenya.
57
 With the anomalies the 2009 census found the Muslim 
population to be over 4.3 million, or 11.1%,
58
 and Christians at 82.5%.
59
 
2.5 Conclusion 
While none of the surveys have been able to establish a definitive figure for the 
Muslim population in Kenya, one can say with a fair amount of confidence that Muslims form 
no more than 11%, and no less than 7%,
60
 of the population, being closer to 11%. The 
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Christian population seems to be around 80 to 85% of the total. We are not in a position to 
comment on the faithfulness or the commitment level of the adherents of either religion. The 
report by Pew Forum indicates that religious believers of both groups continue to participate 
to some extent in African Religion,
61
 whose population figures are listed at 635,352 (or 1.6% 
of the total population) according to the most recent census.
62
 
While it is more difficult to quantify, it is important to also note that Muslims and 
Christians in Kenya tend to be predominant in different ethnic groups; therefore, religious 
difference also implies ethnic difference. There are certain ethnicities that are exceptions to 
this rule, such as the Mijikenda groups near the coast.
63
 There also tend to be small Muslim 
populations within most of the major ethnicities, and one can occasionally find Muslims and 
Christians in the same family.
64
 However, when a Kenyan Christian imagines a Kenyan 
Muslim, she/he is likely to imagine someone of an ethnicity different from her/his own. 
Therefore, interreligious relations in Kenya often imply interethnic relations, including the 
dynamics implied in those. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE AFRICAN RELIGIOUS HERITAGE 
This chapter will briefly examine certain aspects of African Religion that impact upon 
African Christianity and its perceptions of Islam in Kenya. The features of African Religion 
that will be examined are its goals, vital force and power, the spiritual world, evil, and 
community (ubuntu).
1
  
3.1 The Goals of African Religion 
Mbiti describes the African religious view as “anthropocentric ontology,”2 by which 
he means that humanity is at the centre of African Religion. God and other spiritual beings are 
explained and understood according to how they relate with and affect the lives of human 
beings. In contrast to, for example, the Westminster Shorter Catechism, which says that 
“Man’s chief end is to glorify God, and to enjoy him forever,”3 the purpose of humanity in 
African Religion is to enhance communal and personal life; communication with the spiritual 
world and God comprises a significant part of this human and communal objective.
4
 Two 
religious goals that work together towards promoting this larger goal of enhancing communal 
and personal life will be examined. 
An important goal of African Religion is to maintain harmony within the “wholeness 
of creation,”5 which includes the human community, nature and the spiritual world. If the 
“delicate balance” between the vital forces inherent in each of these is not maintained, then 
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the “rhythm of the universe” may be affected,6 which may lead to natural disasters, such as 
famine, flood, earthquakes, epidemics, etc. The responsibility for sustaining this balance 
ultimately falls on human beings, who must obey taboos, follow prohibitions, and perform 
correct rituals.
7
 When there is disharmony within the created whole, as evidenced by illness, 
death or large-scale disaster,
8
 then balance must be restored through the performance of 
certain religious rites, sacrifices or offerings.
9
 Much of African Religion and traditional life is, 
therefore, oriented around living in “harmonious and peaceful existence”10 with the visible 
and the invisible (i.e. spiritual) worlds. 
The purpose of maintaining this “delicate balance”11 is to promote “the good life here 
and now, with health and prosperity, with success in life, happy and productive marriage, 
etc.”12 The concern is not with eschatological salvation, but with human life as lived in the 
world and in the present. As Harries notes among Christian Luo, the concept of salvation 
(warruok)
13
 is a spiritual immunity to “bad spiritual influence” that allows “saved” Luo to 
pursue modern forms of wealth without bringing about the disharmony that arrives from 
breaking traditional taboos.
14
 What can be noted from this example is that Christian salvation 
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has been de-eschatologised as it has been Africanised; it now performs the very human-
centred task of allowing people to become more prosperous in modern Kenya. As Magesa has 
said, “African Religion is human-centered, even overtly utilitarian.”15 
African Christianity retains the importance of traditional Christian theological 
concepts, such as salvation through Jesus Christ and an afterlife, while also taking human-
centred goals as central to a “holistic gospel of salvation.”16 Anderson writes, “African 
Pentecostals proclaim a pragmatic gospel seeking to address practical and contextual issues 
like sickness, poverty, unemployment, loneliness, evil spirits and sorcery.”17 A central aim of 
African Christianity is to promote abundant life, understood to include good health, relative 
prosperity, finding jobs, education, children, etc., which also corresponds to the aims of 
African Religion.
18
 Interruptions to abundant life on a large scale, such as drought, floods, 
epidemics, earthquakes, or other disasters, bring calls of repentance from African Christians, 
often using 2 Chronicles 7:14
19
 as a point of reference. An aspect of this repentance may 
consist of appeals for religious unity, which is seen as essential to gaining abundant life on a 
national level.
20
 
Both mainline and Neo-Pentecostal churches accept the practical goals of African 
Religion, yet differ on how these goals are to be achieved. Neo-Pentecostals address these 
different afflictions by claiming to overcome the spiritual and mystical causes through the 
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power of the Holy Spirit, bringing health, success and prosperity.
21
 Mainline scholars use the 
discourse of liberation, development and/or reconstruction to address problems.
22
 The 
problems are understood to be the result of unequal economic and power relationships, which 
include Western dominance in religious and cultural domains that inhibit the formation of true 
African identity.
23
 A solution seems to be that church leaders need more education in the 
social sciences and humanities in order to be more able to “facilitate” democratisation and 
better governance.
24
 
3.2 Vital Force and Power 
Writing of the Luo in Kenya, Harries remarks that in the West the betterment of the 
human condition (e.g. improved health, economy, etc.) is approached through the use of 
human reason, whereas in Africa people will generally “evoke spiritual powers or God” in 
order to solve these same problems.
25
 Ellis and ter Haar add that it is commonly understood in 
Africa that “all power has its ultimate origin in the spirit world.”26 While observers have 
written of this concept of power in Africa, it has also been interpreted theologically (and 
philosophically) as “vital force,”27 “an ontology based … on life” rather than being.28 
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As Tempels described it, vital force is at the centre of African thought and religion.
29
 
He wrote, “The supreme value is … vital force,”30 and “every effort of the Bantu31 is oriented 
towards the vital force.”32 Magesa adds that “all principles of morality and ethics” in Africa 
are found in the concept of vital force.
33
 Mbiti describes it as a “force, power or energy 
permeating the whole universe,”34 of which God is its ultimate source. Nkemnkia defines it as 
“the universal spirit of the living,”35 saying that “every living being is a vital force.”36 Vital 
force is what enables life. A person, throughout life, seeks to increase their vital force, to 
“augment and strengthen their nature,”37 to become more human. 
God, spirits, ancestors, humans, animals, plants and even inanimate objects possess
38
 
vital force. There is a hierarchical nature to this force, God having control over it and spirits 
and ancestors controlling it more fully than humans. Since God is the source of vital force, a 
union exists between living beings such that they may affect each other in ways that either 
further augment life or diminish it.
39
 Among people, there are those who have the ability to 
access and use vital force.
40
 Religious specialists,
41
 who know how to manipulate vital force, 
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can serve the community by promoting this force, enhancing life and inhibiting the bad. This 
ability can also be used for nefarious purposes, bringing curses upon members of the 
community.
42
 
Many Evangelical and Pentecostal scholars prefer to speak of the African “desire for 
power”43 rather than vital force when discussing African Religion. For example, Adeyemo 
writes that African Religion is based on the idea that “man’s life is power, not law,”44 and this 
power is a “fertility power.”45 Turaki writes, “Creation, nature and everything that exists is 
infused with this impersonal power,”46 which he says some have called vital force and others 
manna.
47
 It seems clear that the same concept is being discussed by scholars from different 
Christian traditions; however, Evangelical and Pentecostal scholars tend to evaluate it more 
negatively, using the word ‘power,’ while Catholic and mainline scholars refer to it as ‘vital 
force.’ According to Anderson there may be room for a positive evaluation of vital force by 
Pentecostals. He compares the similarity in the African concept of power inherent in vital 
force with the New Testament concept of dunamis)48 that Pentecostals seek in their 
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relationship with the Holy Spirit.
49
 Through their relationship with the Holy Spirit, Kenyan 
Pentecostals seek to augment their vital force in order to succeed in the face of obstacles. 
Whether it is called vital force or power, African Christians in pursuit of abundant life 
look towards God as the source of this reality. Individual and community life is enhanced 
through relationship with and obedience to God. Vital force also provides a means for the 
evaluation of religions. Religions can be evaluated by examining their ability to enhance life 
and promote abundant life, since God is the unique source of vital force (or true, and good, 
power). If a religion advances abundant life, then it follows that God must favour it. 
3.3 The Spiritual World 
Within African Religion the spiritual world is well-populated, powerful and influential 
on human life. There are generally a supreme god, subordinate deities, spirits (some are 
created as spirits, others are forgotten ancestors) and ancestors.
50
 These spiritual beings either 
have more access to vital force, or they know better how to use it to influence the physical 
human world than living human beings, which makes them more powerful than people.
51
 
Their ability to influence human life is so great that fear of the ancestors or spirits is not 
uncommon,
52
 as their effects could possibly diminish life, instead of enhancing it.  
It is in this sense that Turaki says, “The traditional African conception of reality is 
deeply rooted in the law of the spirit. Reality does not consist in what is apparent, but in what 
lies behind and guides life’s phenomena.”53 Because god, divinities, spirits and ancestors have 
the ability to impact the lives of the living for good or for bad, reality truly exists in the 
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spiritual world. What happens in the physical world has been shaped, if not determined, by 
the spiritual world.
54
 For example, contemporary politicians seek out religious specialists 
(waganga, or even wachawi, Kiswahili) whose source is the spiritual world,
55
 to gain access 
to political power. As Madathil writes of the Gusii in Kenya, “People are deeply aware of the 
spirit world, and this awareness affects their outlook and experiences in life for better and for 
worse.”56 
One result of African ties to ancestors is the sacred character of land,
57
 which 
“mystically connects people with their past”58 because their ancestors are buried in the land. 
Myths connect the land, the community and God at the very origin.
59
 In current religio-
political discourse reference to the land may be used to designate ethnic territory or national 
borders, often with similar mystically oriented meanings.
60
 African Pentecostals frequently 
use the metaphor, “redeeming the land,” to communicate political messages,61 while retaining 
some of these mystical inferences. 
Many African societies believe in the presence of spiritual beings, subordinate to the 
supreme god in roles similar to assistants.
62
 In the literature on African Religion they are 
generally designated as divinities. Often the divinities are understood to oversee certain 
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functions under the direction of the supreme deity, such as war,
63
 or certain natural 
phenomena
64
 (e.g. thunder, lightning, earthquakes).
65
 According to Magesa there is a 
“consensus among Africans … that there is only one God,”66 who is the Creator, 
demonstrating that African Religion upholds the “principle of unity.”67 Idowu used the term 
‘diffused monotheism’ to describe this belief system in which a strong belief in a single 
supreme God is combined with a belief in subordinate divinities, who act under the authority 
of the supreme God.
68
 In chapter nine it will be seen how this belief in a diffused monotheism 
comes into play for some Christians as they attempt to understand Islam in Kenya.  
McIntosh proposes a way of understanding African religiosity in her study of the 
Giriama in Malindi
69
 that merits brief mention at this point. She remarks that in interacting in 
a religiously plural environment,
70
 the Giriama “acknowledge the mystical potency (the 
ontological reality) of more than one set of religious or cosmological forces,”71 which she 
calls “polyontologism.” A person, for example, may use the symbols, the texts, the practices, 
etc. of Islam, Christianity and African Religion to mystically affect positive change in their 
life. Or put more simply, a person may participate fully in any and/or all religions in order to 
benefit from the mystical powers of each. Though McIntosh does not use the vocabulary of 
vital force, it could be said that the agency of any religion may be accessed to enhance one’s 
vital force. She contrasts the polyontologism of African religiosity with the “mono-
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ontologism” of Christianity and Islam, which draws on one cosmological model, which is 
perceived to be correct, to explain the work of mystical powers
72
 (e.g. healing only comes 
from God through Christianity). Kenyan Christian leaders, almost unanimously, are 
concerned that their parishioners may consult religious specialists from another religion. 
While ordinary Christians would be most likely to consult religious specialists from their own 
ethnic religious tradition, demonstrations of economic or spiritual power (augmented vital 
force) in the Islamic community may also prove enticing to Christians seeking blessing. 
Leaders, therefore, devise means (such as, disparaging the other religion as demonic) to 
discourage members from seeking blessing from these other sources. These means will be 
dealt with more fully in chapter nine. It appears that these Christian leaders, and parishioners, 
are working from a polyontological model. 
Kalu writes that the “Pentecostal accepts the African worldview as real and valid,”73 
but seeks a solution to problems through the Holy Spirit and Pentecostal rituals,
74
 rather than 
through traditional religious methods. Meyer writes that Pentecostals believe that there is a 
“worldwide conspiracy” involving every person in the global struggle against Satan that must 
be fought on the local level.
75
 The ancestors, divinities and spirits of African Religion have 
become evil spirits and demons in Pentecostal thinking,
76
 sometimes adding a henotheistic 
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outlook into the mixture.
77
 Pentecostals find African type solutions by finding greater power 
(vital force) in the Holy Spirit that allows them to overcome evil spirits, who are the 
theologically new in Africa. 
3.4  Evil 
Scholars of African Religion generally view human beings as being at the root of 
evil,
78
 though Mbiti suggests that spirits may at times be the “origin of evil.”79 However, 
though humans normally are the origin of evil (that is they desire harm on others), it becomes 
active and effective through the agency of the spiritual world. Witchcraft is the English word 
(uchawi in Swahili) used to describe the interaction between human and spirit that produces 
evil and harms another person. Normally, it is used to exact revenge or gain wealth and 
advantage over rivals. Magesa writes, “In the African mentality, everything wrong or bad in 
society and in the world, and, most particularly, various afflictions, originate in witchcraft.”80 
Since the agency of evil is in the spirit world, it is unpredictable; therefore, people make much 
effort to deter the effects of witchcraft, such as following taboos,
81
 properly observing 
funerals,
82
 praying,
83
 etc. Harries, perhaps overly pessimistically, says that good does not 
exist in itself, but is only understood as the absence of bad.
84
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To be aware of the possibly nefarious influence of the spiritual world on a daily basis 
seems to be part of ordinary life for many Africans.
85
 Enhancing one’s life and the life of 
one’s community entails a spiritual battle.86 Yet there is no Satan figure, as evil originates in 
the jealousies, vengeances and ambitions of people. The battle is fought against spirits and 
against those who manipulate the spirits through witchcraft. 
The entrance of Christianity into Africa introduced cosmic dualism,
87
 as Satan is 
depicted as the author of evil.
88
 Kenyan Pentecostals frequently emphasize spiritual warfare in 
which Christians through the power of the Holy Spirit are involved in a spiritual battle against 
evil spirits. Catholic theologian, Wachege, has also written on the demonic,
89
 and the 
“Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Devil Worship established by the Kenyan 
government in 1994” was comprised primarily of leaders from mainline churches.90 The idea 
of a spiritual battle between agents of God and agents of Satan can, therefore, be seen to be 
present in all branches of Kenyan Christianity. Witchcraft is now understood, by Christians, 
to be the work of the Devil, and those accused of practicing it are viewed as Devil 
worshippers. The radical transfer of the locus of evil from humanity to spirits has been one of 
the most significant transformations of African religious understanding emerging from the 
Christian missionary movement. The spiritual world – once neutral, yet potentially dangerous 
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– is now primarily evil and dangerous, the exceptions being specifically Christian spirits (e.g. 
angels and the Holy Spirit). 
3.5 Community and Ubuntu 
Mbiti stresses the community-oriented nature of African Religion and African society 
with his well-known turn on Descartes’ famous axiom, “I am, because we are; and since we 
are, therefore I am.”91 He further adds that African Religion is:  
not primarily for the individual, but for his community of which he is part. … 
To be human is to belong to the whole community, and to do so involves 
participating in the beliefs, ceremonies, rituals and festivals of that community. 
A person cannot detach himself from the religion of his group, for to do so is 
to be severed from his roots, his foundation, his context of security, his 
kinships and the entire groups of those who make him aware of his own 
existence.
92
 
The community, consisting of a person’s kin, ancestors and progeny, provides 
security, identity and life to an individual. Within the community a person may enhance their 
own vital force, and the vital force of the community is also enhanced through a person’s 
participation in the community. Du Toit describes it as a “communion of persons,” 
emphasising “solidarity” over “activity.”93 Forster, using Buber’s concept of I-Thou, remarks 
that community in Africa “is focused on the hyphen, the between,”94 rather than on either the 
I, or the Thou.  
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The concept of personhood that forms and is formed in relation to this community has 
been called, ubuntu, which is a Southern African word
95
 that can be best explained through 
the “Zulu maxim ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu,’ i.e. ‘a person is a person through other 
persons.’”96 Gathogo remarks that the Kikuyu of Kenya have a similar saying, “Mundu ni 
mundu ni undu wa andu, that is, ‘a human being is a person because of the other people.’”97 
In Kenya a Swahili translation of ubuntu would be utu. Others have affirmed that this concept 
of personhood
98
 exists throughout Africa.
99
 Gathogo says that ubuntu is what unites the 
various expressions of African Religion as one.
100
 
Ubuntu expresses an ideal, which includes hospitality, generosity,
101
 compassion for 
others,
102
 human dignity,
103
 vulnerability, openness to the other,
104
 and “the fundamental unity 
of the spiritual and material worlds.”105 It is a personhood of becoming, rather than being, 
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developed through interaction with others in community.
106
 A person who lives according to 
ubuntu will become an “ancestor worthy of respect,”107 to be venerated by the living.  
This experience of community and ubuntu also entails a certain degree of conformity 
to the traditions, of which the ancestors are especially understood to be guardians.
108
 Ubuntu 
means that consensus is sought, and failure to conform can result in punishment.
109
 A person 
who defies the community’s religious ways may find themselves punished by the entire 
society for fear that the violation may bring danger upon the whole community in the form of 
epidemics, or other natural disasters.
110
 The rights of the individual can be sacrificed to the 
desires of the community as a whole.
111
 
Gathogo also asks why in Africa, if ubuntu is the principle human philosophy, are 
there so “many acts of unyama (animal-like behaviour in Kiswahili)?”112 He answers that 
ubuntu is often understood to include only people who are “members of the blood relatives, 
tribemates, clanmates, political camp mates, and so forth,”113 which can “exclude the so-
called minority.”114 In other words, personhood (utu, Kiswahili) is not always fully extended 
beyond certain in-groups, allowing the outsider to be treated as less than fully human (mtu, 
Kiswahili). 
Kenyan churches strive to reproduce this African community (sometimes in 
competition with traditional forms of community) with varying degrees of success. Resources 
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are shared among members, and a sense of belonging develops. As will be seen, the sense of 
community has a significant effect on how Kenyan Christians perceive Muslims.
115
 
Both mainline churches and NPCs
116
 emphasize the importance of community in 
Africa, though again with some notable differences. Urban NPCs frequently offer a place for 
migrants from rural areas to form new community.
117
 Additionally, NPCs see themselves as 
“communities of resistance” that are redeeming “the land from hostile occupiers,” referring to 
spirits that have been allowed to dominate.
118
 In this way they stand against the prevailing 
society, which may be perceived to be in league with the dominating spirits. For mainline 
Kenyan scholars the church is recognised as a “utopian community” with a realisation that its 
members “cannot avoid involvement in the political, economic and moral challenges facing 
their communities.”119 They do not stand against the prevailing society, but they must be a 
part of it, providing examples of leadership, integrity, etc.
120
 Community is understood more 
broadly than being only that of the church; there is a desire to be inclusive in the project of 
reconstructing society.
121
 
To briefly summarise, African concepts of community and ubuntu include both a 
strong urge to include others through hospitality, generosity, openness, compassion, etc. and a 
sense of conformity within the group that makes full inclusion of those who are truly different 
difficult.  
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3.6 Kenyan Christianity 
Though some people may have the idea that African Religion is “moving toward 
extinction,”122 most contemporary scholars of Africa would “argue that African conceptions 
of God, the world and morality continue to penetrate Christianity in Africa.”123 This is also 
true for Islam in Africa.
124
  
The two streams of Kenyan Christianity involved in this study deal with their African 
religious heritage in different ways. The mainline scholars address African Religion 
theologically through “their preoccupation with African culture in general.”125 Their 
theological project is to find authentically African expressions of Christian faith in continuity 
with the African religious and cultural heritage, as revealed in the titles of publications, such 
as Intercultural Hermeneutics in Africa,
126
 Interpreting the New Testament in Africa
127
 and 
Jesus Christ Our Mũthamaki.128 As Bediako argues, “modern African Theology emerges as a 
theology of African Christian identity.”129 This identity is found in the interstices between the 
African religious and cultural heritage and historical Christian faith.  
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Bediako, evaluating Byang Kato’s theology,130 writes that his “negative estimation” of 
African Religion was due to his “theological presuppositions,” principally a desire to 
“preserving the integrity of ‘Biblical Christianity.’”131 A result of this theological 
presupposition was a negative evaluation of any non-Christian religion. Kenyan Pentecostals 
and Evangelicals, similarly committed to theological presuppositions concerning ‘Biblical 
Christianity,’ share some of Kato’s negative evaluation of African Religion.132 Pentecostals 
tend to reject African Religion theologically, while accepting its world view,
133
 similar to 
what was described in the previous sections. This theological rejection frequently comes in 
the form of declaring the spirits and religious rites of the former dispensation, ‘demonic.’134 
What is often less noted by researchers is that African Pentecostals view Christian faith as a 
means towards entrance into the modern world and economy;
135
 African Religion is then 
perceived as backwards (i.e. unable to accommodate to modern ways).
136
 They often 
understand mainline scholarly interest in African religion and culture as leading Africa in the 
wrong direction, away from modern socio-economic and technological advancement. 
Very little has been written concerning African Evangelicals and their understanding 
and relationship with African culture and values. What is clear is that African Evangelicals 
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prioritise scripture over culture.
137
 They express interest in creatively adapting African 
traditions into Christian faith (using expressions such as, contextualising the Gospel or 
integrating culture and faith), while cautioning against “Christo-paganism.”138 The fear of 
syncretism and Christo-paganism generally means that there is more vigilance against than 
acceptance of the African religious heritage. 
Scholars of African Christianity have tended to view African Pentecostalism as 
American influenced and non-African in origin and nature.
139
 However, both Kalu and 
Anderson have argued that African Pentecostalism is truly indigenous;
140
 Anderson 
considering it to be a form of African Initiated Christianity.
141
 An example of a Pentecostal 
understanding of its relationship with Africa will be shown. 
A handbill
142
 for a Pentecostal-led event in Uhuru Park, Nairobi in 2007 shows three 
pictures of Africa. The theme revolves around the theological notion of fall and redemption. 
Africa is depicted before the fall, after the fall and after redemption. The fall is related 
principally to colonialism, while the depictions of Africa before the fall and after redemption 
are nearly identical. These depictions emphasize the existence of empires, civilisation, 
technology, unity, wealth, wisdom and freedom. The Christian redemption of Africa from a 
Pentecostal perspective is depicted as a restoration of (an idealised and ancient) pre-colonial 
                                                          
137
 Kwame Bediako, "Scripture as the Interpreter of Culture and Tradition," in African Bible 
Commentary, ed. Tokunboh Adeyemo, (Nairobi: Word Alive Publishers, 2006). Bediako, 
interestingly, bridges the mainline and the Evangelical traditions in Africa. 
138
 Lawrence Lasisi, "Syncretism," in African Bible Commentary, ed. Tokunboh Adeyemo, (Nairobi: 
Word Alive Publishers, 2006). 
139
 Steve Brouwer, Paul Gifford, and Susan D. Rose, Exploring the American Gospel: Global 
Christian Fundamentalism (London: Routledge, 1996), see especially chapter 8. Also, Mugambi, 
"Evangelistic and Charismatic Initiatives in Post-Colonial Africa." 
140
 Kalu, African Pentecostalism. Anderson, African Reformation. 
141
 While I find Anderson’s argument convincing, most African Pentecostals refuse this designation 
(as Anderson acknowledges). 
142
 (Handbill), "The Re-Birth of the Black Race: Prophetic History and Destiny,"  (Nairobi: 
Continental Prayers of Restoration, 2007). A copy of this handbill is found in Appendix One. I 
acquired the handbill at Dove Fellowship in Nairobi in 2007. 
75 
 
Africa. Kenyan neo-Pentecostals use Afrocentric symbolism – as do mainline scholars – but 
within a Pentecostal framework. 
The African religious heritage, as found in Kenya, has significantly influenced Kenyan 
Christianity of all stripes. The manner in which Kenyan Christians interpret and perceive 
Islam depends much less upon the history of Christian-Muslim encounters, or upon Western-
derived theologies of religion, than upon the interaction between the African religious 
heritage and local Christianity. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
HISTORIOGRAPHY OF ISLAM IN KENYA 
This chapter examines the history of how Islam came to be present in Kenya and 
factors that have contributed to its expansion and growth throughout the country. As this 
study is primarily concerned with Christian perceptions of Islam, the chapter will concentrate 
on those features of the history of Islam in Kenya that have the most influence on these 
perceptions. 
4.1 Islam as Foreign to Kenya 
Khalid says “the Kenyan who has gone through a European education has been trained 
to equate Muslims with non-Africans.”1 Current popular and academic writing about Islam in 
Kenya tends to portray Islam and Muslims as somehow foreign to Kenya. The history 
textbooks used in Kenyan secondary schools often refer to the Swahili people as Swahili-
Arabs,
2
 where the addition of the word, Arab, communicates the ‘foreign’ nature of these 
indigenous people. These history textbooks also stress the Arab and Persian origins of the 
Swahili people, language and culture,
3
 which, as will be seen, does not conform to the more 
recent postcolonial scholarship of the past few decades.  
Other Muslim peoples also receive labels, indicating their ‘foreignness.’ Non-Muslim 
Kenyans frequently refer to Somali people as ‘Somalis’ rather than as ‘Kenyans,’ while not 
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necessarily doing the same for other ethnic groups.
4
 Even when challenged that two million 
Somali people are native to Kenya, people are often reluctant to identify them as ‘Kenyans.’ 
In 2007 several people of Somali ethnic origin were deported ‘back’ to Somalia. The 
government claims that they were Somali nationals, not Kenyans, and that they were linked to 
terrorism in some fashion. Human rights groups and Muslim groups have protested, saying 
that Kenyan citizens were deported. While neither claim can be verified, given prevalent 
attitudes towards Somali people, it is very possible that Kenyan citizens of Somali ethnicity 
may have been deported along with those of Somali nationality. A person of Somali ethnicity 
is often considered to be a foreigner until proven otherwise.
 5
  
The Nubian community has lived in Kenya since the early days of colonialism, 
approximately 100 years, yet they are often called ‘Sudanese.’6 They also have difficulty 
receiving the full rights of citizenship. The Boraana people are sometimes considered to be 
from Ethiopia. And finally Muslims of Asian background are obviously foreign, considering 
that they are Asian, though their families may have lived in the territory of what is now Kenya 
since the late 19
th
 century, or possibly from as early as the 14
th
 to 15
th
 century. Several of the 
most important Muslim groups are thus perceived to be at least partially foreign.
7
 
4.2 Origins of Islam in Kenya 
There have been four principle movements of Islam into Kenya. Each of these four 
movements will be examined historically with special concern for how its history influences 
current Christian perceptions of Islam. These four movements of Islam into Kenya can be 
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associated with four different ethnic/national groups: the emergence of the Swahili people 
along the East Africa coast, the presence of the Somali people in north-eastern Kenya, the 
immigration of south Asians, and the settlement of colonial-era African soldiers, often called 
Nubians, in Kenyan urban areas. The size, the effect and the influence on Islam in Kenya of 
each Muslim group vary considerably. The state of present research and available materials 
concerning each of the movements is rather uneven. Some groups have received an 
exceptional amount of attention, while others have received almost none. For example, Spear 
found 270 books and journal articles dedicated to the questions of Swahili origins and history 
written between the years 1985 and 2000.
8
 The amount of research dedicated towards Somali 
origins is much more modest and the presence of Asian Muslims and ‘Nubians’ in Kenya 
have only produced a few articles in academic journals.  
4.3 The Swahili People of the Coast and Islam 
Islam first arrived in the territory now called Kenya through the interaction of Arab 
traders with a coastal African community, commonly referred to as the Swahili. Horton and 
Middleton have noted that it is only within relatively recent history that some people along 
the coast of East Africa have begun calling themselves, ‘Swahili.’9 Eastman also indicates that 
the Kiswahili-speaking
10
 Muslims of the Kenyan coast have only taken on Swahili ethnic 
identity since independence, as a form of opposition to the national identity of being 
Kenyan.
11
 This designation was first used by others (Arab traders in the 12
th
 to 13
th
 centuries) 
to refer to the African people who lived in the coastal trading towns. The word comes from 
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the Arabic, sawahil, for lands of the coast or ports of trade. Though first called ‘Swahili’ by 
Arab traders more than 800 years ago, the label only became popularly used during the British 
colonial era.
12
 Ironically, it was freed slaves, liberated from Arab or Swahili owners, who first 
identified themselves as Waswahili (Swahili people), since most ‘true Swahili’ identified with 
their particular ‘tribe’ or town, such as Watangana, Wamvita (Mombasa), Wapate, etc.13 
Of particular interest for this study is the African origin of these Muslim coastal 
peoples. While the vast majority of current scholars affirm the African origin of the Swahili 
people, culture and language, the more popular image is that of a mixed ‘race’ of Arab and 
Bantu people. In the current Kenyan secondary school curriculum students in Form One learn 
that “The Swahili were a product of intermarriages between the coastal Bantu and the 
Arabs.”14 This seemingly erroneous point of view comes from two sources. One, the Swahili 
people themselves have variously claimed Shirazi, Arab or African origins for themselves.
15
 
Socio-economic and political circumstances have often determined these various claims of 
origin. Two, the writings of colonial era researchers generally attributed the advent of Swahili 
civilisation to Persians and Arabs, as shown by the first line of Trimingham’s Islam in East 
Africa, “The history of Islam in East Africa belongs more to the history of the Indian Ocean 
than to African history.”16 Again this viewpoint is reflected in current Kenyan school books, 
“Arabian and Islamic architecture also took root along the coast. The designs of buildings 
were Arabic and Persian.”17 However, current scholarship, while acknowledging outside 
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influence, affirms the indigenous character of the architecture,
18
 and other cultural features, in 
these coastal towns. 
Because of the prevalence of the view that Swahili people, language and culture are an 
amalgamation of Persian and/or Arab people and African people, often with the foreign 
element as both initiating and predominant, the relevant aspects of the history of these coastal 
African people will be examined in some detail. Standard works such as the Cambridge 
History of Africa
19
 and Trimingham’s Islam in East Africa promote this dual origin 
perspective. This perspective is also found in school books
20
, tourist information,
21
 
photographic coffee table books, etc. 
4.3.1 Swahili Origins 
A brief history of the origin and development of Swahili society on the coast of Kenya 
will be outlined. Four recent studies will be examined. Nurse and Spear,
22
 a linguist and an 
historian, utilise linguistic evidence to establish a time frame on origins and outside 
influences, as well as analysing historical texts and traditions. Pouwels,
23
 a historian 
specialising in East African history, is more critical of linguistic, archaeological and 
anthropological approaches that he believes do not take the historical process and evidence 
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seriously enough. Horton and Middleton,
24
 an archaeologist and an anthropologist, examine 
the issues first from the perspective of Horton’s archaeological research at a few sites along 
the coast, especially at Shanga, and subject the issues raised to a thorough examination using 
the skills of an anthropologist. Kusimba,
25
 a Kenyan archaeologist, provides probably the best 
overall history of the Swahili people by bringing together the methods used by each of the 
above researchers. There is a general consensus among these writers concerning the origin 
and development of Swahili society, though some minor differences in dates and on the role 
of Persian traders on the coast exist. 
Horton and Middleton say that by the middle of the first millennium Bantu-speaking 
people were living in villages along the Kenyan coast, practicing small-scale farming, fishing 
and hunting.
26
 They probably traded with sea-faring Arabs, Indians and Persians on an 
irregular basis, which over time evolved into more permanent commercial relationships. 
Chami and Msemwa, having done recent archaeological research on the northern Tanzanian 
and southern Kenyan coast, assert that “the communities of this region were playing a major 
role in transoceanic trade” already in the 6th century.27 By the 8th century at the latest, some of 
these farming/fishing villages had transformed into merchant towns, as shown by 
archaeological evidence (e.g. the presence of mosques, the minting of local coins
28
 and a 
common tradition of local pottery).
29
 Kiswahili probably emerged as its own distinct language 
around this time,
30
 giving birth to a new civilisation.  
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Both trade and Islam were important factors in the formation of Swahili society. This 
civilisation quickly expanded southward, as evidenced by the Swahili town of Kilwa, a 
thousand kilometres south of Lamu, which dates from the 9
th
 century.
31
 Commercial 
relationships with Arab, and possibly Persian, traders led to the gradual conversion of these 
coastal Kiswahili-speaking peoples to Islam. Following Robin Horton’s theory on 
conversion,
32
 Nurse and Spear write, “Each village was a microcosm, a miniuniverse, with its 
own specific spirits associated with it. To move to another village was to enter another 
world.”33 On the other hand, town people “lived in a macrocosmic world inhabited by peoples 
speaking different languages, having different ancestors, and working in different 
occupations. In this world the beliefs of the microcosm were too parochial; what was needed 
were beliefs that were universal. And so townspeople began to adopt Islam.”34 
Trade along the coast depended upon the monsoon seasons of the Indian Ocean. From 
November to February the winds enabled ships to sail towards the East African coast, whereas 
a change in wind patterns allowed ships to sail north from April to May, or again from August 
to September.
35
 Muslim Arab merchants could be forced to stay a few months in these 
merchant towns waiting for favourable winds to take them back home. Colonial-era writers, 
therefore, concluded that Arab traders had built the trading centres and married local women, 
leading to the emergence of the ‘mixed race’ Swahili people.36 Non-Western scholars see, 
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probably correctly, an element of ethnocentrism in the conclusion that an African people 
could not have founded the Swahili cities.
37
 While current scholars disagree with colonial-era 
scholars on this theory of origins, these extended stays by Muslim merchants increased the 
amount and type of interactions between them and the local Bantu Swahili people. 
Intermarriages cannot be discounted, but they were not responsible for the formation of the 
Swahili people. Wooden mosques were first constructed, such as the one Horton excavated in 
Shanga,
38
 probably for use by these Muslim visitors.  
Over the next few centuries trade increased and a wealthy merchant elite developed 
among the people on the coast. After 1000 CE mosques were being constructed of stone or 
coral blocks in the larger towns.
39
 The elite also began to build large stone/coral houses for 
themselves. They were most likely the first to convert to Islam; their conversions facilitating 
trading relationships with Arab Muslim merchants,
40
 which does not exclude religious and 
cultural reasons for conversions. Immigrants claiming to be shurafa (descendants of the 
prophet endued with special blessing) from Yemen began to arrive in Swahili trading towns in 
small numbers in the 13
th
 century.
41
 It was at this time that Swahili Islam became Sunni of the 
Shafi’i school.42  
It would be a mistake, however, to understand Swahili society to consist only, or even 
primarily, of urban trading centres. Kusimba reports that of over 400 Swahili settlements from 
the period 1000 – 1500 CE surveyed by archaeologists, only around 20 could be classified as 
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urban with coral block houses and mosques.
43
 The majority of the people lived in smaller 
villages, practicing such occupations as artisanship, fishing and farming. Their conversion to 
Islam was also much more gradual, and perhaps less orthodox. Beginning in the 12
th 
century, 
and continuing up to perhaps the 15
th
 century, conversions occurred on a larger scale and the 
Swahili people as a whole became Muslim.
44
  
Pouwels calls the period, from the 12
th
 to the 15
th
 century, the ‘Golden Age’ of 
indigenous Swahili society.
45
 Nurse and Spear note that only a few loan words from Arabic, 
primarily religious and commercial vocabulary, had entered Kiswahili in these early 
centuries,
46
 indicating the African indigenous nature of this coastal civilisation during its 
golden age. The urban elite distinguished themselves from others, both Arab and African, 
referring to themselves as Waungwana, which could be translated as ‘civilised,’ entailing 
knowledge of local African Swahili culture and etiquette.
47
 Both of these would change as 
Arab influence increased on the coast in the following centuries. 
4.3.2 Portuguese Interlude 
As the 15
th
 century came to a close, the Portuguese arrived on the East African Coast 
“interested in commerce and religious crusade.”48 From the beginning they came with naval 
power, Vasco da Gama’s ships being heavily armed as he set sail from Portugal in 1497.49 
Swahili towns were not fortified, nor organised for military defence,
50
 so that a relatively few 
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Portuguese soldiers, sailors, merchants and missionaries were able to impose submission upon 
most of the Swahili towns within a few years. By 1515 the Indian Ocean was controlled by 
the Portuguese,
51
 though their control of the coast was never absolute. However, the effects of 
Portuguese control of the seas were often devastating. In Kusimba’s view the coming of the 
Portuguese signalled the “fall of the Swahili States.”52 The Portuguese attempted to halt all 
trade that they didn’t control between the East African coast and elsewhere. They were not 
completely successful, but the amount of trade that Swahili communities had normally 
participated in was reduced significantly.
53
  
The religious aspect of Portuguese encounter with Muslims was also very present. 
Strandes wrote of a brief attack on Mogadishu, “Without even getting into contact with the 
town, but simply because it was inhabited by Muslims, they bombarded it at close range with 
the ships’ cannon, and inflicted considerable damage, particularly to vessels at their 
moorings.”54 Additionally, Pouwels says, “the Portuguese, following practices that long had 
existed between Muslims and Christians of the Mediterranean, perpetrated several acts of 
egregious brutality.”55 This included attacking and murdering an entire ship of Muslim 
pilgrims.
56
 Kusimba writes, “The Portuguese system of warfare was, in many cases, scorched 
earth. The towns were not only looted, but often reduced to ashes. The town’s residents were 
sent into slavery abroad or enslaved locally. Men, women and children were massacred.”57 
These sort of actions were justified by claiming that “Islam and Christianity were forever 
hostile the one to the other, and that as the Muslims took every opportunity of seizing 
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Christians and their property, so were the Christians justified in retaliating whenever they 
could.”58 However, Prestholdt shows that the Muslim religion of the Swahili, the Arabic 
language spoken by at least a few of them, and similarity in the appearance of Swahili towns 
to Portuguese towns offered the Portuguese some points of familiarity that enabled them to 
communicate and relate with the inhabitants of the East African coast more easily than they 
could with those of the interior.
59
 
Although the Portuguese, under d’Almeida, attacked and sacked Mombasa in 1505, 
their presence along the northern Swahili coast (i.e. Kenya) was limited until the end of the 
century.
60
 After a series of Turkish naval efforts to free fellow Muslims from Christian 
subjection from the 1540s to the 1580s and two revolts in Mombasa in 1528 and 1589, the 
Portuguese began construction of Fort Jesus of Mombasa in 1593.
61
 The Portuguese were 
expelled from Oman in 1650, and Omani power increased considerably in the Indian Ocean 
region. From 1653 to 1698 Omani-backed forces helped to liberate Pemba, Zanzibar, Otondo, 
Pare, Faza and finally Mombasa from Portuguese control.
62
 The Portuguese continued to try 
to assert dominance along the coast, even recapturing Mombasa for about one year, only to be 
forced out permanently in 1729.
63
  
This period of East African history should not, however, be thought of as only 
involving the Portuguese, Swahili and Arabs. Non-Muslim African people were, and had 
been, involved in the history of the coast. Archaeological evidence found along the Galana 
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River in present day Kenya shows that people from the interior were trading with people on 
the coast as early as the 5
th
 – 6th centuries.64 Trade between the coast and the interior was a 
necessary part of the Indian Ocean commercial network. The interior furnished items such as 
skins and ivory to the Swahili merchants, who in turn traded these items along with iron, 
mangrove poles, etc. for cloth, beads, porcelain, and so forth. The commercial links between 
the coast and the interior were often based on African Religion as much as those towards the 
sea were based on Islam. As Kusimba writes, “rural politics retained an allegiance to 
traditional animistic beliefs and kin-sanctioned ancestral cults.”65 Additionally, in the political 
intrigues and the warring between Swahili, Portuguese and Omani Arabs, non-Muslim 
Africans of the immediate hinterland were often involved, allying themselves with one group 
or another. The history of Islam in East Africa belongs as much to African history as it does 
to the history of the Indian Ocean. 
4.3.3 Increasing Arab Influence on the East African Coast 
The Portuguese period in East Africa inadvertently brought about an increase of Arab 
influence along the coast. First, in the early 16
th
 century, Ahmed Gran led a jihad against the 
Orthodox Christian kingdom in Ethiopia. After initial Muslim success, the Christian 
Ethiopian kingdom finally prevailed, with minimal Portuguese help, as Gran’s army 
disintegrated upon his death in battle in 1543.
66
 A number of Arabs, including many shurafa, 
from the Hadramaut in Yemen had joined his army in fighting a holy war against Christians. 
Once Gran was defeated, rather than returning to Yemen, many of these men went to the East 
African coast, primarily in the Pate/Lamu area in the north, to continue the jihad against 
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Portuguese rule.
67
 Being shurafa, these men were accepted in the Swahili towns as teachers 
and carriers of blessing. These men had also come to stay, rather than for trade, so that they 
married into local families, often ruling ones, thus instilling the blessings of being sharif into 
the lineage.
68
 While not successfully expelling the Portuguese, this new Hadramaut Arab 
migration greatly increased the Arab influence upon Swahili culture and language. 
Second, as Portuguese power decreased and Omani power increased in the latter half 
of the 17
th
 century, Swahili coastal towns requested the help of Oman to overthrow their 
Portuguese oppressors.
69
 Once the towns were liberated in 1698, the Yarubi Imams of Oman 
sent representatives, maliwali, to Mombasa to govern the area. In 1742 the religious Yarubi 
Imamate was overthrown by the more secular rule of the Busaidis. During the civil strife 
leading up to the change in rulers, the Mazrui family, who had supplied the maliwali, began to 
rule independently over much of the northern Swahili coast in 1735. Their period of rule 
lasted for about 100 years. Eventually, the Busaidi sultanate moved its capital to the island of 
Zanzibar, and began to take the territory governed by the Mazrui, so that from 1837 until the 
British incorporated the Kenyan coast into its East African Protectorate in 1895 the Busaidi 
sultans ruled over the coast.
70
 The Swahili had moved from Portuguese colonialism to Omani 
colonialism. 
These two waves of Arab immigration, Yemeni and Omani, from the 16
th
 century 
onward greatly augmented the influence of Arabic culture and language upon Swahili society. 
Much of the Arabic vocabulary in modern Kiswahili was incorporated during this period.
71
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Whereas the Swahili elite of the past had been civilised, uungwana, they began to more 
readily use the term, ustaarabu (Arab-like), to speak of themselves.
72
 Previous Arab 
immigrants had readily been integrated into Swahili society, but these new immigrants 
generally remained ‘Arabs’ for generations. Factors, such as the immigration of women and 
families and the large number of immigrants, worked against easy integration. 
Arabs had now also entered the region as colonialists, rather than as equal trading 
partners, and marriages and alliances with local families were not always desired.
73
 By the 
end of the 19
th
 century many Swahili families began to transform their names into more 
Arabic sounding ones (i.e. Kilindini became Al-Kindy).
74
 Even the religion of the coast was 
affected, as religious authority became connected to writing and knowledge of Arabic
75
 
through Mazrui influence in Mombasa and Hadrami influence in Lamu.
76
 During the Omani 
period trade centres and trade routes were established deep into the interior, with both Arab 
and Swahili merchants trading in ivory and slaves. The economy also changed as slavery, 
which had previously been practiced to a small extent,
77
 became a mainstay of the coast’s 
economy. Large plantations were established on Zanzibar, Pemba and along the Kenyan coast 
primarily by Arabs (Omanis more than Yemenis) and some Swahili families.
78
 Economically, 
this was a new period of growth and wealth. 
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4.3.4 Slavery and the Slave Trade in Kenya 
Slavery and trading in slaves had been practiced on at least a small-scale for probably 
centuries along the coast. There is evidence for such trade between the Swahili coast and 
Arabia as early as the 9
th
 – 10th centuries.79 However, it wasn’t until the 19th century that 
slavery took on major economic importance. As the very existence of Swahili towns along the 
present Kenyan coast depended upon good relationships with the peoples of the immediate 
hinterland,
80
 and since trade routes into the interior of Kenya were controlled by the Akamba 
until the 1860s,
81
 not many slaves were actually raided from the present territory of Kenya. 
There are a few exceptions: stories of Akamba traders capturing Kikuyu women to sell as 
slaves in the latter half of the 19
th
 century,
82
 and Arab and Swahili merchants entering from 
Buganda to raid Luhya populated areas in present-day western Kenya in late 1800s.
83
 Also, 
due to a drought affecting the interior of Kenya in the 1880s, “large numbers of Mijikenda 
pawned themselves or their children for grain to the coastal plantation owners”84 expecting to 
redeem them once the drought had finished. However, the coastal people, now in a position of 
power, continued to hold them in slavery.
85
 The drought also “gave coastal potentates a 
somewhat better chance to stage raids, capturing badly needed labourers.”86  
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The non-Muslim people of Kenya were not greatly affected by the slavery practiced 
on the coast,
87
 though Cooper notes that his interviews revealed a “legacy of bitterness” 
among Mijikenda.
88
 Also, as Nnyombi writes “Missionaries presented Islam as a ‘religion of 
slave trade,’ and this generalised description of Islam has remained in the minds of many 
Kenyans to the discredit of Islam.”89 Maina makes similar claims,90 and similar statements – 
that Muslims had enslaved their ancestors – can be heard among up-country Kenyans. 
Secondary school textbooks present an unclear picture of the history of slavery and the slave 
trade. They don’t differentiate between what happened in other parts of East Africa and 
Kenya; they can also be unclear about the extent and chronology of slavery. Upon reading 
these books one gets the impression that much slave trading had been happening throughout 
eastern Africa since the early days of Swahili civilisation.
91
 
The Muslim population of the coast increased significantly because of slavery; most 
slaves and their descendants converted to Islam and entered Swahili society, though as 
marginal people of low social status.
92
 Islam formed one aspect of a threefold identity 
perceived by the descendants of slaves; their ethnic origins and being people of the coast 
formed two aspects.
93
 Others became Muslim through immigration, generally through patron-
client relationships between the Swahili and non-Muslim African groups nearby.
94
 Still others 
                                                          
87
 As noted above there were a few exceptions. 
88
 Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters, 217, footnote 123. 
89
 Nnyombi, "Christian-Muslim Relations in Kenya," 160. 
90
 Newton Kahumbi Maina, "Christian-Muslim Relations in Kenya," in Islam in Kenya, ed. Mohamed 
Bakari and Saad Said Yahya, (Nairobi: Mewa Publications, 1995), 122. 
91
 Maranga and others, History and Government, 74-75, 80-82; Okoth and Ochieng'-Moya, History 
and Government, 89, 104-106, 108. Okoth and Ochieng'-Moya's textbook presents a somewhat more 
clear history of slavery in Kenya, especially in a map on p. 107. Yet, the student would still gain the 
impression that slave-raiding had taken place throughout East Africa, including Kenya. 
92
 Cooper, Plantation Slavery on the East Coast of Africa, 25; Pouwels, Horn and Crescent, 193. 
93
 Cooper, Plantation Slavery on the East Coast of Africa, 240. 
94
 David Sperling, “The growth of Islam among the Mijikenda of the Kenya coast, 1826-1933” 
(Doctoral Thesis, University of London, 1988), 66; Justin Willis, Mombasa, the Swahili, and the 
92 
 
became Muslim through marriage, as some non-Muslim African groups allied themselves 
with the Swahili against Portuguese and Arab intruders, such as the Segeju.
95
 Other Bantu 
language speaking groups (Pokomo and Mijikenda) near the coast also began converting to 
Islam in the 19
th
 century due to Swahili influence and later in reaction to British colonialism.
96
 
4.3.5 British Arrival in East Africa  
With the arrival of the British the dynamics of the situation changed once more. 
British influence was felt early in the 19
th
 century, demonstrated by an 1828 treaty with the 
Busaidi Sultanate on Zanzibar limiting the slave trade
97
 and the presence of Church 
Missionary Society missionaries, Johann Krapf and Johannes Rebman, beginning in the 
1840s.
98
 From the beginning of the Eastern African Protectorate in 1895 several 
characteristics of British rule transformed the situation of Coastal Islam in Kenya. One, 
British rule significantly reduced the wealth of Muslims on the coast. Two, the British viewed 
the Arabs as more civilised than Africans, thus favouring this community. Three, the centre of 
British East Africa soon moved to the Kenyan highlands, where non-Muslim Africans 
received missionary education and eventual employment in the colonial state. Four, as an 
important port, Mombasa attracted workers from the interior.  
The abolishment of slavery in Kenya in 1907 undercut the plantation system upon 
which the wealth of many had been built. Land that formerly had been productive 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Making of the Mijikenda, Oxford Studies in African Affairs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
Willis' entire book makes this case. Scholars, while agreeing with his basic position, disagree about the 
extent to which it can be applied.  
95
 Sperling, “Islam among the Mijikenda”, 46; Strandes, The Portuguese Period in East Africa. The 
Mosungulos in Strandes account of the Portuguese period. 
96
 See Robert Louis Bunger, Islamization among the Upper Pokomo, 2d ed., Foreign and Comparative 
Studies: African Series (Syracuse, NY: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 1979). 
David Sperling, "The Coastal Hinterland and Interior of East Africa," in The History of Islam in 
Africa, ed. Nehemia Levitzion and Randall Pouwels, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000). Sperling, 
“Islam among the Mijikenda”. 
97
 Pouwels, Horn and Crescent, 163. 
98
 Strayer, The Making of Mission Communities in East Africa, 3, 11. 
93 
 
agriculturally lay unused, then the Land Titles Ordinance instituted by the British in 1908 
allowed unused land to be appropriated by the crown.
99
 Much land was lost by Swahili and 
Arabs on the coast in this way, though a few wealthy Omani families benefited greatly by 
purchasing large amounts of property.
100
 
British favouritism towards Arabs encouraged Swahili people to make claims of Arab 
origins for themselves. The British viewed Africa as a place where each person belonged to a 
tribe. The system of ‘indirect rule’ was instituted according to these preconceived ideas of 
tribe. In 1910 the Colonial government introduced legislation which classified Arabs as ‘non-
natives’ concerning the payment of the Hut Tax.101 The Swahili were, therefore, forced to 
make a choice concerning identity unlike any they’d ever been confronted with in the past. 
The acceptance of Swahili identity in the British colonial system meant the acceptance of 
‘native’ status, which acquired the “connotations of inferiority and under-privilege.”102 Being 
an Arab enabled a person to achieve higher social and economic status. Therefore, to claim an 
Arab origin was not to deny being Swahili, as being Swahili was an identity imposed upon 
them by outsiders. However, as Hyder Kindy repeatedly notes in his autobiography,
103
 the 
Arab community looked down upon the Swahili, even criticising him for using an Arab form, 
El-Kindy, of his name.
104
 In any case, many ‘formerly’ Swahili families were then registered 
as ‘Arabs’ in the classification system imposed by the British, further confusing the issue of 
Swahili identity. 
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The railway from Mombasa to Uganda was finished in 1901, which opened the 
Kenyan highlands to white settlers,
105
 and in 1907 the capital of the British Protectorate was 
moved to Nairobi. Christian missions, which had found progress on the coast difficult, also 
gave greater attention to the interior once the railway allowed easier travel.
106
 While 
missionaries often discouraged ‘too much education,’ they were virtually unanimous in their 
advocacy for literacy to enable Kenyans to read the Bible. By contrast Muslim communities 
on the coast distrusted the Western education offered by missionaries; they feared – with 
reason – that the missionaries wanted to convert their children to Christianity.107 Within a 
short time Africans of the interior were educated in the language and culture of the colonisers, 
thus able to find employment, and eventual political power, whereas African Muslims along 
the coast had retained the Islamic forms of education, memorisation of the Qur’ān and Arabic 
script, and were thus left outside the emerging economic and political structures.
108
 From the 
perspective of the people of the coast, this was a reversal of previous roles in which the 
Muslim people of the coast were understood to be more educated and civilised than those of 
the interior. 
Additionally, with the construction of the railway Mombasa became a major port and 
the centre for importing and exporting goods from the Kenyan interior and Uganda. Men from 
the interior came to Mombasa to find jobs. In the early decades of the 20
th
 century some of 
these workers converted to Islam and brought their new religion back to their homeland.
109
 
However, as the years progressed immigrants from the interior brought their religion to the 
coast, and as Holway shows, by 1962 Christianity formed the majority religion in Mombasa 
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District.
110
 In these ways British colonialism negatively affected the standing of the Swahili 
community on the Kenyan coast.  
The struggle for independence from Britain was led primarily by non-Muslim 
Kenyans. The Muslims of the coast campaigned for independence from ‘up country’ Africans 
of the interior in a movement called ‘mwambao’ ( Kiswahili for coast) even to the point of 
demanding the maintenance of British ‘protectorate’ status over the coast and Zanzibar.111 
This movement is one reason that the coast has been relatively marginalised politically since 
independence in 1963. The Swahili language has grown to dominate communication in much 
of eastern Africa, but as Constantin writes, “géant linguistique, la 'swahilité' est un nain 
politique.”112 
It has been shown that the Swahili of the coast are an indigenous African Muslim 
community, though the more popular perception is otherwise. This community has 
experienced some form of colonialism for the past 500 years, and many Swahili would claim 
that they continue to be ‘colonised’ by up-country Africans. This period of colonialism has 
augmented the influence of Arabic language and culture on the Swahili people, though they 
remain an African people. Omani colonialism tended to place the Swahili behind the 
newcomers of Omani origin in both economic terms and social and political status. British 
colonialism again modified this community’s position on the coast, so that today their status 
is greatly diminished, and they seem to be a marginal people in the new state of Kenya. 
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4.4 Somali People in Kenya and Islam 
The Somali people became part of this story when British East Africa joined the 
nomadic groups, who inhabit the arid lands of what is now northern Kenya, with the people of 
the coast and the fertile interior into a single political unit. “One main reason why Britain 
extended her domain over the whole of the Northern Province, including the NFD (Northern 
Frontier District), was that she wished to provide a buffer between Italian Somaliland and 
Ethiopia on the one side, and the East African railway and the white settlers in the highlands 
on the other.”113 The predominant group among these nomadic peoples was the Muslim 
Somali, who are now the largest Muslim group in modern Kenya.
114
  
The Somali are generally considered to be relative newcomers to the region, having 
only crossed the Juba River (in present day Somalia) in the mid-19
th
 century, and reaching the 
Tana River, where the British stopped their advance in 1909.
115
 However, Turton suggests 
that this may have been a reconquest of land as “there is evidence that to the north and north-
west of the Lorian Swamp Galla,
116
 Somali and Masai peoples interacted for several 
centuries.”117 If Turton is correct, then Somali people had most likely lived in northeastern 
Kenya for centuries before being gradually driven out by Oromo expansion from southern 
Ethiopia beginning in the 16
th
 century, only to return in the latter part of the 19
th
 century. 
There are two competing theories of Somali origins. I.M. Lewis, following Somali 
oral traditions, places Somali origins in the northern Horn of Africa, where he says, Cushitic, 
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proto-Somali pastoralists and Arab immigrants intermarried forming new lineages which 
became the Somali people. He adds that due to various historical, ecological and religious 
reasons these people began in the 10
th
 century to steadily migrate in southern and western 
directions, displacing Oromo and Bantu people, finally reaching the Tana River in 1909.
118
 
Herbert Lewis, an American anthropologist working among the Oromo, proposed a different 
theory, using Oromo oral traditions and historical linguistics.
119
 Linguistic evidence suggests 
that the Eastern Cushitic group of languages (of which Somali is one) originated somewhere 
in the area of southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya; 21 of the 24 Eastern Cushitic languages 
are still spoken in this region.
120
 In addition, Oromo traditions collected from many different 
Oromo groups in various regions also speak of a south-central Ethiopian origin near Lake 
Abaya.
121
 Also, Somali traditions of Oromo-Somali warfare are found primarily among the 
Darood clans located in the southern parts of Somali territory (i.e. those regions where 
confrontations would have occurred during Oromo expansion and Somali reconquest).
122
 Iye, 
a Somali political scientist, explains Somali traditions of Quraysh Arabic origin (thus 
countering I.M. Lewis’s argument) saying, “Les Somalis … du fait de leur islamisation et de 
leur tentative d’assimilation à la civilisation arabo-musulmane, se sont construits de toutes 
pièces une origine arabe en rattachant leur généalogie aux tribus prestigieuses du prophète 
Mohamed.”123  
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It would seem that the most likely scenario is that many Somali-speaking people still 
lived in northern Kenya until, for some unknown reason, the Oromo people began to expand 
rapidly across Ethiopia and into present-day Kenya in the early 16
th
 century, as attested to in 
contemporary Ethiopian and Portuguese written sources and Oromo traditions.
124
 About 300 
years later a smallpox epidemic allowed the Somali to defeat the Oromo and control the 
region from the Juba River to the Tana River.
125
 The Somali presence in North Eastern 
Province is almost certainly a return, rather than a new episode.  
Another significant group of Somalis (from the Isaaq clan) living in Kenya, first came 
from Aden as askaris and settled in towns working as clerks, interpreters and traders in 
livestock.
126
 Their success in trade soon attracted Herti Somalis from the Darood clans of 
British Somaliland in the north.
127
 These two groups of Somalis have remained urban traders 
in Kenya. The passionate protests by the Isaaq in the decades before 1940 to pay higher taxes 
illustrates well the attitude that most Somali people held towards non-Somali Africans. The 
Isaaq were classified as native Africans by the colonial administration and therefore required 
to pay the lower ‘native Poll Tax,’ but the Isaaq insisted that they were Asian and demanded 
to pay the higher rate charged to this group. As Turton explains, “The Isaq were indeed 
strongly convinced that their status was superior to that of other East Africans and they 
bitterly resented being placed in the same category as the Bantu, whom they pejoratively 
referred to as ‘slaves.’”128 While other Somali clans may not have gone as far as demanding to 
pay higher taxes, feelings of superiority towards non-Somali Africans would have been (and 
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usually continue to be) similar, which naturally effects Kenyan Somali relations with other 
Kenyans.
129
 
The Somali were also instrumental in the Islamisation of other peoples within Kenya. 
Castagno writes, “Colonial officials readily acknowledged the ‘separate identity’ of the 
Somalis, a separateness which in large part was based on religion, on a degree of homogeneity 
in language and customs, on fighting prowess, and on ability to convert and assimilate 
contiguous non-Muslim groups.”130 Large sections of the Oromo Boraana people in northern 
Kenya became Muslim in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century due to Somali influence. They regarded 
the Somalis as people who were successful in the face of foreign colonialism, so they adopted 
Somali ways, including Islam.
131
 In addition Somali Islam has long been associated with Sufi 
brotherhoods, especially the Qadiriya and Salihiya, inspiring wadaado (sheikhs in Somali) 
who traveled and taught Islam.
132
 The Malakote people (a Pokomo group) along the Tana 
River near Garissa also attribute their Islamisation to contact with Somali people.
133
  
Murunga notes there is a “Kenyan suspicion of all ethnic Somali including those who 
are Kenyan citizens.”134 The shifta war had been a major cause of this suspicion. While 
Muslims on the Kenyan coast protested joining the new nation of Kenya through the 
mwambao movement, the Somali Muslims of Northeast Province took up arms to fight for the 
right to join neighbouring Somalia. This was termed the shifta war, from an Ethiopian word 
meaning bandits. Both the Kenyan and Ethiopian governments found it expedient to refer to 
the war as banditry, rather than a struggle for separateness.  
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Two primary reasons can be given for this shifta war. One reason was the internal 
dynamics of the Somali situation. The Somali clans present in Kenya were also present on the 
other side of the border in Somalia. These people had interacted and crossed the borders since 
their creation. Somalia nationalism was also growing, and the Somali people of the NFD 
wanted to become a part of a larger Somali nation. Murunga says that 87% of the Somali 
people in Kenya wanted to join Somalia.
135
 The Somali Youth League, having started in 
Mogadishu, was also active in colonial Kenya promoting Somali nationalism.
136
 A second 
reason was the manner in which the British administered the NFD where the Somali people 
lived. Mburu writes, “The colonial administration expressed concern that, as more Pagans and 
Christians embrace Islam, the predominately Muslim Somali population might use religion as 
a unifying factor and gain territorial advantage over non-Muslims.”137 Therefore, the Special 
District Ordinance of 1934 was passed to limit interaction between the people of the NFD and 
the rest of Kenya.
138
 Included in this ordinance were provisions for pass laws similar to those 
of apartheid South Africa. Special permits were required to enter or leave the NFD, thus 
isolating its economic and political development from the rest of Kenya.
139
 The Somali and 
Boraana Muslim people of the NFD never had the opportunity to form political alliances with 
those living across the Tana River.  
The outcome of the five-year shifta war was mutual suspicion between Kenyan 
Somalis and other Kenyans. Though, as Al-Safi notes, “In Kenya … Somalis have found 
themselves far more secure economically, socially and politically. … Prospects for education, 
health services and economic development … are more promising in Kenya than in 
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Somalia.”140 However, suspicion and tension between Kenyan Somalis and other Kenyans 
have not disappeared. The presence of 150,000 refugees from Somalia (in 2005),
141
 which has 
grown to half a million since 2011,
142
 has also contributed to tensions and the perception of 
the foreign nature of Somalis in Kenya. 
The issues concerning Somali Muslims in Kenya are similar to those discussed 
concerning the Swahili. It has been shown that the Somali are a Cushitic African people, 
originating in southern Ethiopia. Some Somali clans most likely lived in Kenya for centuries 
before being pushed out by Boraana Oromo expansion, only to return in the 19
th
 century. 
Somali Muslims, similar to the Swahili, have considered themselves to be superior to other 
Africans and contested being ruled by them. Non-Muslim Kenyans have also tended to view 
both groups as ‘foreign’ to what it means to be Kenyan.143 
4.5 Nubis and Islam  
Islam also spread into the interior through the colonial army and police which, in its 
early stages, was a majority Muslim army with Kiswahili the lingua franca of the military.
144
 
These soldiers eventually settled in urban centres throughout British East Africa. The earliest 
soldiers used by the British came from the army that “Khedive Muhammad Ali of Ottoman 
Egypt mobilized to conquer Sudan in the nineteenth century.”145 Frederick Lugard led a group 
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of these men into Uganda in 1890.
146
 Most of the soldiers were from different parts of Sudan, 
and a creolised form of Arabic, which came to be known as Nubi, became the common 
language. These soldiers, most of whom were originally recruited in Sudan, became known as 
Nubis.
147
 Eventually, this military band evolved into the East African Rifles and then the 
King’s African Rifles. By 1902 at least half of the East African Rifles were Sudanese, or 
Nubis.
148
 The majority of the other soldiers were Somali or Swahili, who most likely would 
have been from the lower class or freed slaves. As time passed men from other ethnic origins 
within Kenya became part of this military organisation.  
However, soldiers from these varied Muslim backgrounds: Sudanese, Swahili, Somali, 
etc. settled into homogenous neighbourhoods, called majengo (ghetto in Swahili), Swahili 
and/or Nubi villages, in several Kenyan urban areas,
149
 sometimes even founding the towns as 
centres of British administration.
150
 As these military men were often the first African 
inhabitants of emerging towns in rural areas, they welcomed individuals from rural non-
Muslim ethnic groups into their community as they came to these administration centres in 
search of employment. As a result many of the early urban residents from many different 
ethnic groups converted to Islam. These early converts were often called ‘Swahili’ by the 
local people, and they usually cut off relations with their ethnic homes and took Muslim 
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names, therefore relegating conversion to the individual affairs of urban migrants.
151
 This 
trend changed rather dramatically by World War One, and few conversions to Islam occurred 
thereafter among the ethnic groups of the interior. 
According to the Centre for Minority Rights the Nubis in Kenya are a people without 
nationality, even though they have been there for several generations.
152
 Once more they 
represent a Muslim group which are considered to be foreigners in Kenya. 
4.6 Kenya’s Asian Muslim Community 
Immigrants from Muslim communities in the Indian sub-continent began settling in 
East Africa in the mid-1800s. A British consular report in the 1870s stated that there were 
over 2000 Khojas
153
 (Shia Ismailis) and 500 Bohras,
154
 another Shia group, in East Africa. 
The Asian
155
 communities in East Africa have generally been economically successful. The 
Asian Muslim communities have used some of this wealth to build mosques for African 
Muslim communities.
156
 The Khoja Ismaili community in particular has also constructed 
hospitals, schools and other facilities that have increased their reputation in Kenya. However, 
Asian Muslim communities in Kenya tend to be insular, building and using their own 
mosques and cemeteries, as well as, not marrying outside their community.
157
 Their wealth 
and the inaccessibility of the community to the average African Kenyan has led to a rather 
tense relationship between the Asian and African communities in Kenya.  
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4.7 Conclusion 
The origins of Islam and primary Muslim groups in Kenya have been traced, 
demonstrating that these groups either formed in the area now known as Kenya, or have lived 
here for an extended period of time. The history of the Swahili people has been examined in 
more detail because of their cultural and historical influence in the region. It has been seen 
that under colonisation, and continuing since independence, Muslims groups (Swahili, 
Somali, Nubians and Asians) have been politically and socially marginalised. Non-Muslim 
Kenyans frequently perceive them to be foreign to Kenya, which further marginalises these 
communities. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM ENCOUNTERS IN KENYA 
This chapter will examine the history of Christian-Muslim encounters in Kenya that 
form the background against which the writings of Kenyan Christians analysed in chapters 
eight and nine must be viewed. This background will be explored by a journey from early 
historical possibilities, through the disastrous interreligious encounter under Portuguese 
attempts to colonise the East African coast, through the early British Protestant missionary 
encounter with Muslims, and finally to the recent postcolonial debate over the inclusion of 
kadhi courts in the Kenyan constitution. 
5.1 The Early Possibilities 
It is possible, and even likely, that some sporadic encounters occurred between 
Christianity and the East African coast prior to the arrival of Islam. Christianity had been 
established nearby in the Ethiopian highlands from as early as the middle of the 4
th
 century. 
Baur reports the existence of stories about Ethiopian Coptic Orthodox monks arriving on the 
coast to preach the Christian faith even before the arrival of Islam.
1
 Both Syrian and 
indigenous monks were active in these early centuries of Ethiopian Christianity as wandering 
evangelists. The Aksumite kingdom of Ethiopia also controlled the maritime trade routes of 
the Red Sea from the 4
th
 to the 7
th
 century.
2
 Until the early decades of the 7
th
 century there 
was relatively extensive contact between the coast of India and the Christian nations further 
west, including the kingdom of Aksum.  
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Cosmas Indicopleustes,
3
 writing of his travels to Ethiopia and India in probably the 6
th
 
century, mentions a land beyond Barbaria called Zingium in his account, which seems to be 
linked to the Somali coast on the Indian Ocean. Cosmas personally does not travel to 
Zingium; in fact he fears the ocean currents coming into the Gulf of Aden.
4
 However, his 
account leaves open the possibility of continued contact between Egypt and the East African 
coast. The Periplus of the Erythrean Sea, which demonstrates that Ptolemaic Egypt traded 
along the East African coast a few centuries earlier, might also be considered. In addition, 
coins and shards of cooking pots of Roman-Egyptian origin from the 3
rd
 century have been 
found in Zanzibar.
5
 It is not unreasonable to suppose that by the 6
th
 century some Christian 
merchants, and perhaps monks or priests, must have interacted with the population of that 
area. However, any possible interactions between Christians and the coastal population were 
cut off by the expansion of Islam and Arab control of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean 
beginning in early in the 7
th
 century. 
5.2 Early Portuguese Encounter with Muslims in Kenya 
Leaving the realm of historical possibilities and entering that of historical certainty, 
chapter four has already shown the ruthless manner in which the Portuguese arrived on the 
East African coast: sacking towns, sinking ships and killing inhabitants.
6
 Religion was often a 
factor. Having only recently achieved liberation from Muslim dominance in the Iberian 
Peninsula, Portuguese mission was generally understood in terms of the Reconquista upon 
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meeting the Muslim community along the coast.
7
 In 1498 Vasco da Gama, who was well 
received in Malindi, was permitted to erect a padrao (a pillar with a cross that still stands 
along the beach in Malindi), which for him meant that the city was under “the sphere of the 
Portuguese Conquista.”8 Francis Xavier stopping on his way to India commented on the 
padrao, “How great is the might of the cross, seen standing so lonely and so victorious in the 
midst of this vast land of Moors.”9 This was not uniquely a Portuguese understanding of the 
enterprise, as an early 16
th
 century papal bull praised the Portuguese Crown for its efforts at 
“waging war” and “spreading the faith” around the world, including Ethiopia and Africa.10 In 
such a manner Christian missions to Muslims along the coast made an inauspicious start. 
Almost 100 years after Vasco da Gama’s visit in Malindi, his grandson Dom 
Francisco da Gama, the Portuguese viceroy in Goa, requested that the Augustinians send 
priests and monks to East Africa.
11
 Fort Jesus was being built at this time and da Gama was 
particularly concerned about the spiritual welfare of the increasing Portuguese population in 
Mombasa and elsewhere along the coast, though he also mentioned the spiritual need of the 
local population.
12
 Several chapels and churches were built in towns along the coast, and a 
convent and a ‘House of Mercy’ were opened in Mombasa, which enabled the Augustinians 
to care for orphans, the disabled and the ill.
13
 They reported 600 baptisms in Mombasa alone 
within a year; the number of baptisms per year remained high. Other towns also reported 
baptisms by the hundred. Baur notes that most of these baptisms were probably of slaves 
                                                          
7
 John Baur, 2000 years of Christianity in Africa: An African Church History, 62-1992, Second ed. 
(Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 1998), 46.  
8
 Ibid., 87. 
9
 Ibid., 88. 
10
 Fernanda Olival, "Structural Changes within the 16th-century Portuguese Military Orders," e-
journal of Portuguese History 2, no. 2 (2004) (accessed May 9, 2008). 
11
 Baur, 2000 Years, 88. 
12
 Carlos Alonso, A History of the Augustinians and the Martyrs of Mombasa (1568-1698), trans., 
Maureen Eyles (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2007), 18. 
13
 Baur, Catholic Church in Kenya, 16. 
108 
 
before they were transported to other regions,
14
 though there are also communications which 
indicate that some Swahili Muslims were baptised.
15
 
The relationships between the Augustinian missionaries and the local rulers and 
inhabitants were often ambiguous. While the presence of churches was seen as a threat to the 
continued allegiance of the local people and an inducement to conversion, the missionaries 
were generally able to ease the effects of oppressive Portuguese rule.
16
  
5.2.1 Yusuf bin Hassan 
The high point of the Christian mission seemed to be the return of the young king, 
Jerónimo Chingulia,
17
 born Yusuf bin Hassan, but trained by Augustinians in Goa, converted 
to Christianity and married to a Portuguese noble woman. He had been made a Knight in the 
Order of Christ,
18
 a Portuguese military order specifically created to fight in crusades against 
Muslims.
19
 Two years after his return to Mombasa in late 1625 (or early 1626) Chingulia 
wrote a letter to Pope Urbano VIII declaring his loyalty as a Christian king and boasting of 
having converted more than 100 Muslims.
20
  
Within a few years the dream of a Christian kingdom on the coast had become a 
nightmare. In 1631 Chingulia reconverted to Islam and instigated a massacre of about 600 
hundred Christians, both African and Portuguese. Though the circumstances of Yusuf bin 
Hassan’s (Chingulia’s) reversion to Islam and the subsequent massacre are not clear, they are 
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nonetheless unsurprising. He had been sent to Goa, orphaned as a young boy, after the 
Portuguese captain of Mombasa had bribed some local inhabitants of the hinterland to murder 
King Hassan, Yusuf’s father.21 In his letter to the pope Chingulia (Yusuf) had also written of 
the lack of respect shown to him by the Portuguese officials in Mombasa.
22
  
Alonso surmises that the combination of disrespect shown by the Portuguese captain 
and his reputation as the “traitor king” among his Muslim subjects led to an inner conflict 
between these two sides of his person, which in turn brought about his return to Islam and his 
violent reaction – a relief from “his inner dichotomy.”23 Evidence for Yusuf’s (Chingulia’s) 
psychological condition, however, seems scant and Clerici, who refers to the massacre as “an 
early anticolonial uprising against unjust and despotic rule,”24 may provide a better judgment. 
An inquiry was begun soon after the massacre to determine if those who died were indeed 
martyrs. Survivors were interviewed in Goa, and the proceedings were sent to the Vatican, 
where the matter was not further investigated and eventually forgotten.
25
 
By 1635 Yusuf bin Hassan (Chingulia) had fled from the city fearing Portuguese 
reprisal, and Augustinian missionaries had returned to Mombasa. A convent was even opened 
on the island in 1638. Over the next several decades there were repeated attacks on Mombasa 
and other Portuguese-controlled towns on the Swahili coast, which resulted in the deaths of 
more Augustinian priests. However, after the massacre in Mombasa the Augustinians had 
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little effective influence among the local Swahili people. Finally in 1698 Mombasa was 
conquered by forces from Oman ending Augustinian presence on the coast.
 26
  
The only traces of Christianity left behind by the Portuguese episode of Christian 
presence in Kenya consisted of a few physical structures, such as Fort Jesus in Mombasa and 
the padrao in Malindi. There were no remaining Christians along the Kenya coast when 
Johannes Krapf arrived in Mombasa in 1844. However, renewed efforts promoting the 
canonisation of the ‘Mombasa Martyrs’ are bringing these events back into the memories of 
Christians and Muslims in Kenya. Carlos Alonso’s book, A History of the Augustinians and 
the Martyrs of Mombasa, and Luigi Clerici’s articles in African Christian Studies are part of 
this process. The account of the martyrs is also being popularised by the Catholic Church with 
the publication of a popular book
27
 on the subject and the recent release of Alonso’s study in 
English. The motivation behind these moves seems to be to strengthen the Kenyan Catholic 
Church by developing an indigenous story of martyrdom and perseverance in the faith despite 
opposition. As Clerici writes,  
‘Mombasa martyrs and confessors’ must become a household word in 
the Catholic families of Kenya, for they were splendid witnesses to the power 
of God’s grace and their faith in Jesus the Messiah on a Muslim coast, in spite 
of being evilly treated by a so-called ‘Christian’ nation in its crusading ferocity 
against the followers of the prophet.
28
 
His emphasis here is on the Africans who died, rather than the Portuguese, and upon 
their faithfulness, not in the face of an Islamic threat, but in spite of mistreatment at the hand 
of fellow Christians, the Portuguese. Clerici, however, expresses reservations about 
“publicizing” an event which so clearly shows “past Christian wickedness against our Muslim 
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and African brethren.”29 One might also ask what Muslims think of a popular martyrology 
which portrays Muslims as the persecutors of Christians during a period of aggressive 
European Christian colonialism. 
5.3 Themes in Early British Missionary Encounter with Islam 
The arrival of Johannes Krapf, a German Lutheran serving with the British Church 
Missionary Society, marked the beginning of continuous Christian presence in the territory of 
Kenya, and by extension an interaction between Christians and Muslims in Kenya that 
continues to this day. Five themes can be found in this early Western, primarily British, 
Christian missionary interaction with Islam. These are competition, avoidance, ambiguity, 
antagonism, and marginalisation; they continue to be important in Christian-Muslim relations 
among Kenyans today, though often in altered forms. 
5.3.1 Competition 
Competition between Christianity and Islam for the ‘conquest’ of Africa became one 
of the principle underlying motifs. This is demonstrated as early as Krapf’s mission in East 
Africa. During a previous mission in Ethiopia, he had made contact with the Oromo people 
(referred to as the Galla at that time) whom he saw as the key to the evangelisation of 
Africa.
30
 In addition to seeing innate qualities in the Oromo people,
31
 Islam had already begun 
to make converts among them; Krapf believed that their conversion to Christianity would 
prevent the spread of Islam into the interior of eastern Africa.
32
 One of his primary goals 
became the evangelisation of the Oromo people, though he was never to have success in this. 
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 Krapf also became known for his vision of a chain of mission stations from the East 
African coast across the continent. One purpose was to prevent the spread of Islam towards 
the interior,
33
 a containment strategy which was sometimes referred to as ‘stemming the tide.’ 
He was able to put this strategy into effect when Johannes Rebmann arrived from Germany 
two years later. Then Krapf and Rebmann moved a few miles inland to Rabai Mpya to begin a 
mission station among the Mijikenda people (called the Wanika by Krapf). While several 
reasons can be given for the move, including Rebmann’s arrival and the lack of a genuine 
hearing for his message in Mombasa, Krapf had also discovered, to his surprise, that Muslim 
influence was limited to the coast.
34
 By building a new mission station at Rabai it would be 
possible “to make the Gallas acquainted with the Gospel through the Wanika,”35 thus 
preventing the spread of Islam towards the interior.
36
 
This strategy directed towards the containment of Islam by evangelising among 
African traditionalists in areas bordering Muslim regions continued beyond the earliest days. 
In Uganda Bishop Willis wrote in the Church Missionary Intelligencer that sending local 
evangelists towards the north and east, where it was believed Islam would most likely enter 
Uganda, was “the best and most effectual means of combating the Mohammedan advance.”37 
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Islam had been present in Uganda, but from a missionary perspective it had been contained.
38
 
Gustav Warneck, in the early 20
th
 century, spoke of the ‘race for the soul of the animist’ 
between Christianity and Islam.
39
 Roland Oliver reports that in the years 1908 and 1909 Islam 
became a prominent issue at all missionary conferences concerning East Africa.
40
 At the 
World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh in 1910 there was concern that “If things 
continue as they are now trending, Africa may become a Mohammedan continent.”41 In 1912 
a CMS missionary expressed fear that Muslims in Nairobi would spread Islam among the 
ethnicities of the central highlands, if the missions didn’t invest more effort upon the 
evangelism of these ethnic groups.
42
 Most likely Islam was the majority religion among 
Africans in Nairobi at this time.
43
 Cornelius Patton, who visited Africa as the Secretary of the 
Home Department for the American Board of Commissioner for Foreign Missions, wrote in 
1917, “Africa thus presents the spectacle of two missionary armies advancing for the conquest 
of the continent, the Mohammedan army from the north and the Christian army from the 
south.”44  
After World War I conversion among Kenyans to Islam slowed tremendously.
45
 Its 
influence extended little beyond the towns. The theme of competition with Islam diminished 
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considerably, but it did not disappear. Especially, as independence approached, some 
observers again thought that Islam would see rapid growth to the detriment of Christianity.
46
  
5.3.2 Avoidance 
The principle form of interaction that Christian missionaries sought with Muslim 
people was avoidance. Sanders writes, “It is clear that the objective of the CMS in East Africa 
did not include an attempt to reach the Muslims of the coast.”47 An exception to this general 
rule was William Taylor, who remained in Mombasa in the 1890s in efforts to convert 
Muslims.
48
 Others, such as Rebecca Wakefield, exhibited sentiments leading towards 
avoidance as she wrote in her journal, “Most of the people … are Mohammedans, and no one 
ever expects to make any converts from among them.”49 As seen earlier, Krapf moved to 
Rabai Mpya after spending two years in Mombasa, which Stock, official historian for the 
CMS, later described as the real beginning of Krapf’s mission work in East Africa.50 
Nthamburi makes a similar comment about the Methodist mission when they began to 
concentrate their work among peoples living near Mount Kenya in 1913, rather than among 
peoples living near the coast.
51
 Hewitt comments that in the early 20
th
 century of eighteen 
missions working in Kenya, only three had any presence along the Muslim-dominated coast.
52
 
Mission strategy concerning Islam was principally to contain it within its present boundaries, 
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rather than encounter Muslims, themselves, due to the difficulty found in converting Muslims 
to Christianity.  
5.3.3 Ambiguity 
Though early missionaries viewed Islam as an inferior rival to Christianity, they 
depended quite heavily upon Muslim individuals to commence the mission enterprise in 
Kenya and East Africa. In order to live in Mombasa, Krapf first had to go to Zanzibar to 
obtain permission from Sultan Said, who was very happy for the ‘heathen’ of Africa to learn 
about God. The dependence of Krapf and other early missionaries upon Muslims and Arabs 
did not stop there. Krapf translated parts of the Bible into Swahili with the help of the Kadhi 
of Mombasa.
53
 He depended upon Muslim friends to introduce him to the Mijikenda people 
of Rabai, Ribe and Kambe.
54
 A Muslim friend also helped him in negotiations for building a 
mission station among the Mijikenda of Rabai.
55
 In Krapf and Rebmann’s many travels 
Muslim guides led caravans, Muslim porters carried goods, and Muslim leaders interceded 
with local authorities to enable trips.
56
  
This sort of dependence upon the Muslim community in the mission enterprise was 
not limited to Krapf and Rebmann. For example, a Swahili carpenter and his slaves 
constructed the buildings for the Methodist mission station of Charles New and Thomas 
Wakefield in Ribe.
57
 Ali Muhsin Barwani wrote, in an article critiquing Christian missions in 
East Africa, that Muslims welcomed and helped the missionaries only for them to turn and put 
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much effort into “denigrating” Islam.58 Though Barwani’s article is very polemical, these 
observations seem accurate. 
The ambiguity of the relationships between these early missionaries and Islam is also 
shown in other ways. While Islam was viewed as a competitor – certainly inferior, but capable 
of winning the souls of the ‘pagan’ Africans – the indigenous religions practiced by Africans 
were never understood as true rivals. Krapf writes, for example, of the dullness, drunkenness 
and other vices of the “heathen Wanika,”59 and he even attributes “their feeble conception of a 
Supreme Being, the Mulungu,” to historical interaction with Muslims.60 Though Krapf also 
wrote negatively of Islam, he believed that Muslims were more ‘civilised’ than the Wanika.  
Missionaries and colonial administrators tended to categorise people into different 
groups depending upon how ‘civilised’ they were. Tristam Pruen, a medical doctor serving 
with the CMS in East Africa in the 1880s, explicitly outlined this classification. At the top of 
his hierarchy of civilised people are civilised Christians who both convert to Christianity and 
European civilisation. Following the civilised Christians are two Muslim groups, the semi-
civilised Muslim (i.e. mostly Arabs), then nominal Muslims. Nominal Christians follow with 
the ‘heathen’ at the bottom of the civilisation hierarchy.61 Interestingly both Arab Muslims 
and African Muslims were considered more civilised than non-Europeanised African 
Christians. Certainly most missionaries would not have articulated this hierarchy of 
civilisations so carefully, but it seems that a majority operated with a similar understanding.  
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5.3.4 Antagonism 
The practice of slavery and the slave trade in East Africa provided the early 
missionaries with an opportunity to actively oppose Islam. David Livingstone was certainly 
the most impassioned and widely known spokesman against the Arab slave trade, but Krapf, 
New and Price also wrote vivid accounts in letters to their mission headquarters concerning 
the poor treatment of slaves in East Africa by Muslim slave traders.
62
 Roland Oliver 
commented that the entrance of the Christian church into East Africa could be considered an 
anti-slavery and an anti-Arab movement.
63
 
Freretown was established in 1875 by the CMS as a refuge for men and women freed 
from slave ships plying the East African coast. This freed-slave settlement was provocatively 
located on the mainland opposite Mombasa Island in the midst of the coastal, slave-based, 
plantation economy.
64
 William Price, the CMS missionary who founded the community, also 
brought lawsuits against slave owners who abused slaves and reported illegal slave trading 
activities to British authorities,
65
 which increased animosity between Freretown and Muslim 
slave-owners. In 1880 a white flag with the word, Uhuru (Kiswahili for freedom), written on 
it was raised above Freretown during the administration of CMS missionary, J. R. Streeter.
66
 
At the same time Streeter also had Freretown fortified and installed “12 pound war rockets.”67 
Both the local Arab community and the British envoy, Kirk, believed that Streeter was 
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involved in a possible slave rebellion.
68
 In addition both Freretown and Rabai, the CMS 
mission station further inland, frequently accepted runaway slaves, watoro (Swahili), into 
their communities.  
Missionaries from the Friends Industrial Mission on Pemba Island agitated strongly 
against slavery sending articles and photos of slaves in chains to England.
69
 Peter Scott 
Cameron, who was initially attracted by East Africa due to the Arab slave trade, even took up 
arms upon his arrival to join British forces in fighting against Mbarak al-Mazrui.
70
 As Nwulia 
has indicated, it was the missionary community rather than the Imperial British East Africa 
Company (IBEAC) or the British consulate which most aggressively pursued the abolition of 
slavery.
71
 In doing so, they placed themselves in direct opposition to much of the local 
Muslim community. By enlisting the sympathy of British society and the authority of British 
officials in their anti-slavery endeavour, they brought about conditions that resulted in the 
local Muslim community viewing the missionaries, the IBEAC and the British government as 
a united front opposing them and their traditions.
72
  
5.3.5 Marginalisation 
The marginalisation of the Muslim community has probably had the deepest and most 
enduring effect upon Christian-Muslim relations in Kenya. As seen in the previous chapter
73
 
Muslims had been dominant along the East African coast for about 1000 years with the 
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exception of a relatively brief Portuguese interlude. This movement from dominance to 
marginal status has understandably been difficult. The ability of missions to marginalise, 
either intentionally or unintentionally, the Muslim community was a product of the generally 
positive relationship enjoyed by missions with the governing authorities.  
Muslims were marginalised politically through the creation of semi-autonomous zones 
along the coast and beyond the Tana River in northeast Kenya.
74
 The people in these zones 
were able to exercise a minimal amount of authority over their own institutions, while 
becoming marginal to what became the main power centre, Nairobi. Upon independence these 
zones were, somewhat unwillingly, incorporated into the nation of Kenya. Their previous, 
semi-autonomous status meant that Muslim leaders had not established the sort of political 
connections necessary for full political integration into the emerging power structure. 
Missions were not involved in this level of marginalisation. In fact, the British colonial 
establishment of semi-autonomous zones inhibited mission activities, and were therefore 
sometimes opposed by the missions. 
Mission involvement in education also effectively marginalised Muslims. From the 
perspective of the Christian missions, the purpose of schools and education in East Africa was 
to win converts among more malleable children and to train catechists who would better be 
able to evangelise among their own people.
75
 As Sifuna has written, “The school was to be the 
focal point of Christian propaganda and of all civilising processes.”76 Since schools were 
primarily in the hands of missionaries with the purpose of religious conversions, Muslim 
parents did not send their children to these schools. Consequently, few schools were found in 
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Muslim areas. Sifuna also claims that missionaries opposed the opening of secular schools in 
these areas.
77
 
In Mombasa the CMS founded the higher quality Buxton High School in 1904 in 
order to attract the children of more economically successful Muslims.
78
 There were tensions 
between the mission and the parents and students over the presence of compulsory Christian 
education in the curricula. In 1921 the school altered its original purpose and became the 
school for the children of Christian immigrants from upcountry.
79
 The colonial government 
began to establish some secular schools along the Muslim coast, but these schools also did not 
succeed, as Muslim parents also opposed them as the schools refused to teach Islam or 
Arabic.
80
 The end result was that most Muslim children continued to be educated in 
traditional madrasas, effectively closing the Muslim communities off from Western-style 
education. 
By the 1940s power in African urban centres came through education and access to 
salaried positions within the colonial government, rather than through the ownership of 
property in the cities.
81
 Those receiving the appropriate education were primarily Christians, 
thus bringing about a power shift in the urban centres where Muslim presence was relatively 
strong. Wandera says that this marginalisation of the Muslim community continues even after 
independence, due to the differences in levels of formal education at independence.
82
 Even 
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recently in national school exams, students from Muslim areas generally score lower than 
students from other areas.
83
 
5.4 Christian-Muslim Relations since Independence 
Since Kenya became an independent nation in 1963 interaction between Muslims and 
Christians has continued. This postcolonial history has been discussed and analysed by 
several writers.
84
 Conflict between Muslims and the Kenyan state has resulted in the 
destruction of churches,
85
 as the government is often identified with Christians. Muslims and 
Christians have also clashed leading to the burning of churches
86
 and, at least, one mosque.
87
 
In addition tensions have arisen in Christian-sponsored schools as administrations have 
restricted the religious practices of Muslim students;
88
 in one case the local Muslim 
community constructed a mosque for students on school grounds without obtaining 
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permission.
89
 Muslim regions in which mission activity had been previously restricted by the 
colonial government were opened to Christian mission after independence,
90
 and both 
foreign
91
 and national
92
 Christians now participate in missionary activity among Muslims. 
Kubai suggests that mission activity has increased tension between the two communities;
93
 
however, more research is needed to better understand the effects of Christian mission on the 
Muslim community and Christian-Muslim relations in Kenya.
94
  
Rather than repeat a catalogue of mishaps, misunderstandings and conflicts between 
Muslims and Christians in Kenya since independence, this section will examine the recent 
debate surrounding the continued inclusion of kadhi courts in the new Kenyan constitution. 
There are three reasons for this tactic. One, the cataloguing approach, which lists 
transgressions of peace and understanding, draws a rather inaccurate picture of seemingly 
continuous conflict, when most incidents have been relatively isolated and sporadic. Second, 
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several articles cataloguing such events have been written and can be easily found.
95
 Third, a 
closer examination of the debate over the kadhi courts offers an opportunity to view Christian 
action and reaction in response to Muslim assertiveness in national politics and to living 
together in a plural society. 
The debate over the kadhi courts brings two histories to converge: the struggle for 
democracy and the existence of kadhi courts in Kenya. Before examining the debate itself, it 
will be necessary to briefly recount these two histories. 
5.4.1 The History of Kadhi Courts in Kenya 
Islamic law, in the form of liwali, mudir and kadhi courts,
96
 was first institutionalised 
on the Kenyan coast by the Sultanate of Zanzibar early in the 19
th
 century.
97
 The liwali and 
mudir were political administrators, who also judged legal disputes, under the Sultanate, 
whereas the kadhi’s authority was understood to be derived more directly from Islam.98 
Though officially appointed by the Sultan of Zanzibar,
99
 kadhis were “local elders 
representing their communities in the Sultan’s court.”100  
The IBEAC signed a treaty with the Sultan of Zanzibar in 1887, in which they agreed 
to exempt kadhi courts “from direct British authority.”101 Less than a decade later the British 
government took administrative control of Kenya from the IBEAC, initially assuming both 
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“executive and judicial powers” over the coast.102 However, in 1897 indirect rule was 
instituted through the creation of Native Courts of which liwali, mudir, and kadhi courts were 
retained for use by the Muslim population.
103
 As Cussac suggests the principle purpose of 
these courts from the perspective of the colonial government was to “control the region and 
restrict the powers of traditional officers,”104 though the coastal Muslim populations 
understood it in terms of religious liberty.
105
 
The kadhi courts initially were able to render judgments in both matters of personal 
law and criminal law in the coastal Protectorate.
106
 Appeals could be heard by a High Court 
under British control that would also include the Chief Kadhi as an assessor.
107
 By virtue of 
both its local and religious character the kadhi courts gained the trust of the Muslim 
population.
108
 Due to its effectiveness the kadhi courts were expanded to other areas of Kenya 
with Muslim populations after 1945.
109
  
As Kenyan independence approached, Sir James Robertson was appointed by the 
colonial office to lead a commission to make recommendations on the future of the coastal 
region.
110
 He recommended that the coastal Protectorate be incorporated into Kenya, while 
assuring that the Muslim population would be able to retain certain rights in the new 
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emerging nation.
111
 Most importantly for this study, kadhi courts were retained through an 
article in the constitution “under the chapter on the judiciary”112 being officially limited to 
matters of personal status under Islamic law,
113
 and the jurisdiction of kadhi courts was 
limited to disputes between two Muslim parties, who both agreed to use these courts.
114
 
Since independence the status of Islamic personal law has been under frequent stress. 
The Kenyan government – attempting to harmonise a diverse set of laws concerning marriage, 
divorce and inheritance – made three attempts to enact new standardised regulations that are 
based primarily on Western understandings of family.
115
 The Muslim community strongly 
opposed these proposals, as they were seen to violate Islamic law. The Muslim community 
succeeded in blocking their implementation.
116
 The courts are also closely supervised by the 
Kenyan government: “kadhis must comply with state edicts concerning the administrative 
operation of the courts; their work is periodically reviewed; and any appeals of their decisions 
are heard in the Kenyan High Court rather than an Islamic Court of Appeal.”117 Therefore, in 
a decision between Muslims in a dispute, the losing party could appeal to a secular court to 
overturn the decision based on Islamic law.
118
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The fact that the use of kadhi courts is optional has given them a symbolic importance 
as Muslims are able to assert their religious identity by submitting to their jurisdiction.
119
 
Muslims have also come to view these courts as part of their fundamental rights as citizens.
120
 
Christian efforts to have kadhi courts removed from the constitution (and Muslim reactions) 
need to be understood against this background. 
5.4.2 A Brief History of Change in the Kenyan Constitution 
This section will examine the constitutional process in Kenya that has led to the 
writing and implementation of a new constitution approved through democratic elections in 
2010. The early changes in the original constitution that led to an authoritarian presidential 
regime will first be outlined. Then the processes leading to the publishing of the Bomas Draft, 
the Wako Draft and finally to the new Constitution of Kenya will be looked at briefly. The 
issue of the retention of kadhi courts in these various stages of the development of the new 
constitution raised opposition among many church leaders. This issue will be examined more 
fully in the next section. 
The original Kenyan constitution was published in March 1963 after lengthy 
negotiations involving various Kenyan groups and British interests.
121
 This first constitution, 
forming a government based on a federation of ethnic-based regions,
122
 had no real means of 
fostering national unity. Before power was transferred to the Kenyan national government, it 
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was known that KANU
123
 would make changes to the document.
124
 The next few decades saw 
the constitution amended several times so that power became consolidated in the office of the 
president. 
Okoth-Ogendo divides the first “drastic changes” to the constitution into two short 
historical periods: 1963-1965 and 1966-1969.
125
 In the first period of constitutional change 
the goal was to dismantle the regionalism found in the document
126
 and centralise power in 
the national state.
127
 The later period saw several amendments that gave the ruling party more 
power over the affairs of government.
128
 The power of government became personally 
focused on President Jomo Kenyatta, as party leader and charismatic figure.
129
  
While Kenyatta was ill and nearing the end of his life and rule of Kenya, a group of 
Kikuyu
130
 politicians attempted to add an amendment to the constitution that would prevent 
the vice-president from assuming power upon the president’s death.131 This attempt failed, 
and Daniel arap Moi became the second president of Kenya in 1978. After a failed coup d’état 
in 1982, President Moi modified the constitution again, making Kenya a one-party state.
132
 
Later the constitution was again amended, giving the president the power to dismiss the 
Attorney-General and judges from the High Court and the Court of Appeal.
133
 The same 
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amendment also increased the power of the administration to jail ‘suspects’ without bringing 
charges.
134
 Kenya had become officially and constitutionally an authoritarian state. 
The only national institution powerful enough to express discontent with government 
action was the church.
135
 In the late 1980s church leaders began criticising the government for 
the new queuing system of voting,
136
 which David Gitari, a bishop of the CPK,
 137
 called 
unconstitutional.
138
 By 1990 the critique had expanded to repealing section 2A of the 
constitution,
 139
 which had instituted one-party rule. After multiparty elections in 1992 the 
“demand for constitutional and legal reform” augmented.140 More than thirty years of 
authoritarian rule was understood to be the fault of a constitution that vested too much power 
in the presidency;
141
 therefore, a new constitution was seen as essential to Kenya’s future 
development. In 1997 after many delaying tactics by the government, a delegation of religious 
leaders, which included Protestants, Catholics and Muslims, met with President Moi to push 
for constitutional reform.
142
  
Moi’s rejection of demands for popular participation in the constitutional review 
process led to the formation of the Ufungamano Initiative,
143
 which is a Swahili word 
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meaning unity.
 144
 According to Tayob, Abdul Hamid Slatch and Abdulrahman Wandati first 
approached Christian leaders about forming a civil society group to advocate for 
constitutional reform,
145
 which developed into the Ufungamano movement consisting of 
Muslim, Hindu, Protestant, Catholic and Indigenous Church leaders and leaders of secular 
civil society groups.
146
 These leaders formed a People’s Commission147 that began meeting 
independently of the government appointed, Constitution of Kenya Review Commission 
(CKRC), to discuss and reform the constitution. The two commissions were later joined at the 
insistence of Yash Ghai, chair of the CKRC.
148
 
The expanded CKRC journeyed throughout Kenya from late 2001 to early 2002 in 
order to hear from Kenyans
149
 about “the Kenya we want.”150 In almost every region people 
expressed the opinion that religion was a positive influence on politics, however Muslim 
populated regions viewed Islam as the necessary and good influence on politics, and Christian 
populated areas understood Christianity as the religion that should influence politics.
151
 In 
2003 three meetings, National Constitutional Conferences (NCC), were held at the Bomas 
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near Nairobi to write a draft for a new constitution.
152
 The ‘Bomas Draft’ of the constitution 
was produced in 2004
153
 and though criticised as “unwieldy, costly and inappropriate,”154 it 
had been created through popular participation, it substantially limited the powers of the 
president, and it included the office of an executive prime minister.
155
 
Though Mwai Kibaki had defended similar constitutional changes while in opposition 
against Daniel arap Moi, when he took office as newly elected president in January 2003 
Kibaki’s attitude shifted against a constitution that reduced presidential powers.156 The Bomas 
Draft was never submitted to the voters for approval. Instead parliament suggested 
amendments
157
 and Attorney General Amos Wako produced a “final coherent draft”158 that 
would be voted on in a national referendum. This became known as the Wako Draft. The 
Wako Draft, which “endowed the executive branch with excessive political authority,”159 was 
published in August 2005,
160
 and a referendum was held in November of that year.
161
 The 
proposed constitution was defeated; 57 percent of voters rejected it.
162
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Religious scholars tend to view the kadhi courts issue to be a strong reason for the 
defeat of the Wako Draft,
163
 as both Christian and Muslim groups were dissatisfied with the 
provision of religious courts in the draft constitution.
164
 Political scholars argue three more 
compelling reasons for its defeat.
165
 One, the Wako Draft, similar to the old constitution, gave 
too much power to the president.
166
 Two, the people of Kenya were angry at the political 
manoeuvring that lead from the popular process of the Bomas Draft to the government 
produced Wako Draft.
167
 Three, the Wako Draft was understood to favour certain ethnic 
groups at the expense of others, thus leading to an ethnically divided electorate.
168
 
The electoral campaign over the Wako Draft of the constitution led to the formation of 
the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), which later contested the 2007 presidential 
election under Raila Odinga. The “third phase of Kenya’s constitutional reform process”169 
began as a result of the violence following the 2007 elections. A Committee of Experts, 
primarily legal scholars, wrote a harmonised draft constitution using the previous CKRC, 
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Bomas and Wako drafts.
170
 This draft was submitted to a referendum in August 2010, passing 
with 68% of the vote to become the new constitution of Kenya.
171
 
5.4.3 The Kadhi Courts Issue in the Constitutional Process 
Although the kadhi courts had been in Kenya’s constitution since before independence 
and maintained there after independence, when civic society groups began to get involved in 
the constitutional reform process their presence in the constitution became a divisive issue 
between Christians and Muslims.
172
 It appears plausible that many Christian leaders were 
unaware of the constitutional provision for kadhi courts until this process began.
173
 The 
authoritarian nature of previous Kenyan regimes did not encourage a politically literate 
citizenry. Even as late as 2007, P.L.O. Lumumba, a Christian professor of law, needed to 
correct an audience at a forum at Nairobi International School of Theology, who believed that 
the presence of kadhi courts in proposed constitutions was a new initiative by the Muslim 
community,
174
 though it is also possible that these participants (mostly students) were 
influenced by misinformation campaigns led by some church leaders.
175
 
With the opening of democratic space and constitutional reform Kenyan Muslims 
sought ways to improve the kadhi courts through the new constitutional process.
176
 The most 
important changes advocated by Muslim leaders were a system of appeals maintained within 
                                                          
170
 Ibid. 
171
 Ibid.: 89. 
172
 A good, concise introduction to the kadhi courts debate can be found in John A. Chesworth, 
"Islamic Courts in Kenya and Tanzania: Reactions and Responses," The Centre for Muslim-Christian 
Studies Newsletter, Summer 2010. 
173
 Ibid. 
174
 P.L.O. Lumumba at NIST on 8 November 2007. In my personal observation, it was obvious that 
most students (many of whom served as pastors in local churches) and some professors were not well 
informed about the constitution. 
175
 Mwakimako, "Christian-Muslim Relations in Kenya," 303. 
176
 Kimeu, "Historical and Legal Foundations," 19. 
133 
 
the kadhi courts system,
177
 improved training for the kadhis,
178
 and an extension of the 
jurisdiction of the kadhi courts over civil and commercial law.
179
 A few Muslim leaders, 
mostly from North East Province,
180
 advocated complete application of shari’a, including 
criminal law for jurisdiction over Muslims.
181
 The constitutional draft prepared by the CKRC 
under the direction of Yash Ghai included many of these recommendations for the 
improvement of the kadhi courts.
182
 Chesworth suggests that this Muslim advocacy for an 
enhancement of the kadhi courts led to the negative reaction of Christians participating in the 
Bomas NCCs.
183
  
The Ufungamano Initiative, which had withstood violent Christian-Muslim conflict 
when a church and a mosque were destroyed,
184
 collapsed when Christian members opposed 
the inclusion of kadhi courts in the constitution; Muslim leaders then withdrew in 2003.
185
 
Tayob reports that Muslim participants were “devastated when their Christian comrades 
rejected Kadhis courts in the new constitution.”186 The draft produced by the NCCs at the 
Bomas removed the enhancements of the kadhi courts found in the CKRC draft, returning to 
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the status quo of the original constitution.
187
 NCCK General Secretary, Mutava Musyimi, also 
resigned as a commissioner on the constitutional review commission over the continued 
inclusion of kadhi courts in the Bomas draft.
188
 This was an indication that Christian leaders 
in the constitutional process were no longer accepting of the status quo, but wanted kadhi 
courts to be completely removed from the constitution. 
Considering Christian opposition to kadhi courts in the constitution, Attorney General 
Amos Wako seemingly tried to please each religious group by including a provision for 
religious courts (Muslim, Christian and Hindu) in the proposed constitution of 2005
189
 that 
was put before the electorate. This, in fact, pleased no one. Christians and Hindus felt no need 
to have religious courts,
190
 and Muslims understood the Wako draft to enable kadhi courts to 
be removed via an Act of Parliament.
191
 As mentioned above, the Wako draft was easily 
defeated in 2005 referendum
192
 and the kadhi courts (or religious courts) issue most likely 
played a small role in this. 
The new Kenyan constitution voted into law in 2010 maintains the status quo of the 
kadhi courts
193
 found in the original constitution with only minor changes in language rather 
than substance. Many church leaders campaigned against this constitution for three reasons: 
opposition to abortion, opposition to gay rights, and opposition to the inclusion of kadhi 
courts. Considering that the constitution passed with nearly 70% of the electorate voting in 
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favour,
194
 the political power of the church would now seem to be questionable.
195
 Kramon 
and Posner surveyed Kenyan voters, finding that 30% of ‘No’ voters cited religious issues as 
a deciding factor,
196
 which indicates that a fairly small percentage of the electorate followed 
the directive of their church leaders. 
The next section will look at the Christian opposition to kadhi courts and arguments 
used by church leaders in opposing kadhi courts in the 2010 constitution. 
5.4.4 The Kadhi Courts Debate 
Beginning in April 2009 the Committee of Experts (CoE) began meeting with various 
Kenyan groups and in town hall type gatherings in order to discuss various issues in the 
constitution and to determine which issues were to be classified as contentious, in need of 
more attention in the drafting of the constitution.
197
 Christian leaders from the NCCK, the 
ACK, the Catholic Church and evangelical and Pentecostal churches commenced efforts to 
have the kadhi courts removed from the constitution, or at minimum to have their inclusion 
declared a contentious issue.
198
 After a year of Christian attempts to change the proposed 
constitution, which included talks in April 2010 with a committee chaired by President 
Kibaki, the government announced that “it was impossible to amend the law to accommodate 
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the concerns of Christian church leaders.”199 The Christian leaders stopped discussions with 
the government over the constitution
200
 and began campaigning for a vote against the 
constitution in the upcoming August 2010 elections.
201
 The Christian-led ‘No’ campaign was 
heavily financed by the American Center for Law and Justice, which is an NGO founded by 
Pat Robertson, a prominent conservative American televangelist.
202
 
This decision by the government to reject their demands was interpreted by Christians 
as their concerns being ignored
203
 and partisanship towards Muslims.
204
 Both the NCCK and 
the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya (EAK) claimed that the CoE and the Parliamentary Select 
Committee (PSC), charged with the new constitution, were not only biased, but “dominated 
by Muslims.”205 However, only one of eleven members of the CoE was a Muslim,206 and four 
of the twenty-four members of the PSC were most likely Muslims.
207
 Their claim, while 
spurious, indicates the heated nature of the debate and the emotions involved on the Christian 
side. 
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Maina gives nine reasons that Christians voiced in opposing the inclusion of kadhi 
courts in the constitution:
208
 having kadhi courts in the constitution gives preference to Islam 
and Muslims, possibly making Islam the official religion of Kenya; having kadhi courts in the 
constitution is a devious way to eventually introduce Islamic rule in Kenya; putting kadhi 
courts in the original constitution was an historical wrong that needs correction; Christian 
Kenyans should not have to pay for kadhi courts through taxes; kadhi courts should come 
under an act of parliament, not the constitution; some Christians say that kadhi courts should 
come in the section of the constitution on human rights;
209
 kadhi courts discriminate against 
non-Muslims, as it is only for Muslims and the kadhis must be Muslims;
210
 and issues of 
personal law should be resolved in the mosque, not in a Kenyan court.
211
 
These reasons can be understood as those concerning fairness (preference to Islam, 
taxes for the kadhi courts, courts for Muslims only), legality (their presence in the original 
constitution, created by an act of parliament), confusion with Christian institutions (solving 
issues of personal law in a mosque), and fear (devious way to establish an Islamic state). 
While Christian leaders attempted to frame the debate in terms of fairness, Muslims,
212
 
newspapers,
213
 and some Christians
214
 pointed out that the Kenyan government was 
dominated by Christians, and the constitution was written from a Judeo-Christian perspective 
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incorporating these religious values into the justice system. Also, though it may have seemed 
reasonable to establish the kadhi courts through an act of parliament, rather than in the 
constitution itself, Kenyan Muslims feared that parliament could easily disband them,
215
 and 
Christian opposition to the courts enhanced this fear.
216
 Maina’s appraisal that Christian 
opposition was motivated primarily by Islamophobia seems to be justified
217
 and attempts by 
Christian leaders to hide this fail. 
Once the new constitution passed, church leaders issued statements ‘accepting the 
verdict of the people,’ while vowing to continue to push for constitutional reform.218 The 
issues of abortion and kadhi courts were specifically mentioned as areas in which churches 
would continue to advocate for amendments to the new constitution. As of the writing of this 
thesis, no important concrete actions have been taken by church leaders since the 
implementation of the new constitution to amend it. 
Not all Christian leaders in Kenya supported the ‘No’ campaign. Archbishop Eliud 
Wabukula of the ACK and Cardinal John Njue, though supportive of the ‘No’ campaign, 
refused to participate in large rallies against the constitution.
219
 Anglican priest and Sheepfold 
missionary among Somali Muslims, Francis Omondi, wrote several blog posts arguing for the 
inclusion of kadhi courts in the constitution.
220
 Prominent retired Anglican Archbishop David 
Gitari, after initially opposing the inclusion of kadhi courts, supported the ‘Yes’ campaign.221 
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The Seventh-Day Adventist Church came out in support of the inclusion of kadhi courts in the 
constitution saying that they “have been in the Constitution and have never negatively 
affected Christians.”222 After attending a “civic education programme” a group of 120 pastors 
in Central Province from various denominations decided to support voting ‘Yes’ on the new 
constitution, remarking that they had been misinformed about kadhi courts by those 
campaigning against it.
223
 Perhaps most importantly, retired Presbyterian leader and long-time 
advocate for democracy, Timothy Njoya, campaigned passionately for the new constitution 
and the inclusion of kadhi courts.
224
  
5.5 Conclusion 
The chapter has briefly told the history of Christians encountering Muslims in Kenya 
from before recorded history in the region, through the Portuguese interlude, into the era of 
British colonialism and finally of a postcolonial encounter surrounding the issue of kadhi 
courts. The Portuguese interlude was shown to be oppressive of the local Muslim population 
and most characterised by the violence of the rebellion led by Yusuf bin Hassan. 
Christian interaction with Islam during the colonial period was examined under five 
themes: competition, avoidance, ambiguity, antagonism, and marginalisation. While it would 
be possible to use these themes to examine postcolonial Christian-Muslim encounter, it would 
not necessarily help to clarify these interactions, and it would give the incorrect impression 
that Kenyan Christian encounter with Islam is determined by missionary and colonial 
Christianity. Yet it is also true that missionary Christianity has had some impact upon Kenyan 
Christianity and its response to Islam.  
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As was seen in the kadhi courts debate, Christians tended to be ignorant of Muslim 
institutions and relatively unacquainted with Islam until constitutional talks began in the late 
1990s. Muslims had remained marginalised after independence, and Christian leaders seemed 
to want to maintain this marginalisation by eliminating kadhi courts from the constitution. 
Kenyan Christians also seemed to show a fear of Muslims, which was not as obviously 
apparent in missionary Christianity. Interestingly, although churches had been instrumental in 
bringing about democratic reforms and calling for constitutional reform, many were then 
willing to block this reform in order to oppose the inclusion of kadhi courts in the 
constitution. Other churches (a minority) were willing to advocate for the rights of Muslims to 
have kadhi courts written into the constitution, thus guaranteeing the courts continued 
presence in Kenya. 
Both Muslim and Christian leadership flexed their political muscles; Muslims 
attempted to expand the role of kadhi courts in Kenya, and Christians tried to remove them 
from the constitution. As was seen, the result of this contestation was to maintain the status 
quo concerning kadhi courts within the new constitution, which would indicate that neither 
community was able to exert dominance over the other. Some Christian leaders vowed to 
continue the effort to remove the courts from the constitution, which was a symbolic assertion 
of political power attempting to minimise the message from the referendum results that 
church leaders did not have as much influence over their flock as thought.  
However, Kenyan Christians may have benefited from having lost this small battle. 
Ostien argues that Nigerian Islam became radicalised when Christians managed to defeat a 
“proposed Federal Sharia Court of Appeal” in 1979;225 Kenyan Christians, by losing this 
battle, may have avoided the radicalisation of Kenyan Islam. 
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PART TWO 
ANALYSIS OF KENYAN CHRISTIAN LITERATURE ON ISLAM 
CHAPTER SIX 
 SCHOLARLY DISCOURSE AMONG KENYAN CHRISTIANS CONCERNING 
ISLAM OR CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS 
With the appearance of Jesus in African Christianity
1
 in 1989 an important endeavour 
into the publishing of African theology was born in Kenya. This book marked the first 
publication in Kenya by Kenyan theologians of their own research. Three years later, under 
the leadership of J.N.K. Mugambi, Acton Publishers grew out of this initial effort, which has 
since published more than 60 books
2
 on various aspects of African church and theology. 
About a decade later, Paulines Publications Africa began publishing books on African 
theology with the release of African Religion
3
. Paulines has since published more than 25 
books
4
 of African theology. In addition the Catholic University of East Africa Press, Gaba 
Publications
5
 and Uzima Publishing House
6
 have published books in Kenya on African 
church and theology. Considering that other publishers occasionally release theological 
books, one can estimate that more than 100 books on subjects concerning African theology 
have been published in Kenya over the past two and a half decades, indicating Kenya as a 
major centre for the production of African theology.  
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A few books on Islam have been published in Kenya by Christian publishing houses. 
None of these books have been written by a Kenyan Christian, and only one such book has 
been co-edited by a Kenyan,
7
 which seems to indicate that Kenyan Christian experts on Islam 
have yet to take the lead on addressing this issue in their own country. However, Kenyan 
Christian religious scholars have contributed several chapters in these books on Islam, as well 
as chapters on various issues dealing with Islam in other books of African Theology, journal 
articles and chapters in books published outside of Kenya. These chapters and articles will be 
discussed and analysed in this chapter. The local Kenyan context is given priority (see 1.2.1) 
and the theology of reconstruction (see 6.1), as it proposes the importance of African culture 
and African solutions to African problems, provides a framework for the analysis of the texts 
and the Christian perceptions of Islam found therein.  
Though books and journals included in this study have been published by Roman 
Catholic publishers, the scholarly writing examined in the present chapter represents primarily 
mainline Protestant churches, as mainline Protestant scholars have written most of the articles. 
One article is written by a Catholic lay missionary, and articles by two Evangelical scholars 
are also examined. 
6.1 Kenyan Mainline Scholars 
This chapter will examine articles produced by theologians and religion scholars from 
mainline Protestant churches.
8
 Three articles by two Evangelical scholars will also be 
examined at the end of the chapter. Due to the limited representation of Evangelical 
perspectives these will only be examined briefly; they will not be used extensively in further 
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commenting on Kenyan Christian perceptions of Islam in later chapters. They are included 
here to provide a thorough look at what Kenyan scholars are producing concerning Islam. 
Paul Gifford, in writing about mainline Christianity in Kenya, says, “Kenyan 
intellectuals generally blame the West for their plight,” and that among Christians “the blame 
goes beyond secular agents” to also include Christian missionaries.9 He also critiques Kenyan 
theologians because rather than doing a political theology, they do a “theology of culture”10 in 
which they react to past injustices and the scorn of African culture by Europeans, especially 
during the colonial era. Their concern is then to address cultural and social issues to 
demonstrate that Christianity is not a Western religion, but that it can truly be African.
11
 It is 
important to note that in these theologies of culture, African cultural ways are generally 
promoted as valid, life-giving and exemplary of Christian values, while most of the country’s 
problems are understood to come from outside Kenya. It can be anticipated that Christian-
Muslim tension in Kenya will be presented as coming from Western attitudes towards Islam. 
Gifford adds that the Bible is rarely used to promote this theology of culture, as most of the 
writing consists of “cultural exposition.”12 It might also be expected that those writing on 
Islam will examine social and cultural issues in particular, while biblical and theological 
issues will be less developed.  
Mugambi’s theology of reconstruction is one the theologies of culture that Gifford 
critiques. Mugambi is concerned with a theology of culture in which a genuine Africanness
13
 
is considered the ideal in Christian theology and in the development of society. He also writes 
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of a move from liberation to reconstruction,
14
 where the liberation paradigm of the Exodus 
under Moses is replaced by an emphasis on rebuilding society using the biblical model of 
Nehemiah. He writes that Nehemiah was able to get people to “overcome their sense of 
alienation”15 and work together in unity to rebuild Jerusalem. They were able to “take control 
of their own history.”16 As applied to contemporary Africa, Africans have been alienated by 
colonialism, racism, and neo-imperialism; the current need is for the cultivation of a unity that 
brings African people together, overcoming their alienation, to work for African solutions to 
their problems.
17
 The theology of reconstruction provides a helpful framework for examining 
the texts. The issues of colonialism, neo-imperialism, unity, working together, finding African 
solutions and valuing African culture are those important in African Christian theology. A 
central question in examining the following texts will be how this theology impacts Christian 
perceptions of Islam in Kenya. 
6.2 Kenyan Scholars of Islam from Mainline Churches 
Four Kenyan scholars of Islam will have their works examined in this section. They 
are Newton Kahumbi Maina, Anne Nkirote Kubai, Joseph Wandera, and Joseph Mutei. 
6.2.1 Newton Kahumbi Maina 
Newton Kahumbi Maina, a Presbyterian (PCEA),
18
 who is a senior lecturer in Islamic 
Studies at Kenyatta University in Nairobi (where he also obtained his doctorate),
19
 has written 
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seven articles concerning Islam within the timeframe of this study that will be analysed.
20
 In 
these texts Maina writes on women in Kenyan Islam, the kadhi courts controversy in Kenya, 
the history of Christian-Muslim relations in Kenya, and Islamic extremism. As will be seen 
his writing addresses historical and social issues of Islam in Kenya, rather than theological 
issues. Maina’s main objectives are to promote a better understanding of Islam as it exists in 
Kenya and to correct misperceptions about Islam among Christians. 
In a project report prepared for the Organization for Social Science Research in 
Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA) for the Tenth Gender Issues Research Competition in 
2000, Maina addressed the issue of The Impact of Islam on Women’s Role in Political 
Mobilization in Kenya,
21
 which is the fullest treatment of Islam that he provides within the 
timeframe of this study. A shorter version of this report was later published as Muslim Women 
and Politics in Kenya.
22
 He states the problem as follows: 
In Islam, there is no dichotomy between the sacred and the secular, the affairs 
of the “church” and those of the state. Hence religion is inseparable from 
politics. Although Islam grants a woman political rights, in Kenya, Muslim 
women are on the periphery of political decision making processes. This 
situation creates a paradox which necessitates a research inquiry. The question 
is: is the role of a Muslim woman in Kenya’s politics a product of Islamic 
teachings and practices or are there other influences? In view of that, this study 
has attempted to investigate the impact of Islam on women’s role in political 
mobilization in Kenya.
23
 
A few points can be raised from this paragraph. First, Maina says that Muslim women 
are politically marginal in Kenya. Then he raises the question whether their marginality is due 
to Islam or “other influences,” though he has already provided an answer earlier in the 
                                                          
20
 Maina is the only Kenyan Christian writer who has also published any significant material on Islam 
prior to 1998. 
21
 Newton Kahumbi Maina, The Impact of Islam on Women's Role in Political Mobilization in Kenya 
(Addis Ababa: Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa, 2000). 
22
 Newton Kahumbi Maina, "Muslim Women and Politics in Kenya," in Theology of Reconstruction: 
Exploratory Essays, ed. Mary N. Getui and Emmanuel A. Obeng, (Nairobi: Acton Publishers, 2003). 
23
 Maina, The Impact of Islam on Women's Role, 10. 
146 
 
paragraph where he writes that “Islam grants a woman political rights.” This indicates that the 
role of Muslim women in politics in Kenya is limited by “other influences.” Finally, this 
political marginality is somehow connected to the absence of a “dichotomy between the 
sacred and the secular” within Islam. The non-separation between religion and state is not 
addressed any further in the article, as its presumed importance here is that Islam does 
specifically address the political role of women in the Qur’ān and Hadith.  
The issue is then presented as an intra-Muslim debate between ‘modernists’ and 
‘fundamentalists’ over the interpretation of the Qur’ān concerning “issues pertaining to 
women.” 24 Maina clearly favours the modernist side of the debate, giving examples of 
“women in early Islam,” such as Muhammad’s wives and daughter, Fatima, who were active 
in the politics of the community.
25
 In presenting this perspective he frequently cites from 
works by Muslim feminist scholars Fatima Mernissi and Leila Ahmed, concluding that “the 
teachings of Islam do not hinder the role of a woman in politics.”26 He presents the 
conservative argument as: women are the leaders of the home, whereas men are the leaders in 
the political arena.
27
 The conclusion of the report is that Muslim men in Kenya “interpret the 
Qur’ān in a way that stresses the subordinate role of women as wives and mothers,” which 
limits their participation in politics.
28
 He portrays the modernist argument as more accurately 
reflecting the Qur’ān and the Hadith,29 while representing the conservative argument as more 
influenced by patriarchal traditions,
30
 even writing, “Although the Islamic scriptures do not 
categorically state it, the question of superiority of men over women is a product of 
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patriarchal ideology.”31 Maina is therefore saying that patriarchal African traditions are the 
“other influences” that are primarily responsible for political marginality among Kenyan 
Muslim women. Gifford has noted that Kenyan theologians often present African culture in a 
“rather idealised” fashion, 32 and Maina goes against this trend. As will be seen, this is a 
unique character of Maina’s writing as he defends his understanding of Islam against both 
Christian (and Western) stereotypes and African cultural adaptations of Islam. 
In another article addressing women’s issues in Islam,33 Maina also writes of how 
Muslim women may be marginalised and even denigrated by religion.
34
 However, he states 
that “Islam and Christianity could be cited as religions whose doctrinal imperatives legitimize 
male domination over women.”35 In general, he says that the status of women36 improved 
with the advent of Islam over the pre-Islamic situation. He also notes that Christian women 
could learn from Muslim women on the issue of inheritance.
37
 Therefore, Maina seeks to 
establish parity between Islam and Christianity on women’s issues, which, as will be seen, is a 
common strategy among scholars of the mainline churches in Kenya.  
Maina presented a paper, The Historical Roots of Conflicts between Christians and 
Muslims in Kenya,
38
 at a conference on interfaith dialogue in 2008 at the Catholic University 
of Eastern Africa in Nairobi. He introduced his paper saying: 
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 It is shown that since the first interaction between Christianity and 
Islam in Kenya, the former enjoyed a position of power while the latter was 
presumably reduced to an underdog status. This was the situation during the 
colonial period, a situation that created competition between Christianity and 
Islam. This competition has engendered conflict between Christians and 
Muslims. It is concluded that the causes of conflicts between Christians and 
Muslims in the contemporary period are a product of historical antecedents.
39
 
The purpose of the article is to demonstrate that present day tension between Muslims 
and Christians in Kenya is due to Western colonial and missionary experience, which is 
consistent with expectations arising from Gifford’s analysis of Kenyan mainline churches. 
What was the situation during the colonial period that Maina refers to? He claims that the 
“missionaries wanted to establish Christianity …”40 in Kenya, therefore viewing “… Islam as 
an enemy religion and competitor that need to be obliterated.”41 He also uses similar 
vocabulary to describe colonial era missionary activity, such as a Christian “onslaught on 
Islam … in order to eradicate it.”42 The actions bringing about these accusations are: 
missionaries preached “openly against Islam and slavery,”43 missionary-provided education 
and medical services “were geared towards evangelization and converting people to 
Christianity,”44 and close cooperation between missions and colonialism included requests 
from the colonial government for missions to “broaden their bases of operation in all areas in 
order to hinder the progress of Islam.”45 These actions demonstrate an unconstructive 
approach towards Islam, explaining negative Muslim reaction towards Christianity. However, 
they give no indication of the sort of violence implied in the exaggerated language that Maina 
sometimes uses. This seems to be motivated by the desire to fault Western missionaries. 
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Placing an overstated blame on outsiders also functions as a means to provide at least partial 
excuse for the negative attitude of current Kenyan Christians. 
Maina also mentions recent phenomena that have adversely affected Christian-Muslim 
relations in Kenya. First, “a lot of resources have found their way into Africa from the oil-rich 
Arab and Muslim countries,” which have “enabled Islam to economically compete with 
Christianity in missionary work.”46 Now Christians see Islam as true competition; both 
religions have begun to use propaganda against the other. For example, Muslims accused 
Daystar University in Nairobi of paying Muslims to convert to Christianity.
47
 Christians have 
made similar accusations against Muslims for using “unorthodox means to spread Islam in 
Christian areas.”48 He claims that the use of such propaganda increases the tension in the 
relationship between Muslims and Christians. Second, this competition is also shown through 
calls by Kenyan Christian leaders “to intensify evangelization in order to stem the tide of the 
spread of Islam.”49 These calls to evangelism are understood as responses to the rise in 
Muslim da’wa. Third, Maina writes of the relatively new practice of mihadhara50 (public 
debates) by Muslim preachers that have sometimes led to physical confrontations due to their 
polemical nature.
51
 The method of mihadhara is said to have come from the late South 
African preacher and polemicist, Ahmed Deedat. Fourth, due to terrorist attacks in Kenya and 
around the world “Kenyan Christians have an inherent phobia for Islam and 
Muslims.”52These attacks, clearly indicated to have been instigated by “the Saudi fugitive 
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Osama bin Laden,”53 have created a “social perception of Muslims as a people who thrive on 
violence.”54 Fifth, the fear of Islam is perpetuated by the Western media, who portray it as “a 
source of intolerance, brutality, irrationality, backwardness, militancy, extremism and 
terrorism.”55 Sixth, Kenyan political issues concerning the inclusion of kadhi courts in the 
constitution
56
 and the signing of a MoU between presidential candidate, Raila Odinga, and a 
Muslim organisation
57
 are said to have had detrimental repercussions on Christian-Muslim 
relations. Interestingly, most of these phenomena are clearly indicated to have their origins 
outside of Kenya. The only exceptions are the local political issues of kadhi courts and the 
MoU, and possibly some statements by Christian leaders. One of Maina’s concerns in 
presenting these interfaith problems is to demonstrate that their origin is ultimately foreign to 
Kenya. This is as significant as the presentation of the historical situation in Kenya itself. He 
also attempts to hold both Muslims and Christians responsible for the conflicts. He is careful 
to show no favouritism towards either faith in critiquing the current situation. 
Maina brings the paper to a close saying “in the contemporary period cases of 
conflicts are an exception rather than a rule.”58 He affirms “a long tradition of tolerance, 
mutual respect and peaceful co-existence between Christians and Muslims.”59 He then gives 
recent examples of Christians and Muslims working together in Kenya, which leads him to 
conclude that “Christians and Muslims can work together for the common good.”60 By 
writing that conflict is an exception in the contemporary period, he is again contrasting the 
independent African era with the colonial Western era of interreligious relations. In writing of 
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Christians and Muslims working together, he does not, however, address the question of how 
and who decides what is the common good in Kenya. Do Muslims and Christians differ on 
their understanding of the common good for Kenya? If so, how then is the ‘common’ good 
known and decided upon? This is a question that will be seen again. 
In Christian-Muslim Dialogue in Kenya
61
 Maina addresses many of the same issues of 
conflict in a similar fashion as found in the paper discussed above.
62
 For this reason only the 
part of the article that advocates for interfaith dialogue in Kenya will be discussed. According 
to Maina, “the teachings of Islam and Christianity provide the basis for dialogue between 
Christians and Muslims.”63  
For Christians dialogue is said to be ingrained in the teachings of Jesus. Maina 
specifically mentions the story found in Luke 4:16-30 in which Jesus speaks in the synagogue 
in Nazareth. In this story Jesus says that “God is not only a God of Israel but equally a God of 
the Gentiles.”64 He further comments: 
The account of Jesus in these verses shows that God is not limited and 
confined to a particular group of people. He is a God of others too. This means 
that Christians should reach out and dialogue with Muslims as brothers and 
sisters because all are children of one God.
65
 
In this passage Maina appeals to the universality of God as the Christian basis for 
dialogue with Muslims. God is understood to also be the God of Muslims. As will be seen in 
the discussion of the popular Christian literature on Islam, God is not always understood in 
this way among Kenyan Christians. He refers to Muslims and Christians as brothers and 
sisters, emphasising their commonality over their differences. This family relationship would 
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imply that mutual respect and love should be the norm in their relationship. This family 
relation is based upon both Christians and Muslims being “children of one God,” which 
implies that believers of both religions share in that relationship. Maina is most likely 
directing his appeal specifically to issues that he observes in the Kenyan church. 
For Muslims dialogue is rooted in the nature of da’wa: 
Da’wah should not be coercive. It should only be fulfilled with the free 
consent of the called: “there is no compulsion in religion” (Qur’ān 2:256). 
People who do not pay attention to the message should be approached again 
(3:176-177; 5:108; 47:32). The responsibility of a Muslim is to present truth to 
the people and not to force them to accept it (39:41). This means that dialogue 
is an important component of da’wah work.66 
For Maina the non-coerciveness of da’wa implies the necessity of dialogue. A Muslim 
engaged in da’wa is only responsible for the presentation of the message to others, not for the 
acceptance or non-acceptance of the message. If the recipient of the message does not accept 
it, the only option is to communicate the message another time. It seems that dialogue is then 
understood to represent a form of da’wa that is inherently non-coercive. Since the foundation 
for dialogue among Christians was found to relate to specific issues within the Kenyan 
church, it is plausible that Maina understands da’wa in Kenya to be often done in a coercive 
manner. The mihadhara debates mentioned previously may represent a coercive method of 
da’wa. 
Maina discusses the goals of dialogue between Muslims and Christians, writing: 
Dialogue should foster a better and mutual understanding, communion 
and co-operation between Christians and Muslims for them to live and work 
together. For an effective dialogue, Christians and Muslims should cultivate a 
positive attitude towards others and their religious beliefs. This means either 
should strive to go above the deep seated prejudices and stereotypes. For 
example, Christians should be careful about the blanket condemnation of Islam 
as a “religion that is spread through the edge of the sword,” or the emotive 
label which describes Muslims as fundamentalists. To shed these stereotypes, 
Christians need to understand that Islam is a peace loving religion which does 
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not advocate violence and terrorism of whatever nature. Extreme cases should 
not be used to judge Islam, as doing so would be tantamount to distorting the 
image of Islam.
67
 
The primary goals are practical: mutual understanding, co-operation, working 
together, and living together, rather than theological. By contrast, for example, Mahmoud 
Ayoub provides primarily theological goals for dialogue such as, accepting the divine 
inspiration of each religion, being spiritual partners on a journey towards the divine, and 
seeing each faith as salvific.
68
 Maina is more concerned with living together in peaceful 
relationships, which he believes can only happen when there is positive respect for the 
religious beliefs of others. Elsewhere, he says that people of each faith tradition can “borrow 
and learn from each other through dialogue.”69 Perhaps most importantly, he again addresses 
the local situation, in which “Christians and Muslims seem entrenched in their negative 
attitudes toward each other,”70 by stressing that certain stereotypes must be overcome, namely 
that Islam is violent and Muslims are fundamentalists. He only writes of Christians 
overcoming stereotypes, which should be understood to indicate his target audience and not a 
belief that Muslims harbour no prejudices. His concern is to encourage Christians to correct 
their distorted images of Islam and to engage in constructive dialogue.  
Maina also discusses the proper way to approach dialogue. He shows some 
dependence on Jesuit theologian, Jacques Dupuis.
71
 He writes: 
Dialogue takes into cognizance the doctrinal differences that exist 
between Christians and Muslims. These differences should be taken as the 
strengths of each religious group rather than points of weakness. It is these 
differences that could be explored to provide new insights about others’ 
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religion, to provide accommodation for others opinions and points of view 
which are necessary for an effective dialogue to take place.
72
 
He later adds that while trying to understand these differences, participants in dialogue 
maintain “their own religious convictions.”73 Here Maina follows Dupuis, who suggests that 
true dialogue between adherents of different religions must rest upon the “integrity of their 
faith,”74 which means that differences must be recognised and dealt with. Therefore, for 
Maina dialogue is a learning experience in which adherents of each religion learn from each 
other’s differences, learning to become tolerant of diverse points of view. Within a nation 
such as Kenya, which provides for freedom of religion, then each religion has a right to 
“propagate its faith,”75 though Maina qualifies this by mentioning the negative example of 
mihadhara as provocation. 
It is clear that Maina is concerned about the tensions and misunderstandings between 
Muslims and Christians in Kenya. His expressed desire is for dialogue and cooperation. 
Perhaps the exaggerated and excessive vocabulary that he sometimes uses can be explained 
by a desire to influence his primarily mainline Christian readers, grabbing their attention. 
Again it should be noted that the brunt of ‘blame’ is assigned to past missionaries for the 
current conflicts, the causes of which “are apparently a carryover from the colonial period” 
that “continue to plague the relations between Christians and Muslims.”76 By saying that 
current attitudes are a product of the missionary and colonial past, he may be strategically 
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implying to his readers that continuing with these same attitudes is to persist in the missionary 
and colonial past that Kenyan mainline Christians profess to have moved beyond.
77
 
In discussing Islamic fundamentalism in an article in AFER,
78
 a Catholic journal 
published in Kenya, Maina aims to correct misconceptions that equate Islam, and especially 
Islamic renewal movements, with extremism and terrorism. He writes that the word, Islam, is 
“derived from the Arabic root of salm, which means peace,”79 thus meaning that Islam is a 
“religion of peace.”80 However, Maina also includes a rather long list of atrocities committed 
by Islamic extremists
81
 that would seem to undermine his argument to the ordinary reader that 
Islam is a religion of peace. 
In Islamophobia among Christians and Its Challenge in Entrenchment of Kadhis 
Courts in Kenya,
82
 Maina again takes up the theme of conflict and competition between 
Muslims and Christians in Kenya. He begins the article by indicating that not all Christians 
were opposed to the inclusion of the kadhi courts in the constitution, though most of the 
article discusses those parts of the church who strongly opposed their inclusion. The primary 
theme of the article is that church leaders promote an irrational fear of Islam in order to 
motivate followers to engage in competition with Islam to slow its spread and increase the 
spread of Christianity.
83
  
As can be seen from the above discussions, Maina generally advocates for Muslims 
and critiques negative Christian attitudes. In discussing tensions between the two 
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communities in Kenya, he finds the present conflicts to have historical antecedents in 
colonial-era missionary attitudes and actions. Christian fears and misconceptions are 
attributed mostly to this past and to the portrayal of Islam in Western media. Islamic 
extremism, which comes from outside Kenya, is also said to hold some responsibility for 
these tensions. In discussing women’s issues, he wishes to defend both women and Islam, 
which leads him towards a difficult position concerning his support of Muslims against 
Christian misconceptions. This is solved by observing that Christianity also has a poor record 
in defending the rights of women, by commenting that Islam has improved the lives of 
women over the pre-Islamic jahiliyya, and by using modernist Muslim scholars to state that 
the Qur’ān and Hadith advance the rights of women more than Muslim traditionalists, 
including the Muslim community in Kenya, have allowed.  
6.2.2 Anne Nkirote Kubai 
Anne Nkirote Kubai, a Methodist, who obtained her PhD at the University of London 
in Religious Studies, now teaches at Uppsala University in Sweden and is a researcher at the 
Nordic Africa Institute.
84
 Her approach to the tensions found between Muslims and Christians 
in eastern Africa is influenced by her theoretical point of view that human conflicts are 
normally caused by economic and political factors, which are then “disguised as religious,”85 
as identity becomes a significant issue in the conflict.
86
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Kubai published The Muslim View of Power
87
 in 1999 in a widely-circulated journal 
among Kenyan intellectuals, Wajibu,
88
 shortly after the American embassy bombing in 
Nairobi. The article is an attempt to enlighten readers seeking an explanation of a Muslim 
understanding of political power after the terrorist attack. The same issue of the journal also 
includes an article about a Christian view of power.
89
 She introduces the article as follows: 
Islam presents itself as a blueprint of social order, as a way of life 
based on rules and principles that are divinely ordained. It is a comprehensive 
way of life, which makes no distinction between the sacred and the secular: 
both spheres form one indivisible realm. All creation is suffused with the 
ineffable Oneness of God. The inseparability of the sacred and the secular 
domains is explained in terms of God's dominion, which is absolute. The 
Quran lays emphasis on the unity of all things. In Islam it is "religion and 
state" (din wa dawla). The precedence for this was set by the Prophet 
Muhammad when he founded a religio-political community in Madina and 
wrote the famous "Constitution of Madina" in which the obligations of the 
various communities (both of believers and non-believers) resident in Madina 
were outlined. It is not surprising therefore that, unlike Christianity which 
renders unto Caesar that which belongs to Caesar, Islam does not separate the 
two domains of the sacred and the secular, but retains both within its control.
90
 
The key to understanding the Muslim view of power according to Kubai is the non-
separation of the secular and the sacred; this idea is mentioned in some form at least seven 
times in this short paragraph. By indicating that the Prophet Muhammad “founded a religio-
political community,” she anchors the inseparability of the secular and the sacred in the very 
essence of Islam, and contrasts this with Christianity, which separates “the two domains.” It 
is, however, doubtful that the Kenyan church understands these domains to be completely 
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separate.
91
 She addresses the implications of the Muslim non-separation of the secular and 
sacred by explaining that Muslims expect “an ordinary government to be imbued with 
righteousness.”92 Interestingly, only a few years before this article was written some church 
leaders in Kenya agitated for more ‘righteousness’ in the Kenyan government,93 and they 
were told by leading officials that the church should keep to spiritual matters.
94
 It is not 
obvious that Kubai is addressing both the Muslim view of power and the recent history of 
Christian protest against an authoritarian regime, but the similarities in her account give rise 
to this question. 
She continues, writing that citizens are expected to obey the rulers of the nation, even 
if they are living in a non-Islamic nation.
95
 However, it is also stressed that ultimate obedience 
is to God, and that “the actions of those in position of political power should be judged by the 
standards of the shari’ah.”96 She adds that a fatwa does not need to be obeyed if one lives 
outside “the jurisdiction of an issuing religious authority,”97 which must have been an 
important question for Kenyans at the time. Kubai emphasizes that “social justice” is an 
important part of an ideal Muslim social order.
98
 The “divinely ordained” rules, such as found 
in the shari’a, favour the community over the individual and “human welfare” over “human 
liberty.”99  
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She concludes the article by briefly discussing current Islamic revival in the world. 
She writes that “the central concern of the revival is the state: how can Muslims resist what is 
seen as the alien and the oppressive power of the modern state.”100 It is understood as a 
political revival more than a spiritual revival. This article may assuage concerns a bit, as she 
stresses that Islam enjoins its followers to obey the state. Readers may also see their recent 
concerns with an authoritative regime and the response of Christian leaders mirrored in her 
explanation. However, she frequently writes also of the preference for an Islamic state and the 
possible rejection of a state that is unrighteous. Her description of the Islamic revival may 
raise concerns as well as alleviate fears. 
In Religious Communities and the Struggle for Civil Space, Kubai writes of the role of 
religion in violent conflict. Her basic point of view is that conflict originates in social and 
economic causes, which can then be exacerbated by differences in religious identity. The 
article is about religion in general, and only one paragraph specifically addresses Islam.  
Islam, too, teaches peace. The very word ‘Islam’ means peace! 
Qur’anic verses speak of peace, peacemaking, and forgiveness, and of God as 
Gracious and Merciful. There are various opinions on verses that deal with 
peace, with some saying that it is peace for and among Muslims. However, 
other verses speak of what can be interpreted as violence against those who are 
considered to be unbelievers and hypocrites (66:9). Again on this injunction, 
there is a variety of opinions among Muslim scholars: those who are opposed 
to the use of violence draw support from the verses that encourage a peaceful 
call to Islamic faith, while others advocate for the use of combat against 
unbelievers. Another Qur’anic injunction that has gained ascendancy and also 
a multiplicity of interpretations and applications over centuries is the concept 
of jihad. The term “jihad” means to strive and struggle in the way of Allah. 
Usually for those who use jihad, the variety of theological meanings is 
overshadowed by the emphasis on combat or ‘fight’, as expressed in the 
Qur’an (47:4).101 
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She begins the paragraph by writing, like Maina,
102
 that Islam means peace and 
indicating that the Qur’ān speaks of peace and forgiveness. However, the presence of violence 
in Islam receives more prominence, saying that theological nuances of jihad as struggle are 
“overshadowed” in both reality and in the Qur’ān “by the emphasis on combat.” She also 
points out that Muslim scholars differ on the theologies of peace and violence within Islam. 
Some say that “it is peace for and among Muslims,” and some scholars oppose the use of 
violence altogether, while “others advocate for the use of combat against unbelievers.” No 
indication of which views may be most prevalent among Muslims is given, lending the 
impression that each view is relatively common. The article also notes that the Bible has 
stories of peace and love and those that promote violence.
103
 Her intention is not to paint 
Islam as violent, but to demonstrate that religions may be used to promote peace or violence, 
though her description of Islam tends more towards violence than peace.  
Kubai also gives two examples from Nairobi of interreligious conflict in which the 
original cause, in her view, was land use disputes between economically marginalised groups 
of people, but due to issues of identity became understood as religious conflicts.
104
 In one 
example, the expansion of the central Jamia Mosque meant that some market kiosks were to 
be demolished. The traders responded by throwing the heads of pigs into the mosque 
compound. The other example is similar. In a section of Nairobi known as South B, another 
mosque also planned to expand its compound; a parcel of land where informal traders had 
normally done commerce was fenced in. During the ensuing conflict she mentions that Our 
Lady Queen of Peace Catholic Church was burned down. In this incident the mosque was set 
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on fire first, and the church was burnt down in response.
105
 However, the author does not 
mention the destruction of the mosque, thus leaving the reader to wonder why Muslim youth 
would respond to this incident by burning down a church. There is again a tendency in this 
article for Kubai to present Islam as possibly violent. For her both incidents are examples of 
how a conflict, which she presumes began for non-religious reasons, became a religious 
conflict, so that in one instance traders used pig heads as anti-Islam symbols, and in another 
Muslim youth attacked a church. In contrast to this interpretation, Hassan Mwakimako, a 
Kenyan Muslim, claims that the Kenyan media only presented the Muslim attack on the 
church as religious, neglecting to say that the traders who burnt down the mosque were most 
likely Christians.
106
 In other words, he would like to interpret the event as religious conflict 
from the beginning. Maina also addresses this incident in South B and views it as a land 
dispute that took on religious dimensions.
107
 The religious difference between the traders and 
the Muslims most likely exacerbated the tensions, though religious difference was not the 
initial cause of the conflict. One might also ask why Kubai does not mention that the mosque 
was attacked first. The absence of this fact from her article means that an uninformed reader 
must assume that the violence was initiated by the Muslim community. Kubai seems to 
demonstrate bias through not including all of the facts, thus implying that Islam is violent. 
In 2000 Kubai also presented a paper in Durban, South Africa, entitled Christian-
Muslim Relations in Kenya since Independence. She begins the paper by stressing “Arab 
hegemony” in Kenyan coastal Islam,108 thus giving the impression that Islam in Kenya is an 
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Arab phenomenon rather than an African one.
109
 It is a common strategy in Kenya to taint an 
opposing group with an accusation of being foreign-influenced.
110
 Chapter four shows that 
current historiography of Islam in East Africa demonstrates that the Swahili Muslim 
phenomena along the coast, while influenced by Arab traders, has its roots in Africa.  
Much of the paper consists of explanations for why there is tension between Christians 
and Muslims in Kenya. As Kubai explains it, the principle reason is the impression among 
Muslims that Christians have had and continue to have social and political advantages over 
Muslims. While acknowledging some truth to Muslim disadvantages, she also says that 
religious identity issues have been superimposed over other social, economic and political 
issues.
111
 From this it would seem that Kenyan Muslims have been ‘imagining’ a religious 
discrimination that in reality is due to other social and historical factors. These socio-
historical factors are rooted in colonial policies, such as the political and economic isolation 
of Muslim areas from the rest of Kenya
112
 and colonial missions, as Christian missionaries 
sought to restrict the influence of “Islam while they fostered the spread of Christianity.”113 In 
contrast, Maina strongly argued that Muslims have actually been discriminated against by 
Christians in a paper presented at a seminar on Islam in Kenya.
114
  
Kubai strongly implies that historical underdevelopment with its origin in colonial 
policy has erroneously led many people from Muslim communities to understand their 
situation in terms of religious conflict. She uses the example of the Somali people in North 
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Eastern Province, where there is little infrastructure due to neglect of the colonial government 
and the subsequent Kenyan government,
115
 and where “most of the NGOs involved in the 
endeavour to improve the lives of the peoples of northern Kenya are Christian.”116 In this 
situation, conflicts between the local Muslim community and the central government take on 
“religious overtones”117 that have included attacks on churches.  
Additionally, Kubai attributes some of the tensions to foreign Islamic movements 
having influence among Kenyan Muslims.
118
 These Islamist movements then contribute to 
anti-Christian attitudes. Recently introduced multiparty politics in Kenya are also said to have 
given the Muslim community a voice that they hadn’t previously had, and this voice “is now 
becoming louder.”119 It seems that Muslims expressing their political aspirations and 
grievances are understood to be disruptive.  
Another factor in poor relationships between Muslims and Christians is said to be 
attitudes of superiority of Muslims over non-Muslims. Kubai argues that since many 
Muslims, especially converts in the interior, can’t read the Qur’ān and are “not concerned 
with the practice of orthodoxy,” they make use of “the antiquated coastal meta-cosmology of 
Arabness/civilization versus bush/savage” to understand their relationship with Christians.120 
Anything that is “unIslamic” is then said to be “ushenzi (uncivilzed/savage),”121 which 
impacts upon relations with others in the community, since Christians are therefore 
understood to be uncivilised. 
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She also briefly discusses some events that demonstrate conflict between Muslims and 
Christians.
122
 These incidents are not simply described, but Muslim representations of the 
conflicts are called into question. For example, in the case of a Catholic sponsored school in 
Isiolo where Muslims constructed a mosque and protested against the singing of hymns, 
Kubai asks a hypothetical question concerning Muslim reaction if the Catholic Church had 
built a chapel in a school sponsored by Muslims. She answers somewhat speculatively, “The 
most likely scenario would be that of Muslims rising up in arms, accusing Christians not only 
of disregarding the presence of a good number of Muslim girls in the school, but also of 
making plans to convert them to Christianity.”123 Incidents in which church representatives 
spoke out negatively about Islam are also mentioned
124
 to provide some balance, but the gist 
of the text suggests that the “peaceful co-existence” that has existed between the Christian 
majority and Muslim minority
125
 is more threatened by the actions of Muslims in Kenya than 
by Christian demographic, economic, social and political ascendancy.  
Kubai writes one paragraph in the context of tensions between Muslims and 
Christians, making theological comparisons. She wants to show that there are also theological 
tensions, though she maintains that less abstract issues are most significant in causing 
conflict. 
The doctrines of the two religions are essentially different though there 
are some common grounds of understanding, for instance the idea of One God, 
both are monotheistic. In Islam the relationship between God and humanity is 
that of master (Rabb) and servant (Abd) and therefore, life is a matter of 
service and worship (Ibadah). The primary goal of Islamic existence is 
submission to Allah. The particular emphasis of the Islamic understanding of 
God is on the unity/ontological Oneness of Allah (Tawhid). The response of 
Islam to Trinity is to enunciate its distinctive doctrine of Tawhid. It is an 
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unforgivable sin (shirk) to attribute partners to Allah. Each Muslim must 
affirm Tawhid each day and it infuses the very life of Islam.
126
 
Kubai appears to disagree with Maina when she writes that “the doctrines of the two 
religions are essentially different.” Maina writes in contrast that Christianity and Islam “share 
common beliefs.”127 The main differences that she names are the relationship between 
humanity and God (for Muslims it is one of master and slave) and the emphasis upon Tawhid. 
The opposing Christian beliefs are not mentioned, though it may be assumed that she 
supposes a Father-Child relationship between God and humanity and the Trinity to 
correspond. She also notes that these two Islamic doctrines influence everyday life, so that 
Islam is about submission and the “life of Islam” is infused with Tawhid, though it is not 
specified how. Again one may assume that the counter practice for Christians is relational due 
to the parental relationship with God. Kubai is not attempting to analyse the Islamic theology 
of God, but to simply highlight points of disagreement with Christianity that produce tension. 
Kubai writes in Walking a Tightrope: Christians and Muslims in Post-Genocide 
Rwanda of how Muslims were ‘less guilty’ than their Christian compatriots in the Rwanda 
genocide in 1994.
128
 Since this article discusses Rwanda in particular, the details will be of 
less interest for the present study. However, Kubai’s presentation of Islam here is of some 
interest. Gérard Prunier in The Rwanda Crisis wrote that Islam was “the only faith that 
provided a bulwark against barbarity”129 during the genocide. He attributed this to the fact that 
Muslims were “socially marginal” in Rwanda, which gave them a clear identity as a Muslim 
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community rather than as ethnically Hutu or Tutsi.
130
 Kubai quotes Prunier and comments 
that “the view that the marginalization of Muslims in Rwanda helped forge a close-knit 
community apparently immune to the perennial problem of Tutsi – Hutu identity is 
tenable,”131 though she does not fully endorse his view that Islamic identity completely 
superseded ethnic identities for Rwandan Muslims. She asserts that there are two observable 
“layers of identity,”132 an individual and a community layer among Rwandan Muslims. At the 
community level they formed a Muslim identity in opposition to the Christian majority, but 
“at the individual level, a Rwandan is Hutu, Tutsi or Twa.”133  
Kubai also offers reasons in addition to marginality that explain why Tutsis were able 
to hide and survive in Muslim areas. Tutsis who hid in mosques were spared, unlike those 
who hid in churches, because of a “widely held belief” in the efficacy of “Islamic magic.”134 
Imams in the mosques also preached against participation in the genocide.
135
 Islam, therefore, 
gained a reputation of being a “source of protection and healing,”136 and Islam has been 
growing in Rwanda.
137
 Wax, in her oft-quoted Washington Post article, says that Muslims 
now make up 14% of the population.
138
 American Christian mission organisations have used 
this statistic to promote missions to Rwanda.
139
 However, Kubai, while acknowledging that 
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Islam has grown, claims that Muslims comprise approximately 5% of the population.
140
 In a 
separate article on Pentecostalism in Rwanda, she asserts that Pentecostalism is the religious 
movement that has truly gained adherents after the genocide.
141
  
In Walking a Tightrope, she also finds that Muslims were not blameless in the 
genocide. For example, the editor of the influential newspaper, Kangura, who urged Hutus to 
kill Tutsis, was a Muslim.
142
 Some of those she interviewed also remarked that “some 
Muslims participated in the genocide.”143 From discussions she had among survivors she 
concludes that a Hutu Muslim would not kill a Tutsi Muslim, but they might kill a non-
Muslim Tutsi.
144
 One purpose of Kubai’s article is to dispel what she understands to be overly 
romanticised versions of Islam’s innocence in the Rwandan genocide. She is also very critical 
of the church’s role in the genocide and of its reaction to it.145 In addition she calls upon 
Christians to develop more equal relations with Rwandan Muslims.
146
 Her principle interest is 
missionary in nature exploring what is best for the continued witness of the church in 
Rwanda. 
In Striving in Faith, Kubai addresses issues similar to those in her other writings. She 
emphasizes that social injustices lead to conflicts in Africa, but that these conflicts “acquire 
religious overtones” in which religion serves as an “identity marker” and becomes 
predominant, “overshadowing” the other issues.147 She also writes that the scriptures of both 
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Christianity and Islam can be used to support either peace or violence, though noting that the 
“concept of jihad has gained ascendancy.”148  
She also writes about dialogue between Christians and Muslims, saying that it has 
been “bedevilled by mutual prejudices” and that participants “talk to” the other rather than 
hold a true discussion over issues.
149
 She asks if there are mutual conceptions of the problems 
facing the communities, and if there are equal power relations in the setting of agenda for 
such encounters. Testimonies of a “dialogue of life” are dismissed because they do “not go 
beyond an exchange of pleasantries.”150 Kubai also raises the issue of dialogue fatigue in 
which she says that adherents of both religions claim that “there is no reciprocity between the 
faith communities.”151 The examples that she uses come from Muslims, who say that 
Christians neither recognise the Qur’ān as the word of God, nor Muhammad as a prophet. She 
has not found dialogue to have been, so far, a means towards better understanding and 
relations between Muslims and Christians. 
6.2.3 Joseph Wandera 
Joseph Wandera,
152
 an Anglican, has written three articles on Islam in Kenya. He has 
also edited two books dealing with issues concerning Islam: Christian-Muslim Co-Existence 
in Eastern Africa and Constitutional Review in Kenya and Kadhi Courts.
153
 Similar to the 
above writers he approaches the subject from a socio-historical perspective, and like Maina he 
is critical of Christian discrimination against Muslims.  
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Wandera provides a brief history of Christian-Muslim relations in Kenya in the article 
Love Thy Neighbour,
154
 which was published in a Kenyan Jesuit journal, Hakimaki. Wandera, 
like Kubai, understands “conflict in modern society including religious ones …” to be the “… 
result of social and economic marginalisation and exploitation.”155 Therefore, Christian-
Muslim tensions in Kenya are not seen by Wandera to be primarily the result of religious 
difference, but due to historical and political processes that have led to marginalisation.
156
 The 
article looks at this history from the perspective of the lack of justice for the Muslim 
community. Due to a variety of factors Christians have obtained a position of relative 
dominance over Muslims. Most significant among these factors include an educational system 
dominated by Christian missions during the colonial era and the move of the seat of political 
and economic power from the predominately Muslim coast to the interior Highlands, where 
later much of the local population converted to Christianity.
157
 He writes that “Muslims 
remained suspicious of modern facilities such as education, health and industry because they 
associated them with Christianity,”158 due to the evangelistic methods of colonial era 
Christian mission. The resultant delay in the pursuit of education has left the Muslim 
community in a disadvantageous position from which they have yet to catch up.  
Wandera accepts Muslim claims of discrimination at face value, similar to Maina, but 
unlike Kubai who suspects exaggeration. An example is his view of President Kibaki’s 
declaration of “Idd Ul Hajj”159 as a national holiday in 2007. Wandera says that this Muslim 
holy day should have been a holiday as a matter of normal government policy, considering the 
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significant Muslim minority in Kenya, rather than being done as an election ploy.
160
 He also 
mentions that Kenyan Muslims express the opinion that they are treated as foreigners instead 
of “fellow citizens” in their own country.161 He believes that the formation of some radical 
Islamic groups in Kenya may be due to the discrimination felt by the Muslim community.
162
 
Wandera also notes in the article that Christians opposed making Eid al-Adha a holiday.
163
 
They have also resisted moves by political parties concerning agreements with Muslims over 
“their grievances.”164 In one instance Wandera does claim that Muslims may have obtained 
some advantage since the advent of a multiparty system, in view of the fact that the Muslim 
community is primarily urban and thus votes at a higher rate than rural Christian 
communities.
165
 On the issue of social justice, Wandera advocates for the Muslim community 
in this article. Therefore, he writes similarly to Maina, but somewhat differently than Kubai. 
In laying blame for Christian-Muslim tensions primarily at the feet of colonial-era policy and 
mission, he agrees with the Kenyan mainline Christian intellectual tradition as outlined by 
Gifford. 
In Christian-Muslim Co-Existence in the Light of Sacred Texts and Present 
Contexts
166
 on the emergence of street preaching (mihadhara
167
) by Muslim preachers, 
Wandera advocates the development of a “pluralistic theology” that would recognise that 
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salvation may be found in both Islam and Christianity.
168
 He is also concerned with the 
negative effect that mihadhara has on relations between Muslims and Christians. The Muslim 
preachers normally attack Christian beliefs and the Bible in the highly polemical manner of 
the late South African Muslim debater, Ahmed Deedat.
169
  
Interestingly, Chanfi Ahmed believes that this preaching “contributes to improved 
mutual understanding between the religions”170 simply because the Bible is being spoken of 
by Muslim preachers in a mixed Christian-Muslim audience. Chesworth views the mihadhara 
as being comparable to open air crusades by Christian preachers,
171
 thus explaining it as a 
problem of competing fundamentalisms. However, Wandera understands them to be a sign of 
increased “Islamic radicalism in East Africa” that “marks the end of the period of religious 
tolerance of local Islam.”172 He adds that Muslim identity in Kenya is now being formed 
“over and against the ‘other’ who is Christian.”173  
He finds two principle problems with the mihadhara. First, the Muslim preachers use 
and interpret the Christian scriptures in a negative manner, showing considerable disrespect 
for the Other.
174
 Their message about the Bible is that it is “an inferior version of the Qur’an, 
a corrupted scripture.”175 Secondly, these events are marked by an “inherent” hostile 
atmosphere,
176
 in which any Christians who speak out are usually jeered.
177
 He concludes that 
                                                          
168
 Wandera, "Mihadhara in Nairobi," 104. 
169
 Ibid., 102. 
170
 Chanfi Ahmed, "The Wahubiri wa Kislamu (Preachers of Islam) in East Africa," Africa Today 54, 
no. 4 (2008): 4. 
171
 Chesworth, "Fundamentalism and Outreach Strategies in East Africa." 
172
 Wandera, "Mihadhara in Nairobi," 102. 
173
 Ibid. 
174
 Ibid., 95. 
175
 Ibid., 105. 
176
 Ibid., 104. 
177
 Ibid., 103. 
172 
 
both Muslim and Christian leaders need to speak out about these events and teach mutual 
respect between the religions.
178
  
Wandera offers a pluralist theology that recognises salvation being found in both 
religions as a solution to the problem. He writes: 
What possibilities are there for both Muslims and Christians to lay 
claim to the complete revelation of truth from the One Almighty God? 
Although, there are apparently conflicting claims in the Qur’an and the Bible, 
is it not possible to witness to that truth without conflicting with one another? 
For example, is it not possible to come to an understanding of how God shows 
us His holy will in revelation in a way acceptable both to the Muslims and the 
Christians? That indeed God has not left himself without a witness, the witness 
even of a fully saving knowledge in other faith traditions?
179
 I have a sense that 
perhaps such a pluralistic theology would save both Muslims and Christians 
from imperialistic tendencies that tend to pit them against each other.
180
 
 This paragraph reveals some dependence upon the pluralist theology of Samuel 
Kibicho, a Kenyan theologian and professor. There are two indications in this paragraph that 
Wandera’s call for a pluralistic theology has practical and social goals more than theological 
ones, namely peaceful relations between the two groups. He suggests in a rhetorical question 
that Muslims and Christians can recognise “conflicting claims in the Qur’an and the Bible … 
without conflicting with one another.” He also contrasts a pluralist theology with “imperialist 
tendencies,” (Kibicho’s phrase) which he views as being a reason for conflict. Within the 
context of African theological discussion the reference to imperialistic tendencies carries 
connotations of colonialism, foreignness, and being non-African,
181
 thus subtly reproaching 
those who don’t recognise truth in each other’s religion of being very much like the “puppets 
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of foreign masters” whom former president Moi frequently found among advocates for 
democracy.
182
 This would apply equally to Muslims and Christians. 
Though Wandera’s principle concern is peaceful relations, he also raises some 
theological issues through the use of four rhetorical questions, which are a stylistic choice that 
enables the author to make more daring statements, while disarming the reader. By asking if 
Muslims and Christians have “the complete revelation of truth from the One Almighty God,” 
he implies that this truth is larger than either religion; therefore, neither religion can claim a 
monopoly on truth. This is Wandera’s explanation for why there are “apparently conflicting 
claims” between the two scriptures. Following Kibicho, Wandera suggests that a “fully saving 
knowledge” of God exists outside of either Christianity or Islam, as well as within each of 
these traditions. It would naturally follow that each religion should than accept the other. It is 
also important to recognise that his theological understanding remains practical and ethical, as 
it is God’s “holy will” that Muslims and Christians should come together to understand each 
other. The fact that Wandera introduces the idea of a pluralist theology through rhetorical 
questions suggests that this theological approach towards Islam may not be easily accepted in 
Kenyan mainline Christianity. 
Some interesting peeks into the views of church leaders are found in Anglican 
Responses to Kadhis Courts in Kenya,
183
 where Wandera reviews official statements and 
interviews Anglican bishops. While noting that not all churches, nor all Anglican leaders, 
opposed the new constitution because of the kadhi courts, Wandera is critical of the generally 
negative response of much of the Kenyan Church. Some Anglican leaders supported the 
constitution and the inclusion of the kadhi courts, while some bishops supported voting for 
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the new constitution while maintaining reservations concerning provisions for these courts in 
the constitution.
184
 Perhaps most interesting in this article are the glimpses that he is willing to 
allow the reader of the misinformed and prejudiced views of some Anglican bishops, who 
claim to “know Muslims.”185 Their primary view of Muslims seems to be that they are 
untrustworthy and desirous of taking political control of Kenya.
186
  
6.2.4 Joseph Mutei 
Joseph Mutei, from the African Evangelical Presbyterian Church, presented a paper, 
The Bible: Classical and Contemporary Muslim Attitudes and Exegesis,
187
 at the World 
Evangelical Alliance Theological Commission Symposium on African Theology at Nairobi 
Evangelical Graduate School of Theology (NEGST) in Nairobi in 2006. Mutei recently 
completed a doctorate in Islamic Studies at the Catholic University of East Africa. He is 
currently head of the Department of Church History, Mission and Practical Theology at St. 
Paul’s University in Limuru, Kenya. St. Paul’s University is sponsored by the National 
Council of Churches of Kenya, the Anglican Church of Kenya, the Presbyterian Church of 
East Africa, the Methodist Church of Kenya and the Reformed Church of East Africa. 
Therefore, though Mutei presented this paper at NEGST and it was published in an 
Evangelical journal, his article may be discussed along with those from the Kenyan mainline 
scholars. 
Mutei’s article, based on his master’s thesis at St. Paul’s, discusses the method of 
Islamic da’wa, mihadhara, which has become common in East Africa. His thesis is that this 
current method is based upon a much older approach of polemical writing by Muslims 
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opposing Christianity. He says these polemical writings approach “the Bible from a Qur’ānic 
standpoint.”188 However, he maintains that neither the Qur’ān nor the Bible can be correctly 
understood and evaluated according to the standards of the other scripture.
189
  
Mutei begins by briefly discussing attitudes towards the Bible by classical Muslim 
scholars Ibn Hazm, ‘Abd al Jabbār, and al-Tabari. He classifies these approaches under four 
categories: tahrīf (falsification),190 naskh (abrogation),191 biblical exegesis,192 and lack of 
tawatūr (lack of reliable transmission).193 He provides a few examples for each category, then 
after discussing this historical development concludes:  
What were Muslim scholars attempting to do in using the Bible? To 
understand that would help us to understand their attitude to the Bible. They 
wanted to show respect for the Bible because of its place as the one preceding 
the Qur’ān and for the Prophets contained within it, Moses, David and Jesus in 
particular. They also had a desire to use the Bible to show that Muhammad and 
Islam are clearly foretold in it. Some scholars wanted to attack the Bible in 
order to warn Muslims. … Finally they wished to use the Bible in a polemical 
manner, to show Jews and Christians how corrupted it was, to show them the 
error of their ways and to lead them to the truth.
194
 
Mutei views the Muslim approach to the Bible as one of paradox. The Bible is 
respected as a previous scripture that tells the stories of prophets familiar to Muslims, yet 
since much of the Bible also seems to contradict the Qur’ān, it must also be corrupted in some 
way. The accusations of corruption and the claim that the coming of Muhammad is foretold in 
the Bible serve both to guard Muslims from error that might occur from reading the Christian 
scriptures and as polemical argument against Christians.
195
 They would, therefore, make use 
of the Bible to both argue for the truthfulness of Islam and to demonstrate the unreliability of 
                                                          
188
 Ibid.: 207. 
189
 Ibid. 
190
 Ibid.: 209-211. 
191
 Ibid.: 211-212. 
192
 Ibid.: 212-213. 
193
 Ibid.: 213-214. 
194
 Ibid.: 214. 
195
 Ibid.: 210. 
176 
 
Christianity and its scriptures. By being read in this manner, the Bible remains a relatively 
unknown book among Muslims.  
Mutei then brings the recent phenomena of mihadhara in Kenya into the discussion. 
He finds the teachings involved to be derived from the approach to the Bible of classical 
Muslim scholars,
196
 writing “both the Bible and the Qur’ān are used side by side either to 
discount some Christian teachings or endorse some Islamic teachings.”197 For example, a 
Muslim speaker will ask if Jesus is God. Then using the biblical texts he (the speakers are 
always men) will show that they teach “the unity of God,” thus denying notions of the 
divinity of Jesus. The Qur’ān will also be used to demonstrate that Jesus was only a 
messenger of God.
198
 
Mutei also claims that Muslims believe that Islam is the only true religion (i.e. 
exclusivism); the Bible is then used to demonstrate this.
199
 Biblical texts are used to show that 
Ishmael received God’s blessing, that Muhammad was foretold, etc. Worship is also included 
in the debates; speakers attempt to show biblical support for the five pillars of Islam, the 
performance of ablutions, the prayer posture, etc.
200
 Christian religious terminology, such as 
uzima wa milele (eternal life) and kuokoka (to be saved), is also used to describe Islamic 
teachings.
201
  
He also considers these public debates from a social perspective. Concerning 
mihadhara he writes: 
In the East African context, Mihadhara are a means of Muslims 
exerting themselves in a dominantly Christian setting. Having been for a long 
time passive and less active in outreach, while Christians continued to make 
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headway in many parts, Mihadhara may be seen as a reactionary attempt to 
catch up. This has made Christianity their sole target for outreach.
202
 
They are part of the new dynamism of Islam in East Africa, which has played a back 
seat role to Christianity for decades. They are a means for the Muslim community to assert 
itself and its new found confidence. While Mutei appreciates the social factors leading to the 
development of this practice, he is dissatisfied with their conduct. In his view Muslim 
preachers involved in mihadhara will use anything in an attempt to discredit the Bible and 
Christianity, including contradicting themselves as they speak
203
 or falsely advertising that 
prominent converts from Christianity, such as former bishops, would be speaking at the 
event.
204
 For Mutei a lack of integrity is an almost inherent part of the method of mihadhara.  
A more subtle indictment is located in the discussion as a whole. By linking the 
current practice of mihadhara by Muslims in Kenya with the longer tradition of Arab Muslim 
polemics against Christianity, Mutei indicates that mihadhara – despite its outward 
appearances (i.e. African Muslim debaters) – is non-African at its core. 
6.2.5 Conclusion 
After examining the principle Kenyan mainline Christian scholars of Islam, it is clear 
that they explore and interpret the same history from a relatively similar perspective. Current 
tensions between Christians and Muslims are understood to have their origin in the policies 
and practices of the colonial government and the actions of the Christian missionary 
movement. Social, economic and political factors are generally considered to be primary, 
while theological and religious differences are assumed to be less significant in causing 
tensions and conflicts. Islamic movements external to Kenya are also understood to have had 
a detrimental effect on relations between Muslims and Christians. Mutei, whose only article 
                                                          
202
 Ibid.: 218. 
203
 Ibid.: 219. 
204
 Ibid.: 220. 
178 
 
discusses mihadhara, finds this method of da’wa to have detrimental effects on interreligious 
relations. Kubai differs from Maina and Wandera mostly on the degree of blame that can be 
apportioned to Muslims and Christians in the conflicts, Kubai placing a greater degree of fault 
on Muslim actions and response. Though none of these writers gives much space to 
theological discussion, they agree that there are theological similarities and differences 
between Christianity and Islam. Mutei hints at the concept of understanding each religion 
from within its own tradition when he advocates that the Qur’ān and the Bible must be 
interpreted on their own terms, rather than according to other religion’s scriptures. Maina and 
Wandera stress the similarities between Christianity and Islam, while Kubai emphasizes the 
differences. Both Maina and Wandera propose a theological understanding in which Muslims 
and Christians would recognise the validity of each other’s faith.  
6.3 Discussions of Islam by other Kenyan Theologians 
Kenyan theologians, who are not scholars of Islam, have also written on certain 
aspects of Islam. Their works will be examined in this section. 
6.3.1 Jesse Mugambi 
Mugambi, an Anglican, who is the leading Kenyan theologian of the current 
generation, edited a textbook on comparative religions to be used in universities in Africa.
205
 
This book was originally published in 1990 and re-issued in 2010. Since the book was 
considered significant enough to be re-published (within the timeframe for this study), be 
used as a university textbook, and gain a new readership, it will be briefly examined. 
Mugambi has contributed two chapters on Islam and Waruta has written another. 
These chapters differ significantly from typical introductory chapters on Islam in Western 
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textbooks on world religions. For example, while the five pillars of Islam are discussed,
206
 
these are found in a section entitled “The Teachings of Muhammad”207 rather than the 
teachings of the Qur’ān, as would be common in modern Western textbooks, even ones 
written from a Christian perspective.
208
 It has become common practice in Western, both 
secular and Christian, writing on Islam to say that “the Qur’ān says” in respect of Muslim 
belief in divine revelation. Using the expression “Muhammad says” when referring to words 
from the Qur’ān is frequently understood as a denial of the divine revelation of the Qur’ān. 
Mugambi simply ignores this issue. The section title suitably indicates his overall perspective, 
which is that Muhammad, using the religious material available to him (i.e. Arab paganism, 
Judaism and Christianity) masterfully united the people of the Arab peninsula. For Mugambi, 
divine revelation is irrelevant as Muhammad provides an example of creative human genius to 
bring about unity in a factious environment.  
He understands Muhammad to have incorporated the “Kabah ritual” (the pilgrimage to 
Mecca) into Islam as a necessary continuity with the Arab pagan past.
209
 For Mugambi this 
compares somewhat to African Christianity “incorporating some aspects of the African 
heritage.”210 He also sees Muhammad as appropriating monotheism which gave the Jewish 
people a strong sense of “unified Jewish identity,”211 and using this similar type of identity to 
create a new community in Arabia. Both of these emphases – continuity with the ‘pagan’ 
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religious heritage and a united community that will build society – form the core of 
Mugambi’s approach to Christian theology.212 Mugambi’s interpretation of Islam appears to 
be driven by his Christian-based theological goals for Kenya. 
6.3.2 D.W. Waruta 
Waruta, a Baptist, writes a short chapter on the history of Islam.
213
 He depicts the 
early expansion of Islam as the result of military and political activity, discussing the status of 
‘protected minorities’ somewhat extensively.214 He also writes of the current “divide” within 
Islam between “progressive” and “conservative” Muslims.215 He concludes that neither the 
“extreme secularization” of the progressives nor the return to the “primitive past” of the 
conservatives is likely to succeed, but Islam will probably “evolve and adapt itself to the 
demands of the modern world.”216 This conclusion again mirrors a concern of Kenyan 
mainline theologians.
217
 
6.3.3 Cathy Majtenyi 
Cathy Majtenyi, a Comboni lay missionary, wrote a short article, Making a 
Difference,
218
 in Wajibu that gives a positive description and recommendation of Islamic 
banking. The article is written because the “first bank in Kenya fully compliant with Islamic 
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law”219 was opened in the Eastleigh section of Nairobi. The majority of the text is a 
description of how Islamic banking works through the example of building a house. Islamic 
banking is portrayed as more community-oriented and more moral than Western banking, 
which is said to be more speculative and risky, and to transfer money that is connected to 
activities such as “drug trafficking, gun running and terrorism.”220 Majtenyi also reports that 
both Muslims and non-Muslims are using the bank in Eastleigh.
221
  
The article, while seemingly written for information purposes, also provides the 
opportunity for the author to criticise Western banking, and by extension the financial and 
economic system of the West. While criticising Western banking, Islam functions as a foil in 
the sense of announcing that African Christians are not bound to Western (i.e. Christian) 
economic systems, but they could even choose to endorse an Islamic system. Although subtle, 
this can be seen where she writes that the bank is popular among both Muslims and non-
Muslims and where she links Western banking with terrorism, rather than the typical Western 
media stereotype that links Islam to terrorism. 
6.3.4 John Mbiti 
John Mbiti, an Anglican and the most widely known Kenyan theologian, wrote a 
chapter subtitled, African Religion Looks at Islam,
222
 for a book on how religions view other 
religions. He writes of growing up in rural Kenya, recalling his interactions with Muslims in 
school and in the town of Kitui from the perspective of Akamba tradition and religion, though 
he acknowledges that he was raised in a Christian family.
223
 He tells of how “the Muslim 
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boys” in his middle school were viewed as outsiders.224 He gives several reasons: they lived 
in town rather than on shambas (small farms in Swahili), they didn’t follow Akamba 
traditions such as the circumcision rite, they spoke Kiswahili rather than Kikamba, and they 
learned their religion and prayed in Arabic, a language that even the Muslim boys didn’t 
understand.
225
 Mbiti and his friends also found some admirable qualities among the Muslims, 
such as their discipline to fast during Ramadan, the white robes worn by the Muslim boys, 
their sophistication and the commerce practiced by Muslims in Kitui, which brought outside 
goods into the area.
226
  
As boys they were also wary of “getting too close to Muslims” due to rumours of 
“Muslim men taking boys and young men to sell them to the Arabs” as slaves,227 though it is 
highly unlikely that there was any actual slave trade happening at that point in the history of 
Kenya. Muslims were known to be good, though cunning and dishonest traders.
228
 Even today 
in the Kitui area the expression that someone “acted like a real Muslim”229 indicates that the 
person cheated someone. Muslims were also thought to be violent, carrying a walking stick 
for the purpose of fighting.
230
 He adds that though Muslims shared a belief in God with 
African traditionalists, the sense was that they “did not accept the God in African Religion to 
be the same God as in Islam.”231 As Mbiti points out, these observations came out of the 
African “cultural heritage,”232 rather than a specifically Christian perspective. However, as 
Gifford noted, Kenyan theologians have operated with a certain theology of culture that is not 
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far removed from this type of observation on the relation between Christianity and African 
tradition.
233
 It seems that Mbiti is evaluating Islam with the same methodology that he uses to 
do African Christian theology.  
For the rest of the chapter he makes more general statements on Islam. For example, 
he writes that “shari’ah violates human rights severely,”234 using the example of a young 
woman being stoned to death in northern Nigeria in 2002. He also contrasts the freedom 
women have in African Religion with the restrictions upon them in Islam
235
 and the 
continuation of slavery in Islam, using Sudan as an example of where African traditionalists 
are “forced into slavery by Muslims,”236 with the “big NO” that African Religion has always 
said to slavery.
237
 He finishes the article by discussing how violence within Islam is perceived 
by Kenyans as he learned on a visit home in 2002. He says that there was a lot of discussion 
about Muslim terrorist attacks and Muslim suicide bombings. These discussions gave rise to 
questions about what sort of religion could advocate such acts. It seemed that all previous 
knowledge of Islam had been overwhelmed by these events.
238
 For Mbiti the main point is 
that African Religion is based upon the promotion of life,
239
 rendering these acts of violence 
committed in the name of religion as incomprehensible. Gifford has also noted that Kenyan 
theologians often present African culture in an idealised form, comparing this ideal form with 
the colonial past and modern Western culture.
240
 In this chapter Mbiti compares an idealised 
African Religion with recent negative events in Islamic history, and the results are 
predictable. 
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6.3.5 Ruth Muthei 
Ruth Muthei
241
 presented a paper, Emerging Gender Issues in Interfaith Relationships 
in Kenya,
242
 for a consultation in Togo in 2000 sponsored by the AACC. The main thrust of 
her paper is that women are the primary religious teachers in society due to the role of 
teaching their children.
243
 Therefore, both Muslim and Christian leaders need to promote the 
religious education of women, who play a vital role in interfaith relationships.
244
 Elsewhere, 
she visits themes similar to those already seen in other writers above. Difficulties between 
Muslims and Christians today were sown by a “hostile relation between Christian 
missionaries and Muslims during the colonial period.”245 Missionary domination of the 
educational system meant that Muslims had less access to education than others.
246
 She also 
brings up the popular idea that Muslim men systematically marry Christian women in order to 
spread Islam.
247
 As can be seen, Muthei writes consistently with other Kenyan mainline 
scholars by finding fault within Western and missionary action for current disaccord between 
Muslims and Christians in Kenya. The claim that Muslim men marry Christian women with 
the main purpose of propagating Islam is a relatively popular allegation in Kenya, though it is 
difficult to either prove or disprove. 
6.3.6 Shorter References to Issues Involving Islam 
In addition to these articles written specifically on Islam related matters, Islam is also 
mentioned in a few sentences in other articles and chapters by Kenyan theologians. These 
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brief mentions of Islam are of interest as the writers are not experts in Islam, nor have they 
necessarily done any research on Islam. Therefore, what they’ve written in a few sentences 
often expresses more closely the general views of educated Kenyan Christians concerning 
Islam.  
Mugambi refers to Islam relatively frequently in his writings on social reconstruction. 
It is appropriate here to revisit Mugambi’s twofold project in a theology of reconstruction. 
Mugambi is concerned with a theology of culture in which a genuine Africanness
248
 is 
considered the ideal in Christian theology and in the development of society. He also writes of 
a move from liberation to reconstruction,
249
 where the liberation paradigm of the Exodus 
under Moses is replaced by an emphasis on rebuilding society using the biblical model of 
Nehemiah. He writes that Nehemiah was able to get people to “overcome their sense of 
alienation”250 and work together in unity to rebuild Jerusalem. They were able to “take control 
of their own history.”251 As applied to contemporary Africa, Africans have been alienated by 
colonialism, racism, and neo-imperialism; the current need is for the cultivation of a unity that 
brings African people together, overcoming their alienation, to work for African solutions to 
their problems.
252
 It is a nation-building project. 
For Mugambi religion is foundational in this nation-building project in Africa,
253
 and 
Islam, Christianity and African Religion are understood to have equal value and ability to 
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mobilise society for reconstruction.
254
 The goals of this project are democracy, economic 
development, and African dignity. While Mugambi doesn’t openly state this, it seems that he 
would like to enlist Muslims into the nation-building project. This can be seen where he 
affirms Islam’s ability to contribute towards nation-building elsewhere. In North Africa Islam 
has promoted unity and social transformation, including modernisation.
255
 It has been a factor 
in the process of bringing about more democracy in North Africa, also.
256
 It has provided 
political stability in predominately Muslim African nations.
257
 These brief statements appear 
in longer sections in which he is discussing similar contributions of Christianity to nation-
building. He also says that adherents of both religions can work together to promote peace 
within the nation, using Liberia and Kenya as examples.
258
 While making these subtle appeals 
to include Islam into the nation-building project, he does not address the question of how 
Muslims might attach themselves to such a project, which is heavily driven by African and 
Christian theological categories and symbols and the biblical model of Nehemiah. 
However, both Islam and Christianity are also said to be foreign religions, therefore 
having had detrimental effects on the African world-view,
259
 though in some contexts he 
writes of African resiliency in the face of these foreign religions.
260
 Both religions are accused 
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of permitting the slave trade,
261
 of justifying war (e.g. crusade and jihad) in the name of 
religion,
262
 of denigrating African culture
263
 (i.e. Christian missions sought to Europeanise 
Africans, while Muslims sought Arabisation) and of supporting racism (e.g. in South Africa 
and in Sudan).
264
 He also stresses that in the democratisation processes in Africa, it has made 
no difference if a nation is predominately Muslim or Christian.
265
 While Christians and 
Muslims are expected to contribute towards reconstruction, they are reminded to recognise 
their failings and the goodness of Africa. 
Mugambi also writes, “Four Abrahamic faiths co-exist with varying intensity from 
region to region across the whole continent: African religion, Christianity, Islam and 
Judaism.”266 African Religion is considered to be Abrahamic by virtue of being monotheistic. 
He also makes the curious declaration that “the Old Testament is a common text for Jews, 
Christians and Muslims.”267 Muslims do not ordinarily recognise the Old Testament as their 
scripture. It would seem that for Mugambi (and other Kenyan Christians?) that one of the 
identities imposed on Islam is a Judaic origin in a similar manner to Christianity. The 
similarity between some Qur’ānic and Old Testament stories, and references to the Taurat 
(Torah) and Zabur (Psalms) may be the origin of his interpretation. 
Another Kenyan Christian scholar, Chepkwony, defending African Religion against 
modernist forces, writes that “the Kenyan government is more favourable to Christianity and 
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Islam.”268 He also notes that adherents of each of religion have committed atrocities against 
Africans.
269
 More positively he suggests that African Religions have borrowed from both 
Islam and Christianity, and he lists them along with African Religion as indigenous to 
Africa.
270
 Gichure, also defending African Religion, writes that “for one to be considered 
civilized, he or she had to embrace Christianity or Islam,”271 and reject their own cultural 
heritage.
272
 In these writers’ view Islam (and Christianity) is seen primarily as antagonistic 
towards African traditions. 
Ayanga positively comments that Islam teaches not only other-worldly salvation, but 
also a way to a peaceful and healthy life.
273
 While saying that religions often teach 
reconciliation,
274
 she remarks that sometimes they sanction violence, using jihad and crusades 
as examples.
275
 
Galgalo writes that Christianity disappeared from North Africa for several reasons, 
including the “onslaught of Islam.”276 Mugambi also writes several times of the “onslaught of 
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Islam”277 causing Christianity to disappear in either North Africa or Sudan. It would seem that 
this has become a standard phrase in Kenya. 
Nthamburi remarks that the British administrators preferred Muslims in positions such 
as the military and domestic servants, even to the point that some Christians would hide their 
faith in order to gain employment.
278
 
Among Kenyan scholars who are not experts on Islam, African themes gain more 
prominence. Mugambi and Waruta, in writing chapters in a textbook on world religions, 
present Islam in terms similar to the development of African Christian theologies. Mugambi 
also looks to Islam as a partner in a Christian-led project of nation-building. In addition he 
would like to find Christianity, Islam and African Religion to have common origins in 
Judaism. Majtenyi presents Islamic banking as a possibly more African friendly alternative to 
Western banking. Mbiti finds Islam to be a stranger to his understanding of African religious 
values. Chepkwony expresses wariness of both Islam and Christianity as possibly destructive 
forces against African religious values. Ayanga deems Islam to promote an African religious 
goal of peace and health in life. The manner in which Islam interacts with and relates to the 
African heritage becomes central. Additionally, the idea of competition between Christians 
and Muslims appears in Muthei, Galgalo and Nthamburi. 
6.4 Two Evangelical Scholars of Islam 
Two Evangelical scholars of Islam have also produced a few articles. These will be 
briefly discussed here, though they will not feature significantly in the analyses in the 
thematic chapters eight (Contesting Public Spaces) and nine (Emerging Theologies of 
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Religion), because the sample size is too small to be considered representative of Kenyan 
Evangelicals. Their inclusion at this point is in the interest of a thorough examination of what 
Kenyan Christians have written about Islam. 
Josephine Sesi and the late Stephen Sesi (who were a married couple) obtained their 
PhDs from Fuller Theological Seminary, taught mission studies and Islamic studies at Nairobi 
Graduate School of Theology (NEGST),
279
 were active members of the Africa Inland Church, 
and were involved in missions among the Digo people of the coastal region.
280
 As can be 
seen, their experiences are so similar that their writing cannot be understood to be 
representative of Kenyan Evangelicals as a whole. 
The three articles to be discussed were published in African Missiology,
281
 a volume 
prepared by the missions department of NEGST. The articles are concerned with ways to 
better understand and improve Christian ministry among the Muslim Digo of the coastal 
region. Josephine Sesi contributes two articles in which she describes the impact of Islam and 
Christianity upon Digo women.
282
 Stephen Sesi writes on methods to contextualise Christian 
practices among the Digo people.
283
 
Josephine Sesi provides an overwhelmingly negative picture of the impact of Islam 
upon Digo women. Her principle argument is that the conversion of the Digo people to Islam 
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caused a cultural change from a matriarchal to a patriarchal society, which had devastating 
results on the status of women. She writes: 
When Islam arrived on Digoland, it came with patriarchal kinship that 
traces inheritance through men and gives men ownership and control of land, 
depriving women of the right to own and control property. Muslims also came 
with a religion that allowed only men to participate in worship. The shift from a 
predominantly matriarchal to patriarchal kinship structure parallels a similar shift 
that the major historian W. Montgomery Watt
284
 noted in Arabia at the time of 
Muhammed.
 
This fact gives credibility to my thesis that the role of women in the 
primal context was more important than in the Islamic context that followed, 
thereby stripping women of their honored place in the primal society.
285
 
As can be seen Sesi believes that Islam caused Digo women to lose property rights, 
positions of spiritual prominence, and honour. Women are now seen to be oppressed and 
discriminated against. However, Parkin has argued that Digo society, rather than transforming 
into a “patrilineal system of inheritance,” that the current historical situation is more complex 
with a mixture of systems, so that women have not been completely displaced from control of 
land.
286
 Later in the article Sesi attributes economic underdevelopment among the Digo to a 
history of enslavement by the coastal Muslims of Mombasa.
287
 It seems doubtful that the 
Digo had ever undergone such widespread slavery as she suggests.
288
 
In another context Sesi writes,  
Through this ministry a Digo Muslim woman finds Christian people who 
are full of love. Her traditional consciousness of hate that was imparted in her by 
the Muslim teachers is changing to appreciate not just the love of the Christians 
but also the love of the Christian God.
289
 
She perceives hatred to be taught by Muslims, which is contrasted with the love of 
Christians and the Christian God. Her mention of the “love of the Christian God” indicates 
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that Sesi considers Allah and the “Christian God” to be separate ontological beings, and 
possibly that Allah is associated with hate. In explaining why Digo women are oppressed 
under Islam, she attempts an explanation of “Islamic culture”290 in which Allah is said to be 
understood primarily in terms of power and majesty.
291
 The resultant Islamic culture is then 
seen to be inherently oppressive. 
Sesi also addresses the experience of folk Islam among the Digo, claiming that the 
continued presence of former Digo religious practices and beliefs indicates that Islam has 
proven to be spiritually ineffective and unfulfilling.
292
  
Stephen Sesi searches for some points of dialogue in Context and Worship among 
Digo Muslims in Kenya,
293
 generally following his former professor Dudley Woodberry.
294
 
He finds some similarities in prayer and worship between Christianity and Islam, due to the 
fact that both religions trace their origins through certain Old Testament prophets and Moses, 
back to Abraham.
295
 Some of these similarities are drawn out more fully. He considers a few 
Muslim worship practices and finds antecedents for them in the Old Testament. For example, 
as Muslims prostrate in prayer, Abraham and Moses also prostrated in prayer.
296
 The shahada 
is compared with the Jewish shema and the use of Christian creeds.
297
 As Moses removed his 
shoes at the holy ground of the burning bush, Muslims remove their shoes upon entering a 
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mosque.
298
 These and other similarities do not, however, serve the purpose of mutual 
understanding, but they are to be used as methods of evangelism and contextualisation.  
Differences are also highlighted as similarities are discussed. Most telling is Sesi’s 
explanation of how conversion from Judaism to Christianity in the early church is different 
from the conversion of a Muslim to Christianity. He writes, “Though Muslims and Christians 
have a lot in common, they adhere to two different religions with different sets of beliefs and 
views about cardinal theological issues, like the nature of God and the ultimate solution to the 
human problem of sin.”299 While he finds similarities between Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam, the latter two religions remain essentially different for him.  
He also compares the Lord’s Prayer and Al-Fatihah. He concludes that while there are 
similarities, there is a “lack of forgiveness in the Islamic prayer, while forgiveness is at the 
center of the Lord’s Prayer. Muslims do not have a concept of forgiveness, which accounts for 
a great deal of conflicts in the Muslim world today.”300 The lack of a mention of forgiveness 
in the Muslim Fatihah leads to the essentialised declaration that Muslims lack a “concept of 
forgiveness.” Then the political and social complexity involved in situations of conflict is 
reduced to the perceived essence of Islam and the resultant inability of Muslims to forgive. 
While Stephen Sesi has found some points of commonality for dialogue – dialogue 
being understood as an attitude of listening and understanding that would “awaken sympathy, 
love, and prayer, until the Muslims’ bonds burst, their wounds healed, their sorrows were 
removed, and their desires satisfied in Jesus Christ”301 – difference remains the essential trait 
between Christianity and Islam.  
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The two Evangelical scholars demonstrate much less openness towards Islam than the 
Kenyan mainline Christian scholars. It seems doubtful that Allah may be identified with the 
Father of Jesus Christ. Muslims appear to be especially suspect of a lack of moral attributes, 
being connected with slavery, oppression of women, hatred, lack of forgiveness and conflict. 
The sole relationship possible between Christians and Muslims appears to be one of Christian 
evangelism.  
6.5 Conclusion 
The majority of the writing was produced for seminars or conferences in which issues 
concerning Christian relations with Muslims were at least a partial focus. The primary 
audience at these conferences is Christian, though some Muslims may be present, and the 
writers assume that most readers will be Christians. With very few exceptions the articles 
have been published by Christian publishers. It should be seen as a Christian theological 
endeavour, rather than Christians engaging in Islamic studies. 
These scholars write history, ascribe fault, describe and interpret Islam, analyse 
current affairs, do theology, etc. Most of the scholarly discourse on Islam is of a social and 
historical character. Scholars explore the current social and political relationship between 
Muslims and Christians, using history to explain the reasons for contemporary tensions and 
conflicts. This history then has a certain ideological component depending upon the point of 
view of the particular author. For Maina and Wandera, history shows a past of injustice 
towards Muslims and Christian dominance in which the colonial government and Christian 
missionaries played a negative role. Therefore, they advocate more justice for Muslims and 
more understanding on the part of Christians. The situation is similar for Kubai, though she 
also writes of Arab hegemony along the coast. This leads her to write more critically of 
current Muslim actions and attitudes. These three scholars share a common viewpoint that the 
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Muslim community has remained backwards in comparison with the Christian community. 
The Sesis, however, describe and interpret a history that portrays Islam as essentially 
oppressive of a local African people. Due to educational capital, and the relative symbolic 
power it bestows upon these scholars (see 1.2.3), their interpretations of the history of Islam 
and Christianity in Kenya can impact socio-political spaces as well as religious and 
theological spaces.
302
 
The relationship between Christians and Muslims in Kenya is said to have been 
generally peaceful with only isolated incidents of conflict, which are often attributed to 
political reasons. As Soares points out, peaceful co-existence is assumed to be – or it is 
assumed that it should be – the norm of interreligious relations within society.303 This 
perspective allows the writers to ignore internal systemic issues,
304
 and locate the origin of 
current tensions primarily in external forces, such as Islamic movements and revival, Western 
media and Western Christian missions, which receive special condemnation from Maina and 
Wandera. Behind some of the culpability placed on external forces is an assertion of the good 
and life-giving attributes of the African heritage. Mbiti, for example, especially finds Islamic 
slavery in Sudan and suicide bombers in Palestine to be incomprehensible to the life-
promoting world view of African Religion.  
The concern to promote the goodness of the African heritage also leads the writers to 
portray Christianity and Islam as equally good, or in some cases as equally bad. For example, 
if the Qur’ān is said to have passages that can be interpreted to encourage religious violence, 
then the same is also said of the Bible. Chepkwony says that both religions have looked down 
upon African Religion. When it is suggested that Islam may have patriarchal tendencies, then 
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the patriarchal inclinations of Christianity are also brought up. In contrast to other writers, 
Maina states that traditional African patriarchy is at work in limiting the political rights of 
Muslim women in Kenya. 
Some current happenings in the Muslim world are understood to have had negative 
consequences on interfaith relations in Kenya. A few writers address the relatively recent 
phenomena of Islamic political movements, usually finding them to have encouraged a more 
radical foreign element among Kenyan Muslims. The contemporary Muslim practice of 
mihadhara is addressed by a few writers, who generally view these public and polemical 
debates as detrimental to peaceful relations between Muslims and Christians in Kenya.  
The goals of the writers are primarily practical. They hope to promote peace between 
the two religious communities and the national development that can result from the two 
communities working together. It seems that Islam is sometimes understood to have arisen out 
of Judaism, like Christianity, so as to be seen as a sibling religion, though the beliefs and 
history of Islam are accurately portrayed in general. Mugambi’s Theology of Reconstruction 
seems to provide the blueprint for a Christian approach to nation-building and church-state 
relationships, and Muslims are welcomed to participate in the building of Kenya. Yet little 
thought has gone into considering how Muslims might feel about participating in such a 
Christian-driven project. Kubai raises the issue that Christians and Muslims may not agree on 
their understandings of society’s problems, though she does not address specifics in the 
Kenyan situation.
305
 
While the writers concentrate on social and historical issues, theological questions are 
also raised, usually for the practical purpose of encouraging peaceful co-existence. For 
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scholars of Kenyan mainline Christianity the purpose of examining Christian-Muslim 
relations is to encourage peaceful co-existence.  
A frequently raised question concerns whether Islam and Christianity are considered 
to be more similar or different. While all the writers would seem to acknowledge doctrinal 
differences, they disagree over their emphasis. Maina, for example, stresses that Muslims and 
Christians are “children of one God,” and that differences provide an opportunity for 
dialogue, learning about the other and learning to live with diversity. In contrast, Kubai 
highlights doctrines such as the trinity to point out the essential difference between Islamic 
and Christian theology. Evangelical scholars, Josephine and Stephen Sesi, insist upon the 
differences as overcoming incidental similarities. 
A related question is whether Muslims and Christians worship the same god. It is an 
underlying assumption that they do, in fact, worship the same God. Maina says that they are 
“children of one God.” Kubai writes that they understand the nature of God differently, but 
she assumes that they are speaking of the same God. Wandera follows Kibicho, who argued 
that the Kikuyu Ngai is the same as the God of the Bible, and assumes the same for Allah. 
Mugambi links African Religion, Islam, Christianity and Judaism to Abraham under the same 
God. 
Several writers raise the question of the relationship between the secular and the 
sacred in Islam in order to explain the present Islamic revival and its political manifestations. 
There is something about the Muslim understanding of this relationship that seems to trouble 
the writers; however, Kubai is the only one to contrast the non-separation of the sacred and 
the secular in Islam with the separation of church and state in Christianity. Mugambi 
understands the separation of sacred and secular as a Western phenomenon, rather than a 
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specifically Christian one.
306
 The African tradition is usually understood to have no such 
separation.
307
 For the most part, these scholars advocate some type of relation between the 
sacred and the secular, though they are uncomfortable with the way it is expressed in Islam. 
To briefly summarise, social issues take precedence over theological ones. Peaceful 
co-existence is understood to be the norm that has existed and it is to be strived for, while 
current tensions and isolated conflicts are understood to have their ultimate origins in forces 
external to Kenya. Since nation-building and development are goals, unity and working 
together for the good of the nation are valued, though how Muslims may be involved in such 
a Christian-oriented project remains unclear. Theological issues have not been examined with 
any real depth. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
POPULAR CHRISTIAN WRITING ON ISLAM 
In this chapter popular Christian writing on Islam will be examined. These Christian 
publications provide a window into the theological world of Kenyan Pentecostal Christianity, 
which makes up over half of the Kenyan population.
1
 The messages, prophecies and news 
published here reflect the sermons and teaching heard in churches throughout Kenya. A few 
articles specifically deal with themes about Islam, though brief references to Islam or 
Muslims do appear in many other articles. Several articles in which Islam is a major theme 
will be examined. Other relevant articles and books that mention Islam and hold interest for 
the research topic will also be looked at briefly. The (Neo)Pentecostal community has not 
produced much scholarly literature in Kenya, especially concerning the topic of Islam, but the 
popular literature offers an opportunity to explore its views. These views are examined 
through the method of implicit theology (see 1.2.4), in which the less reflected popular 
writing is rescripted through the use of scholarly literature on African Pentecostalism and 
African Religion. Power, understood in the texts as spiritual power, but which can also be 
understand as symbolic power (see 1.2.3) provides a framework for a careful reading of the 
socio-political aspects of the texts. 
7.1 Popular Christian Literature in Kenya 
Popular Christian literature is here defined in contrast to scholarly writing. Whereas 
the scholarly writing is addressed primarily to the academic community, popular Christian 
writing in Kenya seeks to reach ordinary Kenyan Christians, who are literate in English. The 
reading audience would, therefore, have at least a primary school education and most likely 
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some secondary school education. The popular writing itself, unlike the scholarly writing, 
does not usually cite sources, nor contain footnotes. Grammar and spelling errors are more 
frequent, probably reflecting less editorial attention.  
Popular Christian magazines are available through street vendors who display a large 
variety of local and international magazines and newspapers on the sidewalks of downtown 
Nairobi. Seventy-five issues of twenty-two different Christian magazines were collected over 
more than a 2-year period (2006-2009) through the process of periodically walking 
throughout the downtown area of Nairobi and searching the displays of numerous street 
vendors. Several of the more prominent magazines were also contacted in order to purchase 
back issues, however only Revival Springs responded, and an additional eighty-four issues 
(April 1998 to March 2010) were obtained.  
The sample is weighted towards Revival Springs both numerically and in its 
representation of a longer period of time. Therefore, reaction to certain national events 
involving Muslims and Christians occurring before 2006 are only available in Revival 
Springs. However, this type of article appears to be relatively rare. Though more than half of 
the magazine issues examined were from Revival Springs, only nine of the twenty-five 
articles analysed in the chapter come from this publication. While it can’t be claimed that 
every popular Christian magazine article that may comment on Islam has been found, the 
articles examined can be said to represent what is typically found in Kenyan popular Christian 
literature. 
The majority of these twenty-two magazine publications
2
 are associated with certain 
ministries or church denominations. These churches and ministries, usually located in 
Nairobi, are overwhelmingly Pentecostal in nature. Revival Springs, which has its own 
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publishing house,
3
 is not associated with a particular church or ministry. Revival Springs’ 
primary target seems to be Neo-Pentecostal church members. The primary raison d’être for 
the publication of these magazines and books is to convey a message that is deemed 
important. Some have a very particular emphasis that they wish to communicate. Sermons 
and prophecies are relatively common components of the magazines, and the churches and 
ministries desire a larger audience for these messages. Periodicals connected with church 
denominations also provide news of various events, such as the planting of new churches, 
mission activities, seminars, etc. Additionally, church and ministry related magazines provide 
publicity for the respective institutions (e.g. advertising for special church services or 
‘crusades’ in a local venue). A church, a ministry, or even an individual who is able to publish 
a magazine also gains a certain prestige, which seems to be an important motivation for 
publication in many cases.  
These periodicals are relatively inexpensive, ranging from 50 KSh for those in a 
newspaper format to 200 KSh for those in the most glossy magazine format. Additionally, 
magazines, newspapers and books are passed around among friends, co-workers and 
acquaintances in Africa at a higher rate than generally happens in Europe, so that a typical 
single copy of a magazine will be read by more people in Africa than in Europe.
4
 Therefore, 
the readership of these various publications is rather significant, demonstrating a widespread 
influence of the viewpoints that are found in popular Christian literature in Kenya. 
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Pastors and other church leaders generate the principle ideas found in most articles 
written in these publications. Some articles are directly written by these church leaders, while 
others go through a more complicated process involving a journalist working for the 
magazine. Sermons, speeches and interviews are often published in the church leader’s name, 
though it is obvious that a journalist is also involved in the writing. At other times the 
journalist is also given credit. The testimony is a common genre found in almost all of these 
publications. Testimonies can come from church leaders, Gospel musicians or lay people 
within churches, if they have compelling stories to tell. These stories provide a glimpse into 
the lives and perspectives of average Christians who are not necessarily leaders, though it 
does so through the writing of a journalist. A few publications give the editors/journalists, 
who are also most likely leaders within churches, opportunities to express their opinions on 
church and national issues. The points of view expressed can be considered the quasi-official 
positions of the churches and ministries represented. 
7.2 Conversion Narratives: Moving from Islam to Christianity 
Four testimonies of people who converted from Islam to Christianity were found.
5
 
These will be examined first. The conversion stories, though primarily told in the first person, 
are written through the interpretive lens of a journalist. It is obvious that at a minimum the 
journalist, who has condensed the story for written purposes, has offered some interpretive 
comments. The journalists have also appeared to structure the narratives to fit certain desired 
patterns. 
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Conversion stories are a “special form of autobiographical narrative,”6 in which “one 
universe of discourse” is displaced by another.7 Staples and Mauss interviewed young 
converts from “born-again Christian” fellowships in the north-western USA, finding their 
conversion narratives to incorporate a “repudiation of a sinful past.”8 This past should not be 
understood as simply a factual recording of an individual’s pre-conversion history, but the 
person’s biographical narrative is “reconstructed in accordance with the new … universe of 
discourse.”9 In this reconstruction of the past, an individual will create a “past self” that is 
understood by the convert as a “spurious self” in relation to the “real self” after the 
conversion.
10
 In other words the convert’s past is interpreted in a relatively negative manner 
from the perspective of a new universe of discourse that includes new values, new religious 
and spiritual meanings and symbols, a new community, new scriptural reference points, and 
so forth. Snow and Machalek additionally speak of “demonstration events,” which they define 
as “public displays of conversion” that verify for the new community that the convert has 
indeed truly converted.
11
 
Luhrmann offers a corrective to what she considers to be the overly cognitive 
approach to the study of conversion.
12
 In her study of “fundamentalist Baptists” in the United 
States she finds that “intense spiritual experience,” which includes emotional and corporal 
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involvement, is important in the conversion process.
13
 The specific spiritual experiences that 
were most often found among Baptists were “falling in love with Jesus,” “walking with God,” 
and finding “peace.”14 In the African context spiritual experience takes a central position, 
though these experiences are different from those found by Luhrmann. In the following 
conversion narratives, healings, visions, triumph over adversity, success and finding joy and 
peace will be seen to be the primary spiritual experiences. These spiritual experiences are 
understood to be more readily available through Christianity than through Islam, which in 
itself is perceived as a valid reason for conversion. Religious truth is validated through 
spiritual experience, more than through intellectualisation.  
In the following conversion narratives, in which individuals convert from Islam to 
Christianity, there is an obvious displacement of the universe of discourse. While neither the 
Muslim nor the Christian universe of discourse is articulated clearly, a close reading of the 
texts reveals how the converts and their journalist interpreters understand the important 
differences between the Muslim and Christian universe of discourse. However, there also 
appears to be the maintenance of a more primary universe of discourse before and after the 
conversion, which is that of the African religious worldview. The creation of a ‘spurious self,’ 
in relation to a new or real self, is also evident. It may be anticipated that the spurious self 
may reflect not only personal sin and deficiencies, but also deficiencies perceived to be 
present within Islam. 
7.2.1 The Conversion of Rose Muhando 
The story of Rose Muhando,
15
 a popular gospel singer, is told in 2008 in EndTime 
Christian News, a publication of Redeemed Gospel Church. The article is subtitled, “Rose 
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Muhando swapped Islam for Christianity and she today scales nations healing souls.”16 She 
tells the story of her conversion while growing up in a Muslim family in Tanzania. As a 
young adolescent girl, she became very ill, in great pain and unable to walk. She says, “The 
disease crunched my soul,”17 so that she considered suicide. Then she describes her 
conversion as follows: 
At around 3 A.M., I was wakened by a bright flash of light that filled 
the house. On looking closer, I saw a hand touching me. Then I heard the first 
voice telling me, “I am Jesus I have healed you.” The second voice told me, 
“Raise(sic) up, go and serve me,” suddenly the excruciating pain stopped.18 
This short account has allusions to biblical miracle stories. The bright flash of light 
reminds the reader of Paul’s conversion on the way to Damascus. (Acts 9:1-9) The voice also 
tells Paul to “Arise, and go into the city.” (Acts 9:6 KJV) Muhando later says that her father 
observed the incident though he did not hear the voices, which again is similar to Paul’s 
experience though reversed as Paul’s companions heard the voice but did not see Jesus. (Acts 
9:7) Jesus frequently touches those whom he heals. (Matthew 8:15, 23; 9:20, 29; 20:34; Luke 
22:51) Jesus also says “rise up,” or a similar cognate (in the KJV), while performing a 
healing. (Luke 5:23-24; Luke 6:8) These biblical allusions indicate that her testimony has 
been shaped by her subsequent experience as a Christian. She compares her experience with 
Paul’s, finding a new scriptural reference point to tell her life narrative, therefore allowing the 
New Testament to define her personal experience. This comparison then lends authority to 
Muhando’s ministry as a Gospel singer. 
It is also important to observe that her conversion is linked to healing and a vision. 
That Jesus healed her is understood to indicate that more spiritual power for life is available in 
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Christian faith than in Islam. As Kalu writes, healing “is the restoration of life,”19 and “an 
important aspect of religious life in Africa.”20 Muhando’s illness has also been reconstructed 
to include a spiritual dimension – it ‘crunched her soul’ – therefore, she is not dealing with a 
simple physiological phenomenon. Visions are understood to be a means of communicating 
with the spirit world.
21
Therefore, Muhando’s vision (and her father partly sharing it) validates 
her experience and elevates Jesus and Christianity above Islam, which had presumably 
provided neither a vision nor healing. Significantly no human beings are involved in her 
experience, which is meant to indicate that she was not convinced by argument nor enticed by 
possible benefits that an encounter with Christians may have proffered. Christianity can then 
be proclaimed as superior because of direct spiritual experience, rather than human reason.  
She continues the story saying that people, including her brothers, refused to believe 
that she had been healed by Jesus, “because they were staunch Muslims.”22 Her father having 
witnessed the vision was the only person to believe her. Muhando says that she continued to 
attend a madrasa at the mosque until she was 16 years old, when she heard another voice 
which said, “I am Jesus, go and serve me.”23 It was at this point that “the girl finally crossed 
over to Christianity by accepting Christ as her personal saviour and lord,”24 in the words of 
Onamu, the journalist. Muhando described what followed: 
My brothers rose up in arms because by then there was no single 
Christian in our family. Their resolve was that I was not fit to live with them. It 
was traumatic as I was driven away from home and became sort of a nomad 
roving from relative to relative in search of an abode for several years. It’s 
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during this period that I fell prey to the men who impregnated me and dumped 
me.
25
 
Onamu labels this as persecution. A sharp opposition between Christianity and Islam 
is drawn. Despite her obvious healing, even her family (with the exception of her father) 
refuses to believe that Jesus healed her, simply due to the fact that they are “staunch 
Muslims.” Once again valid spiritual experience in Christianity is contrasted with human 
reason in Islam. Muhando, remaining obedient to her parents, attends a madrasa until she 
hears Jesus again in another mystical experience, who tells her to go and serve him in words 
reminiscent of the Great Commission. (Matthew 28:19) The opposition of her brothers to her 
conversion led to Muhando being forced from her family’s home. However, although she was 
the only Christian in the family, she was able to live with relatives moving from one to 
another. This appears to be an unintentional admission that her entire family was not as 
radically opposed to her conversion. This expulsion from the family home is to blame for her 
pregnancies out of wedlock. It should be noted, however, that her sexually immoral, ‘spurious 
self’ is not linked with her life as a Muslim, but as a young, undiscipled Christian.  
Later, through another miraculous intervention she attends a Neo-Pentecostal church, 
where she learns more of her new faith and where she is helped to reconcile with her parents, 
who also eventually convert to Christianity.
26
 This reconciliation with her parents is again a 
type of healing that the Christian community helps to facilitate. Magesa has shown that 
reconciliation is an aspect of restoring the ‘vital force’ (i.e. healing) in African Religion.27 In 
this sense separation, and therefore an enemy to the vital force, had been brought about by the 
Muslim community around Muhando, whereas the Christian community brings about 
reconciliation and healing. She proceeds to become a successful gospel singer in East Africa, 
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which contrasts with the difficulties she experienced after being forced from her home and 
ties in with the biblically reminiscent calls from God to serve Him that she recounts. 
Of interest is also the choice of vocabulary by the writer to describe Muhando’s 
conversion. Onamu writes that she “swapped Islam for Christianity” and that she “crossed 
over to Christianity.” While each metaphor comes from a different semantic domain – 
swapping implies an exchange of objects and crossing over implies movement from one place 
to another – each suggests two distinct entities: Christianity and Islam, between which one 
can simply choose.
28
 These metaphors contradict the premise of the conversion story that 
Christianity is spiritually more powerful and more life-giving than Islam. While the 
vocabulary choice may be an idiosyncrasy of the writer, it seems to unintentionally describe 
the reality of her experience, which represents a view that Islam and Christianity are two 
distinct spiritual powers that may be accessed independently without necessarily inferring 
equality between them. In this way he describes her experience more accurately than he 
intends, as Muhando interprets her conversion as making a choice between two centres of 
spiritual power, choosing the greater power. 
7.2.2 The Conversion of Shakira Asia 
Shakira Asia tells of her conversion to Christianity in Triumph over Adversity.
29
 As 
she recounts her story, Asia was born in Mombasa, though raised in Mumias
30
 in Western 
Kenya after moving at an early age. Her father was compelled to take a second wife by his 
relatives since his first wife had given him no sons, leaving Asia and her sisters living alone 
with their mother. She then tells about attending secondary school: 
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Dad was a Muslim. He was determined that I would join a Muslim high 
school, but the only admission letter I received was from a Christian school. 
Mom was glad because she was a Christian. I now look back and see God had 
His plan.
31
  
The notion of a universe of discourse is very obvious in this passage as the pull is 
between a Muslim and a Christian education. Asia notes that her father wanted her to attend a 
Muslim secondary school; however, when she is only accepted at a Christian school there is 
no indication of opposition on his part, though her mother is said to have been happy that she 
would attend a Christian school. This suggests a degree of religious discord within the family. 
Asia concludes that her attendance at a Christian school was God’s plan. The contrast with the 
description of Muhando’s conversion as swapping Islam for Christianity should be noted; 
Asia’s anticipated conversion was not a matter of choice, but it had been planned by God.  
This is the first time in the text that the reader is informed of the religious structure of 
her family. Since the religious affiliation of the family is not mentioned until several 
paragraphs into the article, conversion from Islam may not be the most important feature of 
the story. A religiously mixed marriage would also not be completely unusual for a Luhya 
family in Mumias, which has a significant Muslim population,
32
 although as a whole the 
Luhya ethnic group is majority Christian.
33
  
While Asia was away in secondary school,
34
 her mother died. This led to a conflict, 
which is described as follows: 
A conflict arose on the day of the burial when my Dad’s relatives 
demanded that she be buried by Muslims, which meant being buried without a 
coffin, but Mom was a Christian and her church members also wanted to bury 
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her. We finally convinced Dad to do what would have pleased her. He 
obliged.
35
 
The conflict is over burial rites, which are religiously significant in African tradition.
36
 
Funeral rites, properly performed, enable the vital force of the deceased to be transmitted to 
the community.
37
 Therefore, interfering with proper religious funeral rites is often understood 
to prevent the transmission of the deceased’s vital force. For this reason conflicts over burials 
are much more than quarrels about religious tradition.
38
 Issues unmentioned in the article may 
have been which religious community was entitled to receive the transmission of the mother’s 
vital force, that her vital force may be lost altogether if she were buried improperly, or that her 
spirit may haunt the community.  
Significantly, the father is depicted as a good man, though his true historical-moral 
character can’t be known with certainty. He reluctantly took a second wife, forced by his 
relatives. He accepted that his daughter attend a Christian school, though he wanted her to go 
to a Muslim one, which are much less common in Kenya. Finally, he allowed his wife to 
receive a Christian burial against the wishes of his relatives. Asia is also shown to love her 
father and to mourn deeply when he passes away soon after her mother,
39
 and she was well 
cared for up to his death. It would have been possible, perhaps expected, for the Christian 
journalist to portray the Muslim father as morally deficient to some extent, yet this portrayal 
is resisted and the readers encounter what they consider to be a good man and father. A 
Muslim can, therefore, be seen as a moral person in a popular Kenyan Christian magazine; a 
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point of view that is less commonly found among similar American religious groups.
40
 Moral 
values do not play a significant role in the differences between the universes of discourse of 
the two religions in this conversion narrative. 
Asia says that she became a Christian while away at secondary school. The only 
comment that she makes about her conversion is that she “now knew God,”41 which would 
indicate that she previously had not known God. While it is not specifically said that she 
converted from Islam, the context implies that God is known only in the Christian religion 
and not in Islam.  
The father’s Muslim relatives play the role of antagonists. They force a second 
marriage upon Asia’s father, which negatively affects her life. They attempt to have her 
Christian mother receive a Muslim burial. Last, after the death of her father, they reject Asia, 
who had converted to Christianity while in secondary school. She must then move to Nairobi 
and live in poverty without help from her family.
42
 As the story continues, Asia considers 
prostitution,
43
 but she is rescued by a Neo-Pentecostal church, where she receives 
employment and funding to get further education, thus succeeding in life. The testimony takes 
the common form of a person who, through the aid of God and/or Christians, overcomes 
obstacles to find financial and personal success,
44
 which is the primary focus of the article. 
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Unlike Muhando’s story above, the conversion from Islam plays a minor role in this 
testimony, though a clear contrast is drawn between the Muslim relatives who reject Asia and 
the Neo-Pentecostal Christians who help her to succeed. The portrayal thus focuses on which 
religion produces a more supportive and life-giving community. 
7.2.3 The Conversion of Veronicah Wanjiru Njoroge 
The story of Veronicah Wanjiru Njoroge, who converted from African Religion to 
Islam and later converted to Christianity, is told in Today in Africa.
45
 She tells a heart-rending 
life story that includes attempted rape, torture by her father, attempted suicide, single 
motherhood, the murder of her children by her father-in-law and rape.
46
 To support her one 
surviving child, she found a job cleaning rooms at a guesthouse that was owned by a Muslim. 
She converted to Islam, which she says pleased her employer. Nothing else is said about her 
experience as a Muslim. While still working at the guesthouse, she became ill and was 
diagnosed with AIDS. When her employer learned that she was “HIV positive he immediately 
sacked (her) without mercy.”47  
At this point she went to Kijabe Hospital, which is associated with AIM (formerly 
African Inland Mission),
48
 for treatment. Wanjiru received free drugs and AIDS counselling. 
Later, she “gave (her) life to Christ and God restored my hope of living longer with AIDS.”49 
She speaks of her new faith saying, “Although I have faced many challenges in my life, I 
believe that God still loves me.”50 Then she lists the ways in which she has seen this love: she 
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has been provided with free anti-retroviral drugs, and her new landlord has treated her well by 
taking care of her and supporting her.
51
 
Notably absent in either of Wanjiru’s conversions are intense spiritual experiences and 
prominent changes in her universe of discourse. Instead both conversions seem to be a 
combination of having received help – from a Muslim employer and from a mission hospital 
– and a possible desire to remain in the good graces of those assisting her. She comments that 
her Muslim employer was pleased that she converted to Islam, and she ends her testimony by 
saying, “May God bless all those who have helped me in one way or the other.”52 While at 
first glance these conversions may appear to be matters of convenience, from the perspective 
of Wanjiru’s African religious world view there is most likely another process that is 
occurring. Within the African religious world view there is a strong connection between the 
spiritual world and the material world, so that what happens in one of these worlds affects 
events in the other.
53
 While receiving help in the form of employment from a Muslim 
guesthouse owner, Wanjiru understood that the god of her Muslim benefactor had also 
blessed her life and conversion was a sincere expression of gratitude. When her Muslim 
employer fired her, the association with his god was also affected. Her new benefactors, being 
Christians, meant that their god was now blessing her life, and she converted to a new 
religion. For Wanjiru, her experiences of being assisted were both material and spiritual 
experiences, though her universe of discourse remained profoundly and religiously African. 
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A religious contrast is presented in the testimony between the lack of mercy of the 
Muslim employer when he learns that Wanjiru has AIDS and the care that she receives from 
the Christian community at Kijabe Hospital. Similar contrasts between a life-giving Christian 
community and a life-denying Muslim one were also portrayed in the previous conversion 
narratives. 
7.2.4 The Conversion of Edward Buria 
In an interview, Rev. Edward Buria gives his testimony.
54
 He recounts that he “was 
raised up in a Muslim environment.”55 This is the only statement in the article that refers to 
Islam. He says that he became a devout Catholic at age twelve, and later, after being 
miraculously healed from a terminal illness, he converted to Pentecostalism, which is 
understood to have also given him salvation. While very little is said of his experience as a 
Muslim, it is apparent that Islam and Catholicism are perceived as equally deficient in 
comparison with Pentecostalism and its apparent spiritual power.  
7.2.5 Conclusion 
In these conversion narratives overcoming obstacles is the primary theme. The 
narratives would be viewed similarly to other testimonies by magazine readers. The testimony 
format is generally that of a person overcoming difficulties in life to find abundant life in 
Christ. Islam is simply one of the obstacles to overcome. The fact that they have converted 
from Islam plays a minor role in the stories. Their own religious involvement in Islam never 
arises in the narratives; it is family or an employer who are the examples of committed 
Muslims. Their conversion from Islam does not involve moral transformation, but the 
discovery of new found spiritual power to deal with the uncertainties and difficulties of life. 
Their ‘spurious selves’ under Islam were not about sinfulness, but about being powerless. The 
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contrast is then between being powerless prior to conversion and being empowered by 
Christian faith. They also find a new caring community that aids the convert in finding a new 
life, which is sometimes contrasted with a less compassionate Muslim family or employer. 
This caring community should be understood to represent the ideal African community, 
which has been produced by Christianity rather than by either African Religion or Islam. The 
African universe of discourse remains in place throughout the conversions, though African 
Religion is also never viewed as a viable religious option. 
7.3 Conversion Narratives: Meeting Muslims along the Way 
A few conversion narratives in which Islam plays a less important role will be 
examined. In these narratives the principle protagonist has a significant encounter with 
Muslims or Islam that has left enough of an impression to become a part of the story. 
7.3.1 Testimony of Irene Mwangi 
Irene Mwangi recounts her testimony in To Save Life or to Kill It,
56
 in which she 
considered converting to Islam. She says that she converted to Christianity (presumably from 
a nominal Christian status) and became active in Christian organisations while still in 
secondary school.
57
 After graduation she found a job and moved to Mombasa, where she 
became pregnant without marrying and drifted away from her former level of commitment.
58
 
She also seemed to have felt judgement from Christian friends.
59
 At this point Mwangi 
decided to “take radical action” as she narrates: 
I decided since I had betrayed my salvation, I would become a Muslim. 
I asked a friend near our office if she would help me. She agreed to take me to 
the mosque. Since I had found out I was pregnant, I had stopped praying. I was 
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often down and cried a lot. I asked my friend if I would still be accepted as a 
Muslim if I aborted the baby I was carrying. She assured me that I would.
60
 
Since she had become pregnant outside of marriage, she decided that she was no 
longer a valid Christian, “betraying her salvation.” A non-religious life, however, was not a 
valid option for her, because her alternative was to convert to Islam. Her thought process was 
that since she had failed at Christianity, she would try Islam. A part of this process was that 
having an abortion would be unacceptable in her Neo-Pentecostal church, but she had the 
impression that it would be acceptable within Islam. A Muslim friend told her that she would 
be “accepted as a Muslim” though she had an abortion. Her friend’s answer could be 
interpreted as a sign of mercy within the Muslim community, but the narrative portrays it to 
mean that abortion is acceptable in Islam, thus contrasting the ‘moral stance’ of the Neo-
Pentecostal church with the ‘immoral stance’ of Islam from the perspective of the typical 
reader of the magazine.
61
 Assured that she could have an abortion and convert to Islam, 
Mwangi went to a doctor where she believed she would receive an abortion. The doctor, 
however, was revealed to be a Christian, who then prayed for Mwangi and helped her to 
accept her unborn child.
62
 This reinforces the contrast that Christianity stands for life (i.e. 
opposed to the abortion) while Islam does not. 
Two aspects of this short depiction of Islam should be noted. First, Islam is 
misrepresented when it is portrayed as permitting easy abortions for reasons of unwanted 
pregnancies. As Rispler-Chaim notes “Abortion is a complex subject in Islamic law, and is 
legally judged ‘reprehensible.’ This means that it is permitted only when a ‘good’ reason can 
be furnished, and only up to 120 days into the pregnancy, which is the stage before 
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ensoulment.”63 Second, the Muslim friend’s comments could also be understood to indicate 
grace and mercy in the forgiveness of wrongdoing by the Muslim community and Islam, yet 
this interpretation is not pursued in the narrative. The architects of the narrative (Mwangi and 
Kimani, the reporter) miss an opportunity to humanise her Muslim friend and the Muslim 
community, instead relegating them to a one-dimensional, morally suspect role in the story. 
Similar roles have been seen previously, such as the families of Rose Muhando and Shakira 
Asia in their respective stories and the guesthouse owner in Wanjiru’s narrative. 
7.3.2 Testimony of Joseph Njuguna 
In I Hate You Heroin,
64
 Joseph Njuguna tells his story. He tells of moving to London 
and becoming deeply involved in drugs. Islam is not specifically mentioned in the article; 
however, when he narrates why he began using drugs he says, “My room-mates were from 
Kenya. Many of them were from Mombasa.”65 He also mentions the name of the friend who 
got him involved in selling drugs as Ishmael.
66
 In this way, Islam is subtly associated with his 
involvement in drugs. Mombasa, as a port city, is notorious for the prevalence of illegal 
drugs, especially heroin,
67
 and Muslim Swahili people, as well as others, are involved in both 
its use and trade.
68
 The facts in Njuguna’s narrative are, therefore, not in dispute. However, 
within the structure of the conversion narrative his conversion to Christianity brings victory 
over addiction to heroin, whereas his association with Mombasa (read Muslims) and Ishmael 
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(probably a Muslim)
69
 brought him into addiction and crime. The intention is not to present 
Islam as immorally linked to heroin abuse, but the representation of the power of Christianity 
to overcome drug addiction is subtly contrasted with the inability of Islam to do so. There is 
similarity with Muhando’s narrative in that Christianity is portrayed as more mystically 
powerful than Islam for healing. 
7.3.3 Testimony of Josephat Obare 
A conversion narrative with an interesting difference is told by Josephat Obare in 
Dove Harvest.
70
 Similar to Njuguna’s story, Obare converts from a life of crime and 
debauchery to become a Christian minister. He does not encounter any Muslims in his tale, 
but has a mystical experience that is loosely tied to Islam. He met a beautiful woman in a 
night club on the Nairobi-Mombasa highway and left with her. What happened next is 
described: “Everything else happened very fast, the only thing he remembers was seeing a 
mosque behind them and entering a house which had a lot of cats.”71 The next day he realised 
that he had spent the night with a ‘jinni’ (Swahili version of the Arabic jinn) in the guise of a 
beautiful woman. From this moment he changed his life and converted to Christianity.  
The point of this episode seems to be that Obare’s careless and corrupt lifestyle led 
him into the clutches of an evil spiritual force from which he was fortunate to escape with his 
life. The presence of cats at the house indicates that witchcraft is involved. Yet the reference 
to a mosque and jinn identify the evil spirit with Islam. The more common Swahili word for 
depicting evil spirits is mapepo; therefore, the word choice of jinni is significant as an 
indicator of association with Islam. As the purpose of the ‘jinni’ was to take the life of its 
victims, it is also associated with death. Obare escapes death through, what he later 
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understands to be the intervention of God (understood as Christianity’s God), thus associating 
Christian faith with life. There is again the contrast between Islam and Christianity that has 
been seen earlier in which Islam is linked with life-denying forces and Christianity with life-
giving ones.
72
 Additionally, here is an instance of Islam being associated with a mystical, 
spiritual evil.  
7.3.4 Story of John Omino 
Another fascinating, though fictional, conversion narrative is told by John Omino
73
 in 
a booklet titled, Satanism: How the Devil Is Trapping God’s People, which can be found 
reprinted in Devil Worship in Kenya: The Untold Story.
74
 In this narrative Omino becomes 
trapped working for an international Satanic organisation in which he becomes wealthy 
through the procurement and sale of human body parts for use in witchcraft rituals. Later 
through his mother’s Neo-Pentecostal church he converts to Christianity and is delivered of 
evil spirits.  
Blunt analyses this story in relation to the economic and political crises that Kenya 
was experiencing in the late 1990s.
75
 Only ways in which the narrative speaks about Islam 
will be discussed. Omino first becomes involved when he finds work as a driver for a wealthy 
Cameroonian businessman, named Ali. His employer leads Omino into the dark world of 
kidnapping and dismembering human beings and selling the body parts.
76
 It is significant that 
the man who leads him into Satanism has a Muslim name. Blunt comments on the presence of 
a Muslim in the narrative, and it is appropriate to cite his analysis in full. 
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Despite East Africa’s long, often peaceful history with Islam, Ali’s 
Muslim name connects his illicit wealth with what Kenyans, especially after 
the 1998 US embassy bombings, began to perceive as a ‘foreign’ religion with 
supposedly violent tendencies. Islam is implicated in the same transnational 
world of subterranean commerce that western NGO’s are. But, such depictions 
also convey much older associations between the Arab world and the 
commodification of human life under the Omani control of the East African 
slave trade. Ali confirms this sentiment even more because his ‘work’ takes 
place during ‘the night,’ the inversion of the Kenyan notion of honest business, 
which is done ‘in the light of day, bila magendo’ (without deception or 
corruption) i.e. not hidden, a dishonesty often attributed to coastal Muslims 
who allegedly conceal their economic exploitation through the use of spirit 
familiars known as majini.
77
 
Blunt correctly indicates the several associations that arise from the simple use of a 
Muslim character in the narrative to introduce Omino into Satanism. Violence, slavery and 
corruption are subtly associated with Islam, which is generally understood to be a foreign 
religion. His employer, Ali, is a foreigner and the commerce in body parts takes on 
international dimensions, so that local ‘Kenyan Islam’ is less implicated in this trade. The 
East African slave trade and even the supposedly dishonest coastal Muslims are often 
represented as Arabs and foreigners in Kenyan discourse, as was seen in chapter four. Later in 
the story Omino must spend time in the coastal towns of Malindi and Mombasa so that he 
may learn more about Satanic practices and become more deeply involved in the 
organisation.
78
 It is only on the Muslim coast where one can truly become an expert in the 
ways of Satanism. Training in Malindi and Mombasa, two centres of the East African slave 
trade, further elicits connections between the Arab slave trade and the contemporary seeking 
of wealth through evil mystical power.
79
 For most Neo-Pentecostals, who are the primary 
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targets of these publications, the association of Islam with mystical power and possibly with 
satanic practices is especially relevant. Islam then becomes a rival and opposite spiritual 
power whose exploitation is considered illicit and dangerous.  
As McIntosh has proposed in her study of the Giriama in Malindi, many Africans 
“acknowledge the mystical potency (the ontological reality) of more than one set of religious 
or cosmological forces,”80 which she calls “polyontologism.” An individual may seek 
prosperity through a variety of religious and spiritual means. Omino’s story also reflects this 
world view, and it serves as a warning to readers to be cautious of seeking spiritual blessing 
through Islam, which is associated with witchcraft in his story, witchcraft being the ultimate 
signifier of evil in African cosmological symbolism. 
7.3.5 Testimony of Margaret Wanjiru 
Margaret Wanjiru, a popular Neo-Pentecostal Bishop,
81
 wrote of her conversion from 
involvement in witchcraft, which had brought her wealth, in Wiles of the Devil.
82
 Islam is only 
directly mentioned once in the book, where she writes in all capitals, “Do not use items with 
the dragon and do not use items with the mosque,”83 as warnings to avoid spiritually 
destructive objects, which are supposedly infused with demonic spirits. There are also several 
cryptic references to the “queen of the coast,”84 who is an especially powerful demonic spirit 
that she was familiar with in her former use of witchcraft. While Islam is never mentioned in 
reference to this spirit, the association of the coast with Islam in the minds of most Kenyans 
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raises the possibility that readers might make this connection, thus linking Islam with 
dangerous spiritual forces. 
7.3.6 Conclusion 
In the above conversion narratives moral transformations play a much more significant 
role than in the conversion from Islam narratives. The association of the protagonist with 
Muslims often intensifies involvement with sinful practices. Islam is portrayed as a potential 
spiritual and mystical danger to the central character in each narrative, where it serves as a 
warning to readers who might be tempted by Islam. Overcoming obstacles remains the 
principle theme of the narratives, and Islam is viewed as an obstacle to overcome, either as a 
spiritually demonic trap, as a temptation to conversion, or with Muslims as illicit business 
partners. While Christianity is portrayed as powerful, Islam is not benign; it also has spiritual 
power. However, accessing and manipulating this power is understood to be similar to 
witchcraft, involving demonic forces and proving mystically dangerous to those implicated.  
Horton
85
 has argued that conversion from African Religion to Islam, or to Christianity, 
has been motivated by the rapid changes that have been occurring in Africa over the past few 
centuries as Africans have encountered other cultures. The changes have necessitated 
movement from religions that dealt with ‘microcosmic’ issues to the ‘macrocosmic’ religions 
of Islam and Christianity. In other words Islam and Christianity offer means to break with the 
past and to become modern.
86
 However, the above conversion narratives identify Islam with 
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the microcosmic spiritual world of the African “ontological past.”87 Islam is represented as 
spiritually impotent, possibly evil (i.e. witchcraft) and backwards. 
7.4 Islam as a Spiritual Enemy 
There are also a few articles that speak more specifically of Islam as a rival spiritual 
power. Christians are understood to possess more power through the Holy Spirit, but they are 
warned to be careful of rival spiritual powers. 
7.4.1 Satanic Priesthoods 
The association of Islam with dangerous spiritual power is further seen in an article by 
James Kitavi, Satanic Priesthood in our Localities and Tribes,
88
 in Mercy Missions.
89
 The 
article is intended as a teaching document for church members who are involved in 
evangelism and missions. The idea of a satanic priesthood is related to the concepts of 
spiritual warfare and spiritual mapping promoted by C. Peter Wagner
90
 and others,
91
 in which 
it is understood that spiritual forces of evil control certain geographic regions.
92
 The solution 
is to ‘map’ these forces and their supposed origins,93 then to act against them by praying 
special ‘warfare prayers’94 and through prophetic actions known as power encounters.95 
Kitavi’s terminology of “satanic priesthood” seems to be his own, though many of his ideas 
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are similar to those typical of the spiritual mapping movement.
96
 There are only two direct 
mentions of Islam, but these are of interest because of their very direct accusations linking 
Islam with the demonic. The main interest of the author is combating African Religion. 
Most of the article consists of instructions on how to identify a “Satanic priesthood” in 
one’s neighbourhood or village. He writes: 
… to identify Satanic priesthoods as you do spiritual mapping, through 
observation, look out for places of worship such as temples, mosques, churches 
that do not preach salvation through Jesus Christ, or that pray with the rosary. 
We see some of these as we enter towns, for example, in northern Kenya.
97
 
Temples refer to Hindu temples built by the Indian community in Kenya. “Churches 
that do not preach salvation through Jesus Christ” most likely denote mainline Protestant 
churches, which the author probably considers to be too interested in social issues. Churches 
that “pray with the rosary” signify the Roman Catholic Church, whose members most Kenyan 
Neo-Pentecostals consider to be ‘unsaved.’ Later in the article African Religion is especially 
targeted as contributing to the formation of “satanic priesthoods.” These religious 
communities, including Christian ones that the author (and presumably his church 
denomination) does not approve of are joined by Islam, represented by “mosque.” Islam is 
further singled out, when Kitavi mentions seeing satanic priesthoods upon entering towns in 
northern Kenya, which has a large Muslim population. Each of these religious groups is 
understood to operate as a priesthood for Satan (i.e. interfering with the growth of what the 
author perceives to be the true Christian church in the vicinity). Simply being near one of 
these places, such as a mosque, one may “feel a satanic presence,”98 according to Kitavi. It is 
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unclear if Hindus, Muslims and Catholics are understood to be aware of their rather devious 
role. 
Later he comments, “Recently in a local newspaper, an article on ‘majini 99 (demonic 
spirits)’ said that Muslims believe there are both ‘good’ and bad majini. What good can come 
out of demons?”100 In providing an English translation for majini, he deviates from the most 
basic meaning that the word signifies for Swahili speakers, spirits,
101
 by adding the negative 
descriptor ‘demonic.’ Also, Muslims do not believe in good and bad demons, but the standard 
belief is that some jinn are Muslims, therefore obedient to Allah and thus good, while others 
are not.
102
 Jinn are understood to be supernatural beings that were created from fire, rather 
than earth or light as humans and angels were respectively created from,
103
 but the jinn are not 
understood to be identical to demons. Kitavi distorts the beliefs of Muslims, by implying that 
they believe that some “demons” are good. It is difficult to know if he intentionally misleads 
his readers, or if it results from a combination of a lack of knowledge of Islam and his own 
Pentecostal theology of majini, which views all traditional spirits to be demonic.
104
 These 
statements also associate Islam quite closely with majini, suggesting that Muslims are not 
centred in the worship of God but in dealing with spirits. This suggestion, that Muslims deal 
primarily with spirits, would align Islam with many understandings of African Religion; in 
this way it portrays Islam as an unacceptable religious alternative to those seeking modern 
religious solutions. 
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To summarise, Kitavi views mosques to accommodate satanic priesthoods, Muslims to 
consider demons good, and for Muslims to be especially interested in spirits. Though only a 
few sentences speak of Islam, they strongly connect it to evil spiritual power in much the 
same way that Neo-Pentecostals associate African Religion with demonic power. Kalu argues 
that Pentecostalism, with its emphasis on spiritual power, speaks to the “African primal 
worldview,” strengthening its understanding of mystical-spiritual causation, but offering 
answers through Christian faith and power.
105
 In this vein, resistance to the church and to 
evangelism are understood as mystical-spiritual resistance engendered by opposing religious 
ritual. It needs to be reemphasized that Islam is not the sole religion treated as spiritually evil. 
Improper forms of Christianity (mainline churches and Catholicism), and more importantly 
the author’s and the readers’ own African religious heritage is described as demonic. 
Potentially, Kenyan readers of the article find parents and families accused of participating in 
satanic priesthoods when they perform traditional practices or attend non-Pentecostal 
churches. For the typical Kenyan Neo-Pentecostal reader, identifying Islam with a satanic 
priesthood may to a certain extent identify Islam with their own African religious heritage. It 
is thus likely that the strong connections said to be present between the demonic and Islam 
may be understood less antagonistically within the Kenyan context than in a Western 
perspective. This also communicates to those looking to move beyond the old ways towards 
modernity that Islam remains in the past; this may be the more significant aspect. 
Yet one should take note of Geib’s warning that a potential abuse of the Spiritual 
Mapping movement is “holistic social demonizing.”106 Kalu is also critical of the “Nigerian 
Pentecostal rhetoric” in the “demonization of Islam” that has worsened relations between the 
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two religious communities and “hindered conflict transformation” in that nation.107 Most 
likely, the Kenyan Muslim community does not appreciate being associated with satanic 
priesthoods and demons.  
7.4.2 Godly Altars 
Kitavi writes another article, Building a Godly Community Altar, with similar themes. 
A community altar
108
 is defined as “a place where people from different churches, 
communities, tribes, etc. come together to worship God.”109 People of other religions are 
welcome if they “lay their gods aside and worship Jesus.”110 He uses the example of inter-
faith meetings in Uhuru Park,
111
 where leaders of different religions pray for Kenya. He 
characterises these as “defiled altars” and “idolatry”112 in which the worship of false gods is 
intermingled with the worship of the one true God.
113
  
He later writes: 
We must not forget that altars are used to possess the land, and if we do 
not raise altars for God, satanic altars will be raised on our land. Not that they 
are not there already as many altars of different religions litter our cities and 
towns, while tribal altars litter our villages and urban areas too. But if we raise 
Godly community altars, the satanic altars are weakened and phased out 
because He who is in us is greater than he who is in the world. So-called 
humanitarian clubs in our communities, free masons, mosques, etc are not 
godly altars. Allah acknowledges that the Creator of heaven and earth is God. 
How is he a god then? He is not.
114
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Some key components of Kitavi’s implicit theology appear in this paragraph. There is 
an underlying political theology shown in the phrase, “to possess the land,” which Kalu has 
demonstrated to be an important theme in African Pentecostal political theology.
115
 The 
political contest over the land is spiritualised through the physical act of raising competing 
altars.
116
 The hostility is stark, between godly altars and satanic altars. Further clarification is 
given; satanic altars are the centres of worship of non-Christian religions. The strategy to gain 
possession of the land seems to involve starting churches (NPCs) and prayer groups in 
neighbourhoods and locations where non-Christian religion predominates. The contestation is 
understood to be primarily spiritual, assuming that the presence of true, praying Christians 
will cause other religious institutions to gradually weaken and disappear. Prayer is the key 
political act. 
By saying that these non-Christian religious institutions “litter our cities and towns,” 
they are also characterised as trash. No respect is shown for other faiths. In the last few 
sentences Kitavi clearly indicates that he includes Islam among the competing religions that 
are raising satanic altars. His argument that Allah cannot be God shows a distinct lack of 
understanding. He may be arguing that Allah is a minor spiritual being, such as those Mbiti 
calls ‘divinities.’117  
Returning to the implicit Pentecostal political theology, Kitavi does not demonstrate 
interest so much for the allegiance of the soul, but for the possession of the land, which 
ultimately represents the nation. The enemies, against whom Pentecostals are contesting for 
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political dominance, are African Religion, Hindus, mainline churches
118
 and Islam. As Kalu 
points out, African Pentecostals view this as delivering “the land from the hostile 
occupiers.”119 
There is, however, also a hint of welcome in the text. Kitavi recommends that people 
of any religion be welcomed to participate, albeit with the caveat that they leave their gods at 
the door and worship Jesus. Respect for the African (and biblical) notion of hospitality among 
neighbours is in tension with desire for religious purity. In this instance the desire for 
religious purity prevails, but it could be asked if hospitality might triumph under a different, 
less religiously oriented scenario. 
7.4.3 David Owuor and Wilfred Lai 
In 2009 a report on the viewpoints of two major Neo-Pentecostal leaders concerning 
the Inter-Religious Forum (IRF) in Kenya was published in The Shepherd,
120
 the newspaper 
of the Deliverance Church, which is one of the largest Neo-Pentecostal denominations in 
Kenya. The two Neo-Pentecostal leaders, Wilfred Lai
121
 and David Owuor,
122
 are critical of 
Christian leaders who have joined the IRF. Lai is quoted as follows: 
These days, we have these associations intended to bring people of 
faith together to work for a particular cause. I am telling you, that is the highest 
level of deception. … I respect every religion. I respect Muslims and Hindus. 
But I don’t agree with their faith. How can two walk together unless they 
agree? … We don’t believe in the same God. And it is not true that we are all 
going to heaven using different roads – religions. If we join our hands with 
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Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and Hare Krishna, we are not speaking the 
truth.
123
 
In Lai’s thinking there is a multiplicity of gods, and each religion is centred on its own 
god. The Christian God is understood to be the true God, while others are viewed as false 
gods or lesser gods. This is made clear when he states that those of other religions “are not 
going to heaven,” and therefore, in his theology they must be condemned to hell. For him this 
prevents Christians from working together with Muslims. 
Owuor asks: 
How could the so-called chief spiritual leaders of this land have 
paraded themselves at KICC
124
 together with priests of the idol eastern gods 
and purport to be speaking to Jehovah to come and heal this country?
125
 Tell 
me, how blind does it get? How can the bishops even parade themselves on 
national television and radio, agreeing with the other idol eastern gods to be 
equal to Jehovah?
126
  
The “idol eastern gods” is the terminology by which Owuor combines together Allah 
and the Hindu deities.
127
 Similar to Lai, Owuor imagines a spiritual world of many gods in 
which the Christian God is the true God. Both men view Allah (as well as other gods) as 
spiritual rivals to the Christian God, implying that there are various spiritual power centres as 
suggested by McIntosh.
128
 However, different from previous examples, Lai and Owuor also 
include a significant truth claim regarding the Christian God, rather than relying only on a 
claim of superior power. 
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7.4.4 Teresia Wairimu 
In Revival Springs in 2001 Teresia Wairimu, a popular Kenyan Neo-Pentecostal 
preacher, tells a story of her Indian neighbour, whose daughter “is possessed by demon 
spirits.”129 Wairimu says, “I don’t care if they are Hindus, Muslims, or what they are, but the 
moment I walk to their gate and say, ‘I have come to set your daughter free in the Name of 
Jesus,’ the devil will have to go.”130 She wishes to demonstrate that Christianity has more 
power than Islam (or other religions). 
7.4.5 Conclusion 
Islam is viewed as spiritually other. It can be understood to be idolatrous, demonic, or 
simply false. Christian faith is not generally contrasted with Islam in a relationship of truth, 
but one of power. Christians, preaching, prayer, the gospel, and Godly altars are understood to 
have more power than Islam, therefore rendering its dangerous spiritual otherness ineffective. 
African Religion is understood to be the principle religious opposition; conversion to 
Christianity is seen to give the convert power over spirits. Islam, then, relates to Christianity 
in ways similar to African Religion; it is perceived as spiritually impotent and backwards. 
7.5 Islam as a Political Issue 
Islam is also discussed as a political issue in some articles. 
7.5.1  Wanjiru on Kadhi Courts 
Margaret Wanjiru was interviewed in Revival Springs
131
 in 2002 about concerns over 
the proposed draft constitution.
132
 When asked how she first became interested in the draft 
constitution, she responded that the “Lord spoke to” her on the eve of her ordination, saying 
                                                          
129
 Teresia Wairimu, "Expand Your Horizons," Revival Springs, April 2001, 13. 
130
 Ibid. 
131
 Michael Wambugu and Margaret Wanjiru, "The Time is Now," Revival Springs, December 2002. 
132
 The draft constitution that is discussed was defeated and is not the current constitution of Kenya 
newly passed in 2010. 
232 
 
“the enemy has slipped into our nation.”133 He also said that she “should pray prophetically 
concerning the destiny of our country.”134  
Satan is the enemy that she speaks of, demonstrating again the firm belief in spiritual 
causality. There are three issues with the draft constitution that Wanjiru finds troubling: 
equality for gays, legalised abortion, and special consideration for Islam concerning kadhi 
courts.
135
  
Wanjiru is asked if it is true that the Christian community has not presented its views 
to the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC). She answers: 
It is not true. Christians came out and presented their views. However, 
we should realize that whereas Christians were possibly not very articulate in 
their presentations, the Muslims on the other hand made very well-prepared 
presentations, because they knew what they were doing. They sent scholars to 
make the presentations. We need to understand that what is happening here is 
part of a well-orchestrated drive to Islamize Africa. And they know they can 
achieve that, if they get entrenched in the constitutions of the African states.
136
  
There is a veiled reference to the Abuja Declaration, where she speaks of a “well-
orchestrated drive to Islamize Africa.” It is probable that the Muslim community was well-
prepared because the issue is important to their community; however, Wanjiru is only able to 
interpret their preparation as a sign of a larger conspiracy. Wanjiru, and other similar Kenyan 
Christians, see religio-political issues related to Islam through a lens formed by self-contained 
isolation in a social “ghetto,” where the “reality” of the situation is defined uniquely by other 
like-minded Christians, allowing no authentic input from the Muslim community.
137
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She continues her response saying, “the battle for the constitution is a spiritual 
battle,”138 because the nature of the new constitution will determine the future of the nation, 
“spiritually and physically.”139 The debate over the inclusion of kadhi courts in the 
constitution is perceived to be more than a political issue. The stakes are the future of the 
nation, which is thematically similar to what was seen in the previous chapter by writers such 
as Maina
140
 and Mugambi,
141
 though the approaches are radically different. Maina and 
Mugambi understand Kenya’s future progress to depend upon cooperation and unity between 
Muslims and Christians, whereas Wanjiru believes that it depends upon Muslims politically 
submitting to Christian leadership. 
7.5.2 Isaac Kiragu on Political Issues 
In late 2008 the Senior Pastor of Chrisco New Life Church in Nairobi, Isaac Kiragu, 
was interviewed in his church’s magazine, Mercy Mission, for an article, Vision 2030 & 
God’s Destiny for Kenya.142 It is not a true journalistic interview, as Kiragu is essentially the 
reporter’s superior; the questions provide the opportunity for Kiragu to express his opinions 
on a series of Kenyan current affairs. A few questions, which are mostly political in nature, 
are directed at issues related to Islam in Kenya. In the first question the interviewer asks: 
Recently we have seen Kenya partnering with nations in the East and 
Middle East that were not previously traditional trade partners, some of which 
have rampant persecution of Christians and a hatred of Christianity. … would 
you say it is important for Kenya to be wise in selecting trade partners, keeping 
in mind God’s vision for this nation? And can an ungodly nation introduce its 
ideologies and ungodly practices in a nation under the cover of economic 
investment?
143
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The interviewer expresses concern over the spiritual ramifications of trade relations 
with non-Christian nations. The reference to the Middle East indicates that some are Muslim 
nations, and the mention of “rampant persecution of Christians and a hatred of Christians” 
would also be understood by the interviewer to include these. These nations are not only 
understood to be non-Christian, but ungodly. The expressed concern is that “ungodly” 
ideologies and practices will enter Kenya. While these ideologies and practices are not 
specified, it seems that the beliefs and traditions of Islam are being indicted. 
Kiragu begins his answer by deflecting the question towards the responsibility of the 
church,
144
 which suggests that the question harbours the anxieties of those in his church, and 
he wishes to redirect their thoughts on the matter elsewhere. He mentions the Great 
Commission (Matthew 28:19-20) and the mission of the church to “reach the nations with the 
Gospel.”145 Then he says, “God has chosen to use this nation for that purpose,”146 so that by 
trading with “ungodly” nations an opportunity to fulfil this purpose is before them. He 
acknowledges that “they are hostile to Christianity,” but that Kenyan Christians will have the 
occasion to do business in these nations and to “preach Christ” as they interact with people.147 
He has redirected the political aspects of the anxiety towards a concern for Christian 
evangelism in a way that should be reassuring for readers. 
Then he warns of the possible “danger” in these new trade relationships: 
Yet the Church must be awake to the dangers of this, and not allow 
them to convert us instead of us converting them. If we are not awake, they 
could sell their gods to us, and this will result in more idolatry in this nation. 
We are supposed to dominate and not to be dominated over.
148
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The dangers, as seen by Kiragu, are for Christians to be converted to another religion 
(idolatry) and for Christians to be dominated. These dangers have personal, religious and 
political dimensions, which bring readers back to the anxieties of the original question. It is 
clear that from a personal religious viewpoint, conversion to Islam is deemed a possibility for 
Kenyan Neo-Pentecostals by Kiragu. Since Kenya is developing trade relations with these 
nations, he uses the metaphor that they may “sell their gods” to Kenyans, which would 
worsen idolatry in Kenya in his view. Though he is likely attempting a clever wordplay, this 
metaphor implies that an attractive product (i.e. another religion) could be bought by Kenyan 
Christians. These two potential “dangers” suggest that Islam may be a viable option for 
Kenyan Christians, demonstrating that Islam is a true religious rival. The notion that 
Christians must “dominate” rather than be “dominated” makes political and social relations 
between Muslims and Christians in Kenya difficult, eliminating the possibility of 
compromise. 
Kiragu is later asked about “spiritual insights” that he has concerning the 
constitutional review process. His response subtly alludes to the controversy over the 
inclusion of kadhi courts. He says that legislators must “create a conducive atmosphere for the 
gods to fight for themselves (ref. Judges 6:31-32).”149 The passage from Judges concerns 
Gideon who has destroyed an altar to Baal. The people wish to kill him, but they are told to 
allow Baal to defend himself. The implication, of course, is that Baal is a false god and unable 
to act. Kiragu is similarly imagining the god of Islam to be a false god,
150
 and therefore of 
little threat. He admonishes Christians to “obey the Lord’s command and preach the Gospel. 
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He will do the rest.”151 The inference is that the Christian God, being the true god, will be 
successful against the false god. 
The interviewer then directly asks Kiragu about the kadhi courts as follows: “Do you 
see Kadhi courts as a leeway for Islamising this nation according to previously stated 
intentions by Muslim leaders in international conferences to Islamise sub-Saharan Africa?”152 
The question alludes to the Abuja Declaration from the Islam in African Conference held in 
Abuja, Nigeria in 1989.
153
 The communiqué issued at the end of the conference, which 
became known as the Abuja Declaration, advocates a plan for da’wa in Africa.154 
Kiragu agrees that having kadhi courts in the Kenyan constitution is part of a plan to 
Islamise Kenya; however, his answer is mostly irenic. He says: 
Muslims are ‘evangelizing’ the same way Christians are evangelizing. 
They are seeking followers through preaching Islam. What Christians should 
focus on is the Great Commission. If Christians preach to Muslims and they 
get saved, then what the Muslims are planning to do will not worry them. The 
problem is worrying without spreading the Gospel. Preach the Gospel and let 
the Word work on behalf of this nation. That’s what we are called to do. 
Nevertheless, we should not create carnal barriers to the Gospel through such 
things as Kadhi courts.
155
 
His statement is that Muslims are simply doing the same thing that Christians are 
doing. Both are preaching their religion and trying to gain converts. His words must be very 
disarming for the typical Kenyan Neo-Pentecostal reader. Kiragu expresses tremendous 
confidence in the Gospel; if both Muslims and Christians are preaching their message, 
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Muslims will convert and Islamic da’wa will not be effective. Christianity is seen to be more 
spiritually powerful than Islam. He also illustrates common African Pentecostal political 
theology; the role of the church is to “preach the Word” and allow it to work for the nation. 
This is an expression of the deeply held belief in spiritual causality; events in the “physical 
realm” are determined by the “spiritual realm.”156 Preaching the Word is understood to effect 
change in the spiritual realm, which will bring about changes in the political situation.  
The response to a political challenge does not, however, remain only spiritual. 
Kiragu’s last statement – Kenyans “should not create carnal barriers to the Gospel through 
such things as Kadhi courts” – certainly indicates a concerted effort to keep the courts out of 
the constitution. Also, through the use of biblical language (i.e. “carnal barriers to the 
Gospel”) he appears to advocate a political solution to meet a more ultimate spiritual goal. 
Kiragu also answers a question concerning tribal altars and their effects on people. He 
attributes poverty and lack of economic development to the presence of inappropriate tribal 
altars. He uses what he considers to be an obvious example concerning why certain regions 
are poor saying, “We know the general reasons for places like the coast and north-eastern 
provinces.”157 Notably, the Coast Province and the North Eastern Province are the only 
provinces in Kenya which have a significant Muslim population or a Muslim majority.
158
 
Again, belief in spiritual causality is the basis of his assumption; since Islam is prevalent in 
the region, the spiritual realm is negatively affected resulting in poverty and misery. 
Significantly, Kiragu assumes this to be obvious, in no need of explanation. He finds the 
“tribal altars” of African Religion to be less obviously revealed, requiring investigation and 
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research.
159
 In this instance, while Islam and his readers’ own (and his own) traditions are 
understood to have spiritually equal results in the world (i.e. poverty, misery, etc.) Islam is 
placed slightly lower as a more obvious evil. 
7.5.3 Letter concerning Rights of Christians in a Muslim Area 
Sheltel Righa, a pastor from Mombasa, appeals for more Christians in positions of 
governmental authority in a letter to the editor in Revival Springs in 2002.
160
 His letter was 
precipitated by a specific experience described as follows: “Recently when we went to preach 
in a certain region, we were told; ‘You have no permission to preach in this area,’ although 
we had been given a permit.”161 He attributes this to the area being controlled by “evil-minded 
people,” who “hinder the preaching of the Gospel.”162 Considering the local context of 
Mombasa, it is obvious that Righa wished to hold a “crusade”163 in an area with a significant 
Muslim presence and authority, which also leads him to claim that Christians are “denied our 
rights” in certain parts of the nation.164 Relying upon the biblical stories of Nehemiah and 
Esther, he proposes that Christians should gain more political power through the electoral 
system, stating that prayer is not enough.
165
 While not denying spiritual causality, he finds its 
effects limited, and therefore resorts to a call for political action. 
Righa advocates Christian political involvement in order to advance the spread of 
Christianity and in his particular case in a traditionally Muslim environment. A personal 
component is also likely, since a successful crusade evangelist gains status in the Christian 
                                                          
159
 Kiragu, "Vision 2030 and God's Destiny for Kenya," 7. 
160
 Sheltel Righa, "Let's Clean the Politics," Revival Springs, May 2002. 
161
 Ibid., 2. 
162
 Ibid. 
163
 Righa does use the word, crusade, elsewhere in the letter. 
164
 Righa, "Let's Clean the Politics." 
165
 Ibid. 
239 
 
community,
166
 and he is being prevented from holding these meetings. He seems to have little 
concern with establishing good interreligious relations with the Muslim community, deeming 
its political leaders, “evil-minded” and perceiving himself and his community to be 
oppressed, having their rights denied. His reference to Esther “delivering the Jews from 
danger”167 indicates that he wishes to portray his situation as one of persecution. 
7.5.4 Religious Commentary on the National Anthem 
Catherine Muriithi wrote Kenya Arise in 2007 as a commentary on the national 
anthem and a call to unity in Kenya. As a call to unity she attempts to be inclusive, writing of 
racial, ethnic, language and economic differences that must be overcome, though ignoring 
religious differences. Throughout the book, Muriithi quotes scripture and uses biblical 
language to comment on the anthem, which is written as a prayer to “the God of all 
creation.”168 There are, however, a few pages of graphics which include Islam. On one page, 
there are 12 small photographs of individual Kenyans, one of whom is obviously a Muslim.
169
 
Elsewhere, the word, thank you, is written in 18 different Kenyan languages, of which Somali 
and Arabic are included.
170
 Both of these languages would be considered Islamic in this 
context. These are the only signs of fully including Muslims into the unity that is being called 
for. 
Her goal is most clearly shown as she writes, “It is not political theology that will 
drive Kenya. It is a common vision that the people pursue, a common creed irrespective of 
differences in ethnicity, occupation, education, skill, talent, and so on.”171 Considering the 
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Christian perspective of the writer, the “common creed” that she believes “will drive Kenya” 
towards unity and prosperity is obviously a Christian one. While Muriithi doesn’t seem to 
hold any malice towards Islam, Muslims are basically ignored as she mounts an appeal 
towards a religious-based unity of Kenya.
172
 
7.5.5 Conclusion 
It can be seen that (Neo)Pentecostals find it difficult to relate politically with Muslims. 
In some cases, Muslims are viewed seemingly as political enemies, such as Wanjiru’s 
accusations against Muslims concerning the inclusion of kadhi courts in the constitution. 
While at other times a more irenic approach is sought; for example, Muriithi’s attempts to 
include Muslims through the illustrations in her book, which ultimately fails as all of the 
writers have Christian-oriented political agendas.  
A naïve theocratic vision seems present in these articles. Kiragu says that Christians 
must dominate, and Righa urges for Christian political control along the Muslim coast. 
Muriithi’s idyllic interpretation of the national anthem also lends itself to theocratic ideals in 
which Christianity sets the agenda of the state. The theocratic vision remains naïve, because 
there is no concrete theocratic agenda, nor even a realisation or acknowledgement of such a 
vision. However, this vision is sharp enough to render political dealings with the Muslim 
community difficult at best.  
7.6 Polemics 
Polemics seems to be a rather uncommon Kenyan approach to Islam in the Kenyan 
context. One article was found that describes a seminar in which a polemical approach to 
Islam was taught, seemingly as an evangelistic method.  
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In a 2009 issue of Mercy Mission there is a report on the missions programs of Chrisco 
New Life Church in Nairobi, which includes an account of the training of teams for Muslim 
evangelism.
173
 One of the teachers who taught the teams is identified as Evangelist John 
Asige. He is quoted as follows: 
Nairobi has been invaded by Islam from all the four gates. The heart of 
the town has been invaded and bought too. Not to mention Eastleigh.
174
 
Christians have been in their comfort zones, but they are now realizing what is 
happening. If we don’t wake up and not only pray, but also evangelize, it will 
be very difficult in future to preach the Gospel. Unless we act now, it may take 
people’s lives to take back what we’ve lost. Islam is using technology, 
craftiness, anything it can use, to spread the religion. People have testified how 
they were being offered money in order to join Islam; some Shs 70,000, others 
Shs 40,000,
175
 etc. This is in a bid to increase the numbers of Muslims in case 
Sharia law, which can be effected because of numbers, can be applicable in 
future. It is a trick of the enemy. In this hard economic times, some people are 
falling victim to this. While the church is busy preaching prosperity gospel, 
Muslims are busy ‘buying’ people into Islam. The government is also 
embracing Islam in the name of wooing investors to the country.
176
  
The intention of Asige’s words is to motivate members of Chrisco Church’s 
evangelistic teams to evangelise Muslims, seemingly through the use of fear. Images from 
economics (bought, buying people, investors, offered money to convert), war (invaded, take 
people’s lives to take back what we’ve lost, enemy) and deception (craftiness, trick) are used 
to describe the apparent growth of Islam in Nairobi. Current happenings in Nairobi are 
alluded to in the paragraph.  
First, since the dissolution of Somalia, many Somali businessmen have invested 
heavily in the Eastleigh section of Nairobi. This area of Nairobi now has many multi-story 
buildings, hotels, shopping centres and banks, becoming a rival business centre to downtown 
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Nairobi. Many computer and technology shops in downtown Nairobi are also owned by 
Somali, Arab or South Asian Muslim businessmen. The supposed economic power of the 
Muslim community seems to be envied (the church preaches prosperity gospel, while 
Muslims do actual buying) and the perceived source of the growth of Islam. His viewpoint is 
that if Islam has power, then Christians may convert to Islam. 
This visible economic growth is portrayed as an Islamic invasion, which Asige links 
with the kadhi court debate. The purpose of this invasion is to increase the number of 
Muslims so that shari’a177 may be implemented. Invasion also implies that Muslims come 
from outside Nairobi; they are foreigners. For now he recommends evangelism and prayer as 
effective strategies to counter the invasion. Without evangelism the future appears to be 
ominous, possibly requiring the sacrificing of lives. It is not clear if Asige envisions this as 
possible Christian martyrdom or deaths incurred during a Holy War against Islam. Either 
way, he paints a grim picture of a violent future in which Muslims may be in the majority. 
The kadhi court debate remains at the forefront of this picture. In Asige’s thinking, the kadhi 
court provision in the constitution can be defeated or rendered null, if Pentecostals evangelise 
Muslims.  
He also accuses Muslims of buying converts, thus defusing Islam of any spiritual 
power to attract converts from Christianity in any ‘real’ sense.178 The convert can be said to 
have been bought, to have sold out for money, rather than to have found an authentic spiritual 
attraction in Islam. The assumed economic power of Islam would also be associated with 
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either Somali immigrants or Arab oil money, implying that the alleged financially induced 
conversions are a subtle form of national disloyalty as well. 
“A team of teachers involved in Muslim evangelism”179 is said to have taught the 
following at the training centre. It is not clear who this team of teachers consists of, though 
from the small pieces of teaching that are presented in the articles it appears that resources 
provided by Njia ya Uzima
180
 (Way of Life) were used, and it is probable that this Christian 
ministry provided the teachers. One part of their ministry is to provide polemical resources in 
English and Swahili on Islam. Light of Life Publishing of Villach, Austria produces much of 
their material. The writer presents a few examples of the teaching, which may be assumed to 
be those parts expected to hold the most interest for the readers of the magazine. The first 
piece of teaching is presented as follows: 
The Quran teaches that every Muslim has to go through hell first, and 
only those whose works on earth were good will make it out of hell into a good 
place. They taught that Islam is founded on the spirit of deception. It denies the 
divinity of Christ, and when one approaches a Muslim to witness to him/her, 
one is preaching to someone who has already made up his/her mind to oppose 
God.
181
 
Two main points are made in this paragraph. The first claims that the Qur’ān teaches 
that all Muslims must go through hell before they can go to jannah (paradise). The second 
claims that Islam is a deception. Both of these accusations are somewhat commonly used in 
Christian polemical attacks against Islam. 
The first polemical point, which comes from Sura 19:70-72, is used to show that Allah 
(often understood in Christian polemical writing to be the Muslim god as opposed to the 
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Christian god) is not kind nor loving towards Muslims.
182
 Some Muslim interpreters have 
understood the passage to indicate that all people will indeed pass through hell at the Day of 
Judgment.
183
 Yusuf Ali offers two alternate interpretations in addition to the above. In one, 
rather than all people passing through hell, a ‘you’ in the text is understood to refer only to the 
wicked. In the second alternative, the passage is understood to refer to the “Bridge Ṣirāt,” 
which passes over hell and “over which all must pass to their final Destiny.”184 In any case, it 
is clear that the intentions of the team of teachers and the writer of the article were not to 
understand Islam better and inform students and readers about Islam, but to communicate a 
negative image of the Muslim concept of God. 
The second polemical point, that Islam is a deception, is very common.
185
 It follows 
its own internal logic. First, it assumes the absolute truth of Christianity and its doctrines, 
including the divinity of Christ. Since Islam teaches that Jesus was a prophet and not divine, 
then according to the internal logic of the polemics Islam is in error, and by “denying” the 
divinity of Christ Islam is therefore “deceiving” its followers.  
The analogous claim that a Muslim has “made up his/her mind to oppose God,” while 
seemingly unreasonable, follows a similar logic. The Qur’ān contains verses that specifically 
address certain Christian doctrines concerning Jesus and the Trinity.
186
 According to this type 
of polemical thinking “Islam has so redefined biblical teachings and concepts (such as 
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heaven, Christ, and God) that it is impossible to find common ground.”187 Similarly, Abd-al-
Masih
188
 who produces material for Light of Life (thus Njia ya Uzima also) writes, “Islam is a 
post-Christian religion which has consciously dealt with Christ and has developed into an 
anti-Christian power.”189 Muslims have therefore “become immune to the spirit of Christ.”190 
Abd-al-Masih adds that Sura 112 is a “compilation of” Islam’s “revolt against God and his 
anointed one.”191 Therefore, the difficulty of convincing a Muslim to convert to Christianity is 
attributed to the deception of Islam and to the Muslim having previously made up his/her 
mind to oppose God. The Kenyan Christian reader of this paragraph (and the Kenyan 
Christian recipient of the teaching) would be influenced to perceive Muslims as unduly 
stubborn and deceived by their own god, who is probably demonic. 
Another example of the teaching is presented: 
 There are confessions that one makes when becoming a Muslim and 
these become a powerful stronghold in their lives. Some Muslims have got 
saved but when they have tried to confess Christ as Lord, the confession of 
Islam comes out of their mouths instead. We’ve had to pray for them and break 
that stronghold so that they are able to confess Christ as Lord and saviour.
192
 
The shahada is here considered to be a spiritual stronghold, which is defined as “a 
place where the devil and his forces are entrenched”193 by an early proponent of the spiritual 
warfare movement. Abd-al-Masih writes that the shahada “cuts every Muslim off from Christ 
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and binds him to Allah as his slave.”194 The idea seems to be that by repeating the shahada 
innumerable times throughout one’s life, a Muslim comes under the influence of a spirit that 
will not permit the convert to confess Jesus Christ as Lord (i.e. a Christian equivalent 
confession of faith). Instead, even upon attempting to say, “Jesus Christ is Lord,” the convert 
says the shahada.
195
 The only remedy for this situation is special prayer to break spiritual 
strongholds. The paragraph resembles a generalised conversion narrative, but rather than 
narrating a conversion from a sinful past
196
 or recounting an intense spiritual experience,
197
 it 
narrates the convert’s lack of power to overcome the hold of Islam.  
The article continues by quoting the teaching team, who say that “God loves Muslims” 
and even though many “Christians view them as violent,” they should also “love them, deal 
with the spirits that bind them and preach the Gospel to them, that they might be saved.”198 
This pattern – first, to present a negative and fearful picture of Islam, then to advocate love 
and evangelism of Muslims – seems to be the common pattern of Christian polemical works 
aimed at evangelising Muslims.
199
 
Finally, the article says that Muslims have difficulty with Christianity because of the 
latter’s “connection with the Jews.”200 Muhammad is said to have “cursed the Jews and 
Christians” just before his death, so that “a curse from God hangs on anyone who professes 
Islam.”201 Muhammad is reported to have cursed the Jews and Christians on his deathbed for 
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having taken the “graves of their prophets as places of worship.”202 This hadith is used by 
some Christian polemicists to demonstrate Muhammad’s ‘negative’ character;203 however, it 
seems to be less common to conclude that Muslims are therefore cursed by God. From the 
viewpoint of African Pentecostals a curse would offer an explanation for why Muslims 
‘suffer’ an inability to recognise the truth of the Gospel.204 Though Western polemical sources 
are used, it would seem that they are used creatively from an African perspective. The alleged 
curse upon Muslims is reported so that the readers may know to pray to break the curse so 
that God might have “mercy and grace over them despite these.”205  
The polemical teaching reported in the article is strongly influenced by Western anti-
Islam Christian polemics and Western Pentecostalism. Much of the polemics seem to be 
drawn from the writings of Abd-al-Masih indicating that Njia ya Uzima was most likely 
involved in the teaching, since the polemical material that it provides include several books by 
this author, and his works are primarily available through its ministry. If Njia ya Uzima led 
this seminar then Kenyans would have very likely been involved in the teaching,
206
 which 
should then be seen as a Kenyan adaptation of Western polemical material. Additionally, the 
writer of the article selected examples of the teaching that appealed to Kenyan readers. In 
these brief snippets, Islam is portrayed as deceptive and demonic. Its followers are understood 
to be under the influence of curses and spirits opposed to God, which can make them both 
frightening and objects of sympathy. The polemics are designed to convince Christians of the 
need to evangelise Muslims, rather than for debate with Muslims. 
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7.7 Islam as the Ideal Other 
There are also several seemingly innocuous references to Islam that reveal a 
perception of Muslims as the embodiment of Otherness. The general purpose of these short 
statements are either to castigate Christians by comparing them unfavourably with Muslims, 
or to enhance the reputation of a Christian leader by saying that even Muslims recognise the 
leader’s gift. A few examples will demonstrate this. 
In an article from 2007 on disagreements among Christians over important national 
issues, Okumu writes in The Shepherd, “While Muslims have problems with some specific 
aspects of the Quran, Christians seem to differ on almost the entire Bible, leaving many 
ordinary Christians wondering who among the many voices and interpretations is representing 
the voice of God.”207 This sentence is part of his argument in criticising Christian leaders for 
voicing public disagreements, while each side uses the Bible to defend its position. His 
insinuation is that ‘even’ Muslims (the ultimate Other) are united; therefore, Christians should 
more so be united. 
In a Revival Springs article from 2001 a Pentecostal revival in Nanyuki, Kenya is 
reported on. The reporter writes of several wonderful changes in Nanyuki because of the 
revival, and then adds, “Muslims are also turning to God for salvation.”208 This last sentence 
functions as more than mere reporting; it intends to say that this was more than an ordinary 
Pentecostal revival, because ‘even’ Muslims (those least likely) are affected.  
Similarly, a 2007 article in Arise Africa promoted the arrival in Kenya of Nigerian 
evangelist William Kumuyi, who founded Deeper Life Church.
209
 One of his key attributes 
that is mentioned in order to attract people to his evangelistic meetings was that his church 
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has a large membership “in northern Nigeria which is pro-Islam.”210 The exceptionalness of 
Kumuyi is supposedly demonstrated by noting this last fact. 
David Owuor frequently speaks of even Muslims converting to Christianity after 
witnessing miracles at his preaching events. A reporter for Arise Africa writing on one of 
Owuor’s evangelistic meetings says, “The open-heaven event that took place at Kakamega, 
Bukhungu on June 25
th
, 2005, is one such event that would sweep away even a Muslim’s 
heart to be caused to swiftly accept the Jesus of Nazareth without much delay.”211 In addition 
to showing the wonders of Owuor’s miraculous gifts that “sweep away even a Muslim’s 
heart,” it can be seen that the Muslim Other is perceived as especially obstinate.  
Maximum Miracle Times reported on the candidature for president of Neo-Pentecostal 
pastor, Pius Muiru in 2007. It reports as follows on the meeting in which he announced his 
candidature: “Among these were Muslim faithful who expressed unswerving support for Pst. 
Muiru.”212 To show that Muiru had a political appeal beyond the Neo-Pentecostal community, 
Muslims are used as the example, chosen as the most Other from Neo-Pentecostal Christians. 
In 2006 Muchai wrote concerning a Nairobi city ordinance that limits outdoor noise in 
God’s Champion. Many Christians, including Muchai, saw this as a means to limit the 
number of open-air preaching events that are frequently held in Nairobi. He calls the new law 
“persecution” of the church then says, “tell me what fee Muslims remit to our councils for the 
nuisance they cause the residents of any city particularly during every early morning.”213 
Christians are portrayed as oppressed, while Muslims are represented as especially favoured 
by the city government.  
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In Revival Spring in 2003 Wairimu is reported to have said the following at a crusade: 
“The Church is being fought. Just the other day, we saw on television churches being burnt to 
ashes.
214
 … If Christians burn a mosque, we will have a riot in the country. But churches are 
being burnt and nobody is saying anything!”215 Christians are again represented as victims, 
while Muslims are seen to be aggressors who will riot if offended.  
In each of these examples Muslims are viewed as those who are of the greatest 
contrast with Christians, the ultimate Other. This viewpoint is considerably different from that 
of most Kenyan mainline scholars, who tend to view Christianity and Islam as Abrahamic 
religions with many similarities. 
7.8 Conclusion 
Much of the discussion is centred on issues of power, which can be understood as vital 
force. Conversion from Islam to Christianity is connected with healing and spiritual power. 
While Islam is viewed as an opposing, even demonic, spiritual power, Christianity is 
consistently understood to be more spiritually powerful. This can be manifested in prayers, 
building ‘Godly altars,’ sermons, revivals, etc. In some instances, Islam is associated with 
witchcraft (an African symbol of evil), lending it an illicit and dangerous dimension. This 
serves as warning to readers to be cautious of contact with Muslims. Islam, through being 
associated with spirits and witchcraft, is also portrayed as backwards rather than as a path to 
modernity. Christianity, on the other hand, is viewed as a means towards engagement with 
modern society and economy. 
Political and economic power can also be evoked. Islam can be seen as a political 
rival, as in the constitutional debate over kadhi courts and also in the Pentecostal political 
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theology concerning the land. Through a naïve theocratic vision, it is affirmed that 
Christianity (i.e. its symbols, values, institutions, etc.) must remain supreme in the nation. 
There is concern that if Islam has economic and/or political power, Christians may convert to 
Islam. The worry over Islamic political power exposes an ambivalent Pentecostal attitude 
towards Islam. On one hand, Islam is seen to be spiritually and mystically impotent in 
comparison with Pentecostal Christianity, on the other hand, a small Muslim minority is 
perceived to wield such political and economic power that it poses a serious challenge to the 
much larger Christian community. 
While the popular view of spiritual power sees it as a mystical power that can affect 
material change in the world through healing, prosperity, etc., spiritual power can also be 
understood as a form of symbolic power. Those who are understood to possess the mystical-
form of spiritual power accumulate spiritual capital.
216
 There is then the possibility of 
exchange with other forms of capital, such as economic capital and political capital. Examples 
would be of well-known Neo-Pentecostal (and mainline) pastors pursuing political careers or 
gaining economic wealth due to their position. This can also help explain the hidden 
mechanism behind the naïve theocratic vision. Christianity in Kenya is understood to have 
accumulated a sufficient amount of spiritual capital to transform some of it into political 
capital (i.e. the theocratic vision). However, if spiritual capital can be converted into 
economic and political capital, then the reverse must also be true. Therefore, when Islam 
accumulates considerable economic capital and political capital, this may be transformed into 
spiritual capital (increasing spiritual power) and thus enhance the likelihood that some 
Christians may convert to Islam. Since spiritual power is understood popularly as a mystical 
power effecting material change, the increased spiritual power – though having been gained 
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through converted economic and political capital – is understood mystically. Expressed 
popularly, one would say that the wealth and political power of Muslims demonstrates that 
they must have spiritual (i.e. mystical) power. 
Islam as a religion is never seriously considered nor understood. It is often grouped 
with other non-Christian religions, such as Hinduism and African Religion, and with non-
approved forms of Christianity, such as Catholicism and mainline Protestant churches. 
Together with these other religions it is then perceived to be an opposing spiritual power that 
impedes the growth of the true church. It could be said to be a part of the general religious 
background against which true (i.e. Pentecostal) Christianity must contend in its mission.
217
  
Christians and Muslims are never understood to worship the same God. Allah, in fact, 
is often judged to be something less than a god, though it is not clear what that might be. He 
can be portrayed as a false god or as demonic. The two faiths are never seen to have 
commonalities. In fact, Islam is sometimes depicted as the ultimate Other to Christianity. 
The conversion narratives offer two interesting perspectives that are not found in other 
genre. One, the Christian and Muslim communities are contrasted with the Christian 
community portrayed as more compassionate and moral, perhaps more fully demonstrating 
the African ideal of ubuntu.
218
 These attributes of the Christian community are then presented 
as valid reasons for conversion. Two, while converts exhibit some change in their universe of 
discourse from a Muslim one to a Christian one, their primary universe of discourse remains 
profoundly African. The conversion from Islam to Christianity takes place according to 
criteria from an African religious world view, which confirms insights from Sanneh and 
Bediako.
219
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The popular writers can be characterised as exclusivist in their approach towards 
Islam. Christian exclusivism is normally thought of as a theological position that believes that 
only Christians will achieve salvation. However, these Kenyan popular (Neo-Pentecostal) 
writers seem to wish to exclude Muslims theologically, socially and politically. It appears to 
be a rather harsh position that makes the peaceful relations between Muslims and Christians 
sought by mainline Kenyan scholars
220
 difficult to achieve. 
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PART THREE 
THEMES IN INTERRELIGIOUS ENCOUNTER IN KENYA 
CHAPTER 8 
CONTESTING PUBLIC SPACES 
 
This chapter will examine certain themes concerning the contestation of public space 
that arise from earlier historical chapters four and five, and chapters six and seven, which 
analysed the scholarly and popular Christian literature on Islam. 
8.1 Nation-building 
Since independence African governments have emphasized nation-building
1
 in their 
political ideologies. African states have employed the educational system, the mass media,
2
 a 
“reassertion of African culture,”3 language policy4 and African religious symbolism 
associated with “primary resistance movements”5 to promote feelings of national identity. 
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Elements of banal nationalism,
6
 such as popular music, styles of dress, national football 
teams
7
 and cuisine,
8
 have also instilled national sentiment among a country’s inhabitants.  
The Christian church has also been active in nationalist projects, as Pobee suggested 
“Christians can join hands with nationalists,”9 and Mugambi’s theology of reconstruction10 
could reasonably be called a theology of nation-building. Hastings even claims that 
nationalism in Africa has always been a Christian, and specifically not an Islamic, phenomena 
with Bible translation as a key element,
11
 though this claim may be tenuous.
12
 
The Christian and Muslim discourse in Kenya contesting public space centres 
primarily upon this nation-building project. The principle contested question is: Which 
religion will define the national identity? Recognising their minority status, Muslims often 
seek to define the place of Islam within the nationalist discourse, whereas Christians are more 
apt to imagine a dominant role for Christianity in nation-building. As this study concerns 
Christian perceptions of Islam, the Christian contribution to this discourse will be examined, 
while the Muslim contribution will be looked at only as necessary to clarify the contestation. 
As discussed in chapter one, this contestation takes the form of a symbolic confrontation.
13
 
Establishing the legitimacy to properly claim a voice in nation-building is a primary 
means by which Christians and Muslims contest public space. Legitimacy is claimed through 
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contesting for historical/mythological space, moral space and spiritual/theological space. Each 
of these contested spaces will be examined in this chapter. 
The writing of mainline Christian scholars and the popular Christian literature of the 
Neo-Pentecostal churches will be treated separately.  
8.2 Contesting Historical/Mythical Space 
The symbolic contest over historical/mythical space is especially concerned with the 
origins and nature of Kenya. As Appiah says concerning Africa, “mythical and historical 
narrative is an unavoidable ingredient for the formation of group as well as individual identity 
and for defining inclusion in a given clan or tribe.”14 Mythical and historical narrative in the 
modern African nation-state has also become strategic in defining national identity. 
The Muslim community, especially the Swahili and Arab components, views Kenya’s 
origin in the emergence of the Swahili Muslim city-states along the coast.
15
 Ebrahim says, 
“Muslims … have been the longest settled group of the major religions in East Africa,” noting 
that “while the rest of the country was still a jungle,” Muslim “cities witnessed phenomenal 
development.”16 Islam is portrayed as the carrier of civilisation to Kenya, implying its 
foundational role over that of Christianity, which arrived later, and over other Africans, who 
were living in the ‘jungle’. 
8.2.1 Scholarly Christian Writing 
The Christian scholarly community, in contrast, tends to locate origins in Africaness. 
Nationalist movements in Kenya, as elsewhere in Africa, were in opposition to foreign, 
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European colonialism,
17
 finding solidarity in the common racial and cultural heritage of being 
African.
18
 The establishment of postcolonial nation-states was understood mythically as the 
resurgence of African community and values.
19
 The writers examined in this thesis assume 
this historical/mythical foundation of the nation. Rather than reassert the story of African 
nationalism, this story underlies their descriptive analysis of the current situation and their 
prospective theologies of reconstruction.
20
 
Mugambi writes that “the African cultural and religious heritage contains the 
foundations upon which social transformation”21 … reconstructs the … “economy, politics, 
ethics, aesthetics and ontology” of Africa.22 He suggests that the future success of African 
nations and societies depends upon, not imitating foreign ways, but truly following an African 
path. While Islam and Christianity are invited to contribute to the reconstruction of Africa, 
they are asked to leave all foreign imposition at the door.
23
 Mugambi makes the case that 
associating “Islam with Arab culture and ethnicity” incorrectly portrays Islam, which has been 
‘ethnically ecumenical’ historically.24 Yet he also finds fault in Islam for the Arabisation of 
African converts.
25
 For Mugambi, Christianity and Islam can be either African or foreign, and 
it is only their African manifestations that can be truly beneficial to the nation-building of 
Kenya.  
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The Christian ascendancy in the historical origins of Kenya is explained by 
Wandera.
26
 He writes, “Islam tended to be confined to the Coast” … while … “Christianity 
spread more evenly in the interior. … Muslims remained suspicious of modern facilities such 
as education,
27
 health and industry … Christians on the other hand, embraced 
modernisation.”28 This was because these services were initially in the hands of Christian 
missionaries. The “modernisation and development” associated with modern nationalism is 
linked with the non-Muslim African peoples of the Kenyan interior who converted to 
Christianity. In this way the national foundation of Kenya is attached to up country Kenya
29
 
rather than the Muslim coast. The story of African nationalism underlies this 
historical/mythical interpretation, since the interior of Kenya is generally regarded as African, 
while the coast is often thought to be more Arab. It then becomes possible to align 
Christianity with African nationalist beginnings. 
Chepkwony writes, “African Religion is the central pillar around which all other social 
institutions stand. Political values in Africa are thus closely linked to the belief in … God as 
the custodian of democratic values and good governance.”30 That which is foundational for 
building the nation is to be found in African religious and cultural values. Yet he also 
observes that nation-building in Africa will come through “the Gospel,” when it is properly 
taught with “mercy, dialogue, patience, understanding and conversion of heart and mind.”31 
Christianity as a missionary religion is understood to be foreign, yet he also understands it 
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capable of genuinely reflecting African values when divorced from European arrogance. 
African nationalism is seen to be compatible with Christianity. 
Kubai seeks to disarm Muslim claims concerning Kenyan origins, writing: 
Prior to the establishment of colonial administration in Kenya, Islam 
had been a core element of Arab hegemony in the East African coast for 
centuries. Though in the minority, the Muslim Arabs were politically and 
economically powerful and formed the ruling class. Over the centuries, this 
society functioned through ‘a sort of coastal meta-cosmology whose key 
oppositional dyads … are ustaarabu/nyika (Arabness/civilization and 
town/bush), Muslim/mshenzi (pagan or savage), waungwana/watumwa 
(freemen/slaves).’ … As these concepts were transmuted in places far away 
from the coast after the establishment of British colonial administration, 
Swahili-Islamic culture was considered to be superior to African culture.
32
 
A contrast is subtly drawn between Muslim domination on the East African coast and 
British control in Kenya. Muslims are therefore not associated with Kenya itself. Kubai also 
turns the Swahili ‘meta-cosmology’ on its head, demonstrating how it denigrates African 
culture. The Arabness of the early Muslim communities of the coast
33
 and the continued value 
placed on Arabness seem to disqualify them from making any historical claims on Kenya. 
Kubai has adopted the colonial interpretation that coastal Swahili Islam was Arab in nature 
and origin, rather than the postcolonial evaluation that it was African. The story of African 
nationalism can again be seen to underlie her evaluation of Islam and its historical/mythical 
claims to Kenya. 
Mbiti further contributes to this discussion by evaluating Islam from an African 
Religion perspective, as a leading Kenyan Christian theologian who was raised in a rural 
Akamba Christian home.
34
 He notes that the Muslims at his school were considered outsiders 
to Akamba/African culture, while instinctively including Christian children as insiders to that 
cultural context. Christianity is viewed as compatible with African values; therefore, it may be 
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concluded that African values and Christian values may contribute to the establishment of an 
African nation. Mutei subtly connects the current, popular Islamic form of da’wa with 
Arabness, thus implying that it is not African. 
These examples show that in prioritising an African up country nationalist origin for 
Kenya, Islam, often perceived as Arab, is marginalised from the nation-building discussion. 
On the other hand, since the peoples of up country Kenya converted to Christianity, Christian 
faith, once cleansed of European dominance, is accepted as an integral part of the national 
reconstruction of Kenya. Islam is nominally invited into the nation-building conversation but 
under strict conditions that it demonstrate its Africanness and diminish its Arabness. Kenyan 
mainline scholars claim the symbol of being African for Christians, and call into question the 
use of this symbol by Muslims. 
Mainline Christian scholars construct their argument for the mythical/historical 
foundation of the nation academically by using the resources of history and cultural studies. It 
can be said that they expend educational capital to acquire a form of political capital that 
bestows the symbolic political power to define the foundational myth. The generative effects 
of habitus are also apparent. The up country scholar knows that she/he is a Christian and also 
deeply feels African. That which feels odd or different about African Muslims is viewed 
naturally as foreign and Arab.
35
 This can be seen in Mbiti’s article, in which he and other 
Akamba Christian children sense no doubt about their own Africanness yet easily question the 
Africanness of Akamba Muslim children.  
 Subjectivity enters the seemingly objective academic discourse over history, not 
because mainline Christian scholars are performing as political propagandists, but due to 
embodied dispositions – knowing that they are both fully Christian and fully African, while 
                                                          
35
 As seen in chapter 4.1, Kenyan Islam is portrayed as Arab in the public school system, which forms 
part of the habitus of Kenyan Christian scholars. 
261 
 
intuiting a foreign element among African Muslims. The symbolic power (through education 
capital) employed to inadvertently marginalise Kenyan Muslims, who seemingly desire to 
inhabit a degree of Arabness, operates not by recognising the situation but through 
misrecognition,
36
 that is the misrecognition of the identity of Kenyan Muslims. At the same 
time, there is recognition of the possibilities that Christians and Muslims can be either unduly 
influenced by foreign religio-cultural elements within their own traditions, or they can 
Africanise those traditions. The question is: can Kenyan mainline scholars accept the 
Africanness of Kenyan Muslims on their own terms, or must mainline Christian scholars 
impose the conditions? 
8.2.2 Popular Christian Writing 
In the popular literature the Christian character of the nationalist agenda becomes 
obvious, while historical arguments become less important. Since popular literature and the 
Neo-Pentecostal leaders who produce it accumulate spiritual capital, rather than educational 
capital, they don’t use historical arguments (i.e. academic-style reasoning), but they convert 
their spiritual capital into a form of political/mythical capital by declaring Kenya a Christian 
nation. However, their declarations are recognised only in circles that accept their particular 
spiritual capital. 
Muriithi provides the most comprehensive example of the popular view. Commenting 
on the phrase, “May we dwell in unity,” of the Kenyan national anthem, she writes: 
Our intent as Kenyans has to reflect our unity as brothers dwelling 
together in love, focused on bringing honour to God – the God of all creation. 
Otherwise, we have simply been singing sweet but empty words over the last 
almost half century of independence as a republic. If we believe in God and 
choose to pursue a true relationship with Him, then genuine love will be our 
banner. And love will spur the nation to great heights for the glory of our 
Maker. Our national anthem declares words of life.
37
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There are two things to especially note in this paragraph. First, much of the language 
is borrowed from Christianity: “dwelling together in love,” “pursue a true relationship with 
Him,” and “words of life.” The Christian character of the statement is clear, and throughout 
the book Muriithi quotes from the Bible. Second, nation-building, rather than personal 
religious experience, is the subject of the paragraph. The national anthem is understood to be 
a Christian hymn or prayer, and the future success of Kenya depends upon the Christian 
commitment of its citizens. Muriithi demonstrates little interest in the story of African 
nationalism, instead declaring a ‘finished’ myth of Kenya as a Christian nation. She makes no 
attempt to specifically exclude Islam, but there is no room for it in her vision of Kenya, united 
in Christian faith. 
Elsewhere two underlying mythical themes emerge briefly but without explanation. 
These mythical themes are that Islam is foreign and only Christians may govern in Kenya. As 
was seen in chapter four, the foreignness of Islam is a common theme in Kenya even within 
the secular school system. In the popular Christian literature, Islam was referred to as an 
invasion force at an evangelistic training seminar.
38
 Kiragu comments that Christians “are 
supposed to dominate and not be dominated over,”39 while Neo-Pentecostal bishop and 
politician, Wanjiru, viewed the issue of kadhi courts in the constitution as an open contest 
between Christian and Muslim political control.
40
 The underlying mythical constructs used in 
these examples are that Christian control of the nation (i.e. Christian nationalism) guarantees 
future success for Kenya through the mystical means of God’s favour, and that Islam is 
disqualified from contesting for this control, not only because it is understood to be spiritually 
impotent, but because Islam is an intruder into Kenya. It may be asked how Islam is 
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considered to be an intruder, but Christianity is not. Pentecostals view the God of African 
Religion to be in continuance with the God of Christianity, once certain elements of African 
Religion are removed,
41
 but Allah is not similarly understood by Pentecostals. 
A good synopsis of the popular point of view is found in an editorial of the EndTime 
Christian News, “Christianity as the leading faith in this nation has already gone a step ahead 
and what remains of the other religious groups … is follow example and the rest will be 
history.”42 Perhaps one could read this as Kenyan Christians have accumulated a sufficiently 
large amount of spiritual capital, so that spiritual competition is no longer realistically 
feasible. There is no place for Muslims in the public space other than being subordinate to 
Christians. 
In the popular writing the history of Islam and Christianity in Kenya is not considered. 
Instead the contestation is over a theologically constructed mythical space. The national 
anthem becomes a Christian prayer for a Christian nation; Christians are understood to be the 
legitimate rulers of Kenya, while Muslims are not given a place to belong.  
8.2.3 Kadhi Courts Issue 
The debate over the inclusion of kadhi courts in the constitution reveals more about 
the contest for historical/mythical space. Muslim sources generally portray the history of 
kadhi courts in Kenya as one of deteriorating authority and religious integrity as both the 
British colonial government and the African postcolonial government interfered with internal 
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Muslim affairs.
43
 Christians are understood as aggressors whose goal is to weaken or destroy 
Islam.  
Two Christian mythical constructions are examined. First, the presence of kadhi courts 
in the constitution is said to be the first step in a political conquest of Kenya by Muslims. 
Second, churches are viewed as powerful actors that can dramatically influence the populace. 
The NCCK said the following in a press statement concerning the kadhi courts: 
It is clear that the Muslim community is basically carving for itself an Islamic 
state within a state. … The embedment of Islam in the constitution … is a 
snare to the country. This is routinely the first step towards introduction of 
Sharia law in a country. This is the warning we bring to Kenyans today. 
Entrenchment of one religion in the constitution is a risk we should not take.
44
 
First, it should be noted that the NCCK is the ecumenical association of the mainline 
churches of Kenya, which includes the churches that the Kenyan mainline scholars are 
members of. While most of the scholars studied would disagree with the above sentiment,
45
 
the line between the mainline churches and the NPCs on this matter is not so sharp. As can be 
seen in the above text, the inclusion of kadhi courts in the constitution is viewed as a secretive 
attempt, a “first step,” towards a greater Muslim goal of political control of Kenya. Also 
commenting on the kadhi courts Neo-Pentecostal leader, Wanjiru, says that it is “a well-
orchestrated drive to Islamize Africa.”46 Both comments are an allusion to the Abuja 
Declaration in which Muslim leaders are said to have conspired to take over Africa.
47
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Blanuša says that conspiracy theories are pre-ideological constructs of the enemy that 
are used to explain why things have gone wrong.
48
 For these Kenyan Christians, the nation is 
to be united under one religion
49
 that provides the values and symbolic structure by which it is 
to be governed and its people live. Muslims, by demanding the inclusion of kadhi courts in 
the constitution of the nation, undermine the Christian claim to unique representation of 
Kenyan values and symbolism. Thus the conspiracy theory concerning secret Muslim 
intentions explains why Christians have not been able to attain these goals. Additionally, the 
contention that Muslims secretly plan to take over becomes difficult for Muslim leaders to 
counter, as any rebuttal can be understood as an attempt to conceal their hidden design. Thus 
this conspiracy theory, believed to be true by many Christians, proved to be a powerful ally in 
the symbolic contestation for mythical space; Muslims were put on the defensive, eventually 
settling for the status quo concerning kadhi courts in the constitution,
50
 though one suspects 
that the debate provided powerful symbolic representation for uniting Muslims.  
While the symbolic power of the Christian leadership becomes apparent through the 
use of the above conspiracy theory to maintain the status quo, Christian leaders imagined 
themselves to be even more influential over the public space. They were convinced that they 
could prevent the ratification of the new constitution, if it contained provisions for kadhi 
courts. In a press statement entitled, Kenyans, Reject This Draft, the NCCK called for all 
Christians to vote against the new constitution in the upcoming elections.
51
 Church leaders 
sent a memorandum to the National Assembly in which they asserted “If the Proposed 
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Constitution shall contain any reference to Kadhis Courts, we shall REJECT
52
 the draft in 
total. To avoid another rejection of the draft constitution at the referendum, we propose that”53 
kadhi courts be removed from the constitution. However, as was seen in chapter 5.4.2, the 
new constitution was ratified with over 70% of the vote, indicating a lack of influence by 
Christian leaders. After ratification the Catholic bishops released a statement saying, “We … 
as the shepherds placed to give moral guidance to our people, still reiterate the need to address 
the flawed moral issues in this new Constitution.”54 
The assertion by Christian leaders that they have great influence is a declaration of 
victory in the symbolic contestation for public space. Through this declaration of supposed 
victory Kenya is proclaimed to be a Christian nation wherein the moral values and symbols of 
the nation must necessarily be Christian. It can be seen as an attempt to impede others who 
contest for public space. As a mythical construct its primary purpose is to prevent other values 
and symbols from gaining national prominence. However, as demonstrated above this has not 
been entirely successful, though the frequent reporting in the public media of the views of 
Christian leaders provides them with a certain symbolic victory. However, it would seem that 
Christian leaders either possess less spiritual capital than they believe, or spiritual capital may 
not be as readily convertible to political capital as these leaders had hoped. 
8.2.4 Conclusion 
The three different examinations of Christian ways of contesting mythical space 
provide insight to the issues underlying this symbolic contestation. Briefly, these three ways 
of contesting mythical space consist of the historical/mythical origins of Kenya as African, 
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the pronouncement of Kenya as a Christian-oriented nation, and a defence against Islamic 
symbols and values. This is a symbolic contestation over what is acceptable religious 
symbolism in the public space that defines the identity of the modern nation-state of Kenya.  
While different attitudes are exhibited by groups contesting differently, the 
commonality is that specifically Islamic symbolism is either restricted or rejected, leaving 
room for only African and Christian symbolism to contest for the national mythical space. If 
Islamic symbolism is successfully restricted, then Islam’s corresponding symbolic power will 
be limited, thus reducing Islam’s ability to contest symbolically, to gain symbolic capital and 
to acquire social and political capital. Islam would, therefore, remain socially and politically 
marginal. 
Postcolonial Kenya is religiously plural, and in a democratic society
55
 space will need 
to be made for Islamic symbolism. This has, of course, happened to some extent with the 
inclusion of kadhi courts in the constitution; Christian denominations and individuals who 
have welcomed this are making space for Islamic symbols and values on a national stage. The 
history of the trade-oriented Muslim community on the coast could also enrich the mythical 
history of Kenya upon which a modern nation engaged in international commerce builds 
itself. 
8.3 Contesting Moral Space 
The contestation over public moral space concerns claims of who has the legitimate 
moral right to guide the nation-building project. Each group attempts to increase their own 
relative symbolic capital by discrediting the Other, and thus reducing the symbolic capital of 
the opposing party. 
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The Muslim community has a propensity to view the Kenyan government as 
Christian; therefore, problems related to the government, such as corruption, discrimination, 
etc. are understood and portrayed as the moral failings of Christians.
56
 In particular, Muslims 
say that obtaining certain official documents (e.g. identity papers and travel documents) are 
more difficult for Muslims because the government clerks are Christians.
57
 Another stated 
concern is that Kenyan Christians attempt to discredit Islam by associating it with East 
African slavery, while playing down the trans-Atlantic slave trade.
58
  
8.3.1 Scholarly Christian Writing 
Arab slavery in East Africa forms part of the historical curricula found in the Kenyan 
public school system.
59
 It is therefore not uncommon for Kenyan Christians to speak of 
Muslims as those who formerly attempted to enslave their ancestors.
60
 Even President Moi 
spoke of Muslims as former slave traders
61
 in order to control Muslim political aspirations. 
The historical fact of Arab slavery has thus become a symbolic tool for contesting public 
moral space in Kenya. Christian scholars of Islam, however, recognise that Christian 
missionaries used the issue of slavery to distance the African populace of the interior from 
Islam,
62
 and have thus been careful in making these accusations. 
Some scholars allude to slavery. Josephine Sesi, an Evangelical scholar, forthrightly 
accuses coastal Muslims of having enslaved Digo people,
63
 though mainline scholars tend to 
be more circumspect. Mbiti writes of his childhood, “there was some talk about Muslim men 
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taking boys and young men to sell them to the Arabs who used them as slaves in Arab 
countries.”64 This brief statement most likely indicates the effectiveness of the missionary use 
of Arab slavery to discredit Islam, as the slave trade would no longer have been present in 
Kenya during Mbiti’s childhood.65 These rumours did, however, cause some fear of Muslims 
among Mbiti and his friends. Mugambi critiques both Christianity and Islam for participation 
in slave trading in Africa.
66
 Though both scholars speak of Muslim slavery, neither uses it to 
denigrate Islam. Considering the local context, however, in which Kenyans have learned in 
school, from politicians, from religious leaders, from family, etc. (i.e. habitus) that Arabs and 
Muslims once traded in African slaves from Kenya, the more benign approach of mainline 
scholars may still elicit strong emotions from readers. 
Islam can also be associated with aggressiveness and violence. Kubai writes, “The 
term ‘jihad’ means to strive and struggle in the way of Allah. Usually for those who use jihad, 
the variety of theological meanings is overshadowed by the emphasis on combat or ‘fight,’ as 
expressed in the Qur’an.”67 Violence is shown to be the most normative and Qur’ānic 
understanding of jihad, implying that combat is in the very nature of Islam. Kubai also writes 
of Christian-Muslim violence in the South B neighbourhood of Nairobi. She tells of the 
destruction by fire of a Catholic church, but does not mention that this act was done in 
response to the destruction of a mosque.
68
 Kubai also produced an article on the Rwandan 
genocide in which one purpose was to correct supposed errors that credited Rwandan 
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Muslims for rejecting participation in the genocide.
69
 While she never directly accuses Islam 
of being violent, there is a subtle link made between Islam and violence in her writing.  
Mbiti recalls a visit home to Kenya in 2002 in which Kenyans reacted to Muslim 
terrorist attacks by asking what kind of religion could advocate such things.
70
 For Mbiti this is 
an indication of how Islam compares unfavourably to African Religion which promotes life. It 
should also be remembered that Mbiti finds Christianity to be compatible with African 
Religion; therefore, Islam, as a religion that promotes violence, seems to have no moral place 
in the public space of a truly African nation.  
Mutei, discussing the proselytising method of mihadhara, brings up the notion of 
dishonesty in the manner in which some Muslims relate with Christians.
71
 While his 
statements concerning supposed Muslim dishonesty are confined within the particular context 
of mihadhara, the idea of a lack of integrity among Muslims resonates among many Kenyan 
Christians. This can be seen in Mbiti’s account of interaction with Muslim merchants in Kitui, 
where he writes that Muslims were known to be good, though dishonest, traders.
72
 As in the 
preceding paragraphs discussing slavery and terrorism/violence, direct accusations of 
dishonesty are not made against Muslims in general. However, the subtle indictments present 
in the scholarly articles dovetail with popular Christian sentiment concerning Muslims.
73
 
Maina offers a contrast to the other scholars by focusing on Christian historical 
injustice towards Muslims,
74
 though he tends to place primary responsibility upon colonial-
era missions rather than upon present-day Kenyan Christians. Wandera, perhaps less 
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forcefully and consistently, also addresses the issue of historical Christian injustice towards 
Muslims in Kenya.
75
 
Slavery, violence and dishonesty form the primary moral issues found in the scholarly 
literature that challenge Islam’s legitimacy to contest for public space. None of mainline 
scholars directly challenge Islam’s moral legitimacy in symbolic confrontation. However, 
taking into account the local context, which is described in Mbiti’s article,76 the discussions of 
slavery, violence and dishonesty are likely to have a greater impact upon readers’ views of 
Islam than the writers may have intended. Interestingly, despite the terrorist attacks in Kenya 
by Islamic extremists, terrorism is not used to question the moral legitimacy of Islam, though 
question concerning violence must elicit thoughts of terrorism among Christian readers and 
listeners.  
8.3.2 Popular Christian Writing 
While issues of Arab slavery and Islamic terrorism may be alive within Neo-
Pentecostal churches, these issues do not appear in the written material.
77
 When the terrorist 
attacks are discussed the issues are corruption in the government,
78
 end time scenarios
79
 and 
the need to always be spiritually prepared to meet one’s fate.80 It is unclear why issues of 
slavery and terrorism, which seem to be alive within churches, are ignored in written material. 
It is possible, since an attack on Hope FM,
81
 which was broadcasting anti-Islamic polemics, 
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that the editors of popular Christian magazines have been careful to not publish overly 
negative material concerning Islam. 
While the morality of Islam is impugned in a few articles by associating Islam with 
abortion
82
 and the Muslim coast with drug use,
83
 this is not a primary concern in the popular 
literature. The moral problems of Islam are associated more strongly with demonic spiritual 
powers than with particular socio-political activities. Kenyan Pentecostal theology of evil 
ultimately places the source of moral failure in the spiritual world. Subtle allusions that 
associate Islam with witchcraft are made,
84
 witchcraft being the symbol of evil in African 
cosmology. It is in this way that a moral indictment is levelled at Islam. Rather than citing 
particular historical moral failings, Islam, itself, can be characterised as evil through these 
witchcraft allusions. 
8.3.3 Conclusion 
The history of Arab slavery is the strongest and most frequently used symbolic tool in 
questioning the moral integrity of the Muslim community by the Christian community. The 
use of this strategic moral weapon was introduced by Christian missionaries, and it continues 
among Kenyan Christians and politicians. It was seen in the discussion of Evangelical 
scholars that slavery is sometimes used uncompromisingly as a means to assail the moral 
legitimacy of Islam.
85
 There is enough truth
86
 in the claim to put Muslim political leadership 
on the defensive and render the tactic effective. 
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The advent of Islamic terrorism has added another means by which Christians cast 
doubt upon the moral legitimacy of Muslims to contest for public space, though it seems to be 
accepted that these are the acts of extremists and reflect less upon average Muslims. However, 
some Christians appear to view Islam as inherently violent.
87
 The integrity of Muslims is also 
portrayed as deficient, and one sometimes hears Christians talk of the hidden Islamic agenda. 
The association of Islam with spirits and witchcraft in popular Christian literature, 
while a serious accusation, seems to have a limited range of influence (i.e. among 
Pentecostals). It is unlikely to contend as strongly in the contestation for moral space in public 
discourse as the history of slavery, allusions to violence and terrorism and accusations of 
dishonesty. 
The question that becomes contested by both the Muslim and Christian communities 
concerns who is the oppressor and the oppressed. Allusions to Muslim slavery depict Islam as 
oppressive towards Africans. Josephine Sesi directly states that Islam has oppressed the Digo 
women.
88
 From the Pentecostal perspective the oppression is displaced into the spiritual 
sphere; Muslims are both oppressed by spirits (of their own choosing) and threats to bring 
spiritual oppression upon others. Muslims writers counter that the Christian (in their view) 
government of Kenya oppresses Muslims by limiting their participation in government and by 
denying them access to documents, such as passports, etc. The contestation over who is 
oppressor and who is oppressed necessarily engenders a contested search for liberation. Each 
seeks to be liberated from the other. 
This mode of contesting operates via each side (Christian and Muslim) arguing from 
history and current events that its people are oppressed by the other; their people stand on the 
moral high ground, while the Other merits condemnation. As Volf says, “The categories of 
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oppression and liberation provide combat gear … they are good for fighting, but not for 
negotiating or celebrating.”89 While in the Kenyan situation the “fighting” primarily takes the 
form of symbolic confrontation,
90
 the use of an oppression/liberation mode of discourse 
results in contestation, rather than cooperation.  
Maina and Wandera take a first step in moving from confrontation to cooperation by 
examining how Muslims have been oppressed and discriminated against.
91
 They also open the 
discourse towards another mode of thinking by writing that Christians and Muslims can 
“work together” for peace and the common good. In seeking to work together they move 
towards a model of reconciliation. This combination of recognising the discrimination and 
oppression perpetuated against the Other (the Muslim community) by one’s own community, 
and repositioning the discourse towards one of reconciliation and working together offers a 
way through the impasse of symbolic confrontation.  
8.4 Contesting Spiritual/Theological Space 
Both Islam and Kenyan Christianity reject the notion of a secular – sacred divide in 
society and government.
92
 For this reason Islam and Christianity also contest for 
spiritual/theological space.  
8.4.1  Scholarly Christian Writing 
Kenyan mainline Christian scholars do not elaborate specific theological agenda to be 
used in contesting with Islam for public space. In fact, these scholars promote theologies that 
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encourage cooperation and understanding between Christians and Muslims.
93
 However, the 
theology of reconstruction, which is popular among mainline Christian scholars, promotes a 
nation-building project that is based upon the biblical story of Nehemiah. Though these 
scholars may wish to include Muslims within the national project, they appear to be unaware 
that nationalism built upon the Christian scriptures may not appeal to Muslims. 
Mugambi writes: 
From the perspective of the Theology of Reconstruction, Nehemiah’s 
approach is useful to the extent that he helps us to appreciate the relationship 
between prayer and planning; between work and worship; between despair and 
hope; between the elite and the ordinary people; between the priesthood and 
the laity. … Post-Exilic Judah is ethnically, religiously and politically 
pluralistic. At the community level the conflicts are not only between the 
returnees and the remnants; it is also between the Jews and other communities. 
… It is the complexity of this context that makes Ezra-Nehemiah very 
insightful as a textual frame of reference for the Theology of Reconstruction.
94
 
First, the theology of reconstruction is meant to be the theological basis for building 
the African nation in the way that the theology of liberation worked, most specifically, in 
South Africa as a foundation for obtaining political freedom. Therefore, the specifically 
Christian character of the language used in the above paragraph is expected. There are, 
however, two problems that this theology poses for nation-building in a religiously plural 
context.  
Mugambi cites the fact that the post-exilic Judah of Nehemiah was religiously plural 
as a positive recommendation for the use of this text to build a theology of reconstruction 
upon. However, as Gathogo notes, the theologians of reconstruction have “failed to see the 
political motivation behind Nehemiah’s rebuilding project,” which is the protection of “his 
                                                          
93
 See especially the previous chapter that discusses the works of Maina, Kubai and Wandera; 6.2.1, 
6.2.2 and 6.2.3. 
94
 Mugambi, Christian Theology and Social Reconstruction, 75-76. 
276 
 
own people” from others.95 The enemies of Jerusalem (Arabs, Ammonites and Ashodites) 
threaten to attack those building the walls, and Nehemiah arms his Jewish workers in 
response.
96
 Interethnic and interreligious marriage is also condemned,
97
 as Nehemiah 
“cleansed (Israel) from everything foreign.”98 While the situation of this particular biblical 
book is pluralistic, the response to pluralism is reactionary in search of ethnic and religious 
purity. Mugambi does not deal with the issue of Nehemiah and Ezra’s responses to pluralism 
in any of his works, leading one to ask how a theology of reconstruction (i.e. nation-building) 
based on these texts may include Muslim fellow citizens. Maina suggests that Christians and 
Muslims can work together for the common good,
99
 and Mugambi invites Muslims to 
participate in this nation-building project.
100
 However, neither provides any guidance on how 
working together for the common good might be achieved. 
The second problem is that Muslims are being invited
101
 to participate in a nation-
building project that is based on a text from the Hebrew Scriptures. Mugambi attempts to 
solve this difficulty by saying that Muslims share the Old Testament as a sacred text with 
Christians.
102
 Islam does refer to the Taurat, the Zabur, and several persons from the Hebrew 
Scriptures; however, Nehemiah is not among them. It would therefore seem incorrect to 
justify Muslim participation in this project, based upon the text of Nehemiah, by referring to a 
common Old Testament between Christians and Muslims. 
                                                          
95
 Gathogo, "African Philosophy," 47. 
96
 Nehemiah chapter 4. 
97
 Nehemiah 13:23-28. 
98
 Nehemiah 13:30 (NRSV). 
99
 See chapter 6.2.1. 
100
 See chapter 6.3.7. 
101
 This is invitation is subtle and not universally made, but it does appear to be genuinely offered by 
several mainline Kenyan scholars. 
102
 Mugambi, Christian Theology and Social Reconstruction, 151. 
277 
 
At the heart of this dilemma is the rejection of the secularist model of the state by 
Kenyan theologians.
103
 The alternative is understood to consist in the participation of religion 
in the creation of national unity, democracy, development, etc.
104
 However, religions are 
never religion in general, but specific religions (such as Christianity and Islam) each with its 
own symbols, scriptures, values, institutions, and traditions. The cooperation of religion and 
state in a pluralistic society (if secular models are rejected) must take into account specifics, 
differences and similarities among the actual religions present. Kenyan mainline Christian 
scholars acknowledge the religious plurality, while working primarily with a Christian 
symbolic universe.
105
 Given the relative population
106
 and influence of Christianity as 
compared to Islam in Kenya, this religious approach to nation-building effectively excludes 
Muslims from participation in the public theological space. If Muslims are to be included in a 
religious model of nation-building, then Islamic symbolism and values must also gain 
presence in shared public space. 
8.4.2 Popular Christian Writing 
Within popular Neo-Pentecostal Christian literature there are two closely related 
means by which Islam is deemed ineligible from engaging spiritually and theologically in the 
public space. First, Islam is linked with the evil spiritual world. Second, political theology is 
often expressed through the idea of possessing the land, which is accomplished spiritually. 
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Islam is frequently identified with evil (or demonic) spirits in popular Christian 
literature. In Josephat Obare’s conversion narrative, he encounters a ‘jinni,’ understood as an 
evil spirit, in the form of a woman who takes him into a house near a mosque.
107
 In another 
story John Omino works for a Muslim who is an international leader in witchcraft and the 
trade in body parts for performing witchcraft rituals.
108
 Kitavi misinterprets Muslim 
understandings of majini, which is a Swahili word that is defined differently by Muslims and 
Christians.
109
 For Muslims it is the plural of jinn, spirit beings, who can be either good or evil. 
For Christians, the word means demons; therefore, they can only be evil. Kitavi’s purpose is 
to associate Islam with majini (i.e. demons), whom he says Muslims believe may be good.  
By associating Islam with evil spirits and demons, these Neo-Pentecostal writers also 
attempt to disqualify Islam from carrying any spiritual legitimacy for discourse in the public 
space. The state and society are understood to be in need of a strong spiritual foundation so 
that the people may prosper and flourish. In the popular Christian literature, Neo-Pentecostal 
leaders and prophets are understood to be in direct contact with God,
110
 while Muslims are 
strongly suspected of association with the demonic. From this perspective, Muslim discourse 
that attempts to find a place for Islam in the public space can only be viewed as leading 
towards malevolent ends, thus disqualified. While Neo-Pentecostals understand this spiritual 
confrontation literally, it can also be viewed as a symbolic confrontation in which the spiritual 
capital of Neo-Pentecostals may be converted into economic (or socio-economic 
development) capital, while the spiritual capital of Islam is seen as corrupted, and thus 
nonconvertible. 
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Kitavi uses the metaphor of Godly altars to express a political theology of possessing 
the land.
111
 He writes, “We must not forget that altars are used to possess the land, and if we 
do not raise altars for God, satanic altars will be raised on our land.”112 Land is claimed 
through the building of altars; these altars can only be Godly or satanic according to 
Pentecostal dualistic theology.
113
 While the altars may indirectly refer to places of worship, 
they should not be understood literally. A Godly community altar is erected when a 
significant portion of the community is spiritually engaged, praying to and worshiping Jesus 
Christ.
114
 A satanic altar is present when spiritual activity that is not related to Jesus Christ 
occurs. As seen in the above quote, there is a competition for the land (i.e. the nation) that can 
be won through raising Godly altars, which eliminates opposition through spiritual means.
115
 
Similar to the previous examples, Islam (and other religions) is connected with satanic 
altars, while Christianity is related to Godly altars. Therefore, Islam is disqualified from 
public space through this disreputable association. Additionally, victory, understood as 
possessing the land (or nation), is seen to be inevitable on the condition that Christians are 
committed and prayerful. Seen in this way, there is no reason to acknowledge Muslim 
participation in the public space since Islam’s presence is only fleeting. 
8.4.3 Conclusion 
Because of the rejection of a secular state, spiritual/theological space becomes an 
important public and political point of symbolic contestation. Mazrui has proposed the model 
of an ecumenical state that “accommodate(s) the different religions through official 
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institutions or through official processes.”116 The state is neutral towards each particular 
religion but promotes all religions equally. This position, which is also favoured by other 
Kenyan Muslim intellectuals,
117
 seems to have advantages for religious minorities (because 
the majority religion needs less official state support). An ecumenical state also appears to be 
compatible with the politico-religious vision of mainline Kenyan scholars; however, it is in 
direct confrontation with Pentecostal naïve theocracy. It raises the question if Kenyan Neo-
Pentecostals can develop (or accept) a theological justification for social, political, and 
religious pluralism in the nation.  
8.5 Christians Contesting Public Space 
This chapter has examined ways in which Christians have contested with Muslims for 
legitimacy in public space. Three different areas of symbolic contestation over legitimacy 
were looked at: mythical/historical, moral and spiritual/theological. Some important Muslim 
positions were briefly stated so that the Christian positions could be seen within the larger 
context, though only Christian views were elaborated upon. The Christian arguments were 
divided between those made by mainline Christian scholars and those found in the popular 
literature.  
The scholars make use of education capital by examining and interpreting history, 
Islam, current events, culture, etc. In contrast, the popular Christian literature uses spiritual 
capital by claiming to have spiritual insight in their understandings. In considering how their 
respective arguments might impact upon public space, reflecting upon where in the social 
structure these types of capital might find favourable conversion into social and political 
capital should prove helpful.  
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First, education capital and cultural capital can be considered easily 
interchangeable,
118
 so that those who are thought of as ‘educated’ and ‘cultured’ generally 
belong to the same social class. Therefore, the initial impact of these Christian scholars should 
be among a higher social class of well-educated and cultured individuals, who ironically
119
 
have benefited from Western-style education and modernising trends in Kenya. These are 
often the individuals who are able to set the cultural and political agendas of the nation. The 
impact, the arguments and the ideas of the scholars may then also flow to other groups 
through various means (i.e. pastors to parishioners, teachers to students, etc.).  
Second, the valuation of spiritual capital will depend less upon social class and more 
upon the religious worldview of individuals. Even though popular literature is produced by 
Neo-Pentecostals, it should not be assumed that the value of this spiritual capital will be 
limited to fellow Neo-Pentecostal Christians. As was seen in chapter three, The African 
Religious Heritage, the Neo-Pentecostal spiritual understanding shares many similarities with 
that of African Religion. The debate over the inclusion of kadhi courts in the constitution 
offers an example; mainline Christian leaders sometimes partnered with Neo-Pentecostal 
leaders – often using similar arguments – to oppose the inclusion of kadhi courts. This 
spiritual capital (and thus the views expressed in the popular literature concerning Islam) will 
be most valued among ordinary Christians, whose access to social and political capital is 
often limited and temporary (i.e. mobilising support for a particular issue, party or candidate). 
The mythical/historical contestation centres upon the nature of the Kenyan society and 
nation. Mainline scholars emphasize the African character of the nation, while tending to 
promote the view that Islam is foreign to Africanness. At the same time Christianity, divorced 
from its European distortions, is understood to be compatible with Africanness. The Kenyan 
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government, when confronted with Islamic political movements, has also promoted the 
understanding of Kenya as specifically African,
120
 which has proven to be successful. African 
Muslims have frequently chosen African symbolism over Islamic symbolic politics promoted 
by coastal Arab Muslim leaders.
121
 This would seem to affirm the effectiveness of the 
mythical/historical argument of Kenyan mainline Christian scholars.  
Kenyan Neo-Pentecostals in the popular literature dispense with historical 
argumentation and simply declare Kenya to be a Christian nation, calling for Christianity to 
lead in public political and social space. 
Moral legitimacy is also contested, though on a more subtle level. Christians do not 
assert that Muslims are immoral, but scholars may allude to the history of Arab slavery in 
East Africa and to violence that has been done in the name of Islam, which connote images of 
oppression. Evangelicals are an exception, as Josephine and Stephen Sesi rather freely 
highlight the immoral and oppressive nature of Islam.
122
 In this way Muslims are frequently 
put on the moral defensive in contestations for public space. Though Maina and Wandera, 
Kenyan experts on Islam, offer critiques of historical Christian injustice towards Muslims in 
Kenya, their discourse does not seem to carry much influence into the larger discourse 
contesting moral legitimacy in the public space.  
Kenyan Neo-Pentecostals in the popular literature treat moral issues from the 
perspective of evil spirits, finding Muslims to be linked in some ways to these. Islam, itself, 
can then be understood to be essentially immoral and backwards; the acts of individual 
Muslims become irrelevant to the discourse. However, in conversion narratives Muslims 
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frequently play the role of immoral antagonists to the principle character who is overcoming 
obstacles to find new life in Christian faith. These are powerful stories that create impressions 
upon readers that potentially leave them with the understanding that Muslims are morally 
untrustworthy. 
Since Christians and Muslims in Kenya tend to reject secularism, spiritual/theological 
legitimacy is also contested. Mainline Christian scholars promote a Christian-oriented nation-
building theology of reconstruction through which they unintentionally exclude Muslims. 
They willingly invite Muslims to join them in this theological nation-building project, 
seemingly with a naivety that does not ask how Muslims can join in such a Christian-based 
project. Kenyan scholars wish to leave a place for Muslims in the public theological space, 
but have difficulty knowing how to do so.  
Kenyan Neo-Pentecostals in the popular literature view Islam (as well as other 
religions) as a harbour of evil and demonic spirits. Pentecostal political theology expressed as 
‘possessing the land’ – given the ethnic and geographic differences between Kenyan 
Christians and Muslims – can give the impression of a move towards the dispossession of 
Muslims from their land, even though the expression is only meant to communicate 
symbolically and spiritually. From the perspective of this popular literature there is no place 
for Islam in public spiritual/theological space. 
Both the scholarly and popular writing tend to assign Muslims a second-class position 
as they contest for public space. Kenyan mainline scholars are more open to Muslim input in 
the public space, but they must follow some implicit guidelines in order to gain a hearing. 
Muslims must prioritise Africanness over Arabness. They must acknowledge their role in 
slavery and violence and probably exhibit appropriate repentance and humility. They must 
enlist in a Christian-led project for building Kenya into a prosperous, united, democratic 
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nation. Maina (and Wandera to a lesser extent) call for similar repentance and humility from 
Christians concerning Kenyan Muslims; however, their words seem to have less influence 
than might be expected. 
In the popular writing, Muslims must also accept a second-class position, but in this 
case they are barely tolerated. It seems that silence and following the lead of the churches are 
the only options deemed appropriate. Any Muslim participation in the public space is 
understood to be devious, unwarranted, regressive and potentially destructive to Kenya. 
However, as the kadhi court debate demonstrated, Christians have less influence than 
they claim due to political power structures formed by ethnic alliances, which may at times 
include Muslim-majority ethnicities. Despite Christian contestation that attempts to relegate 
Muslims to second-class status, the Muslim community is able to contest against this status. 
Therefore, kadhi courts have remained in the constitution, and Muslims maintain a vocal 
presence in the symbolic contestation over public space in Kenya. 
 
285 
 
CHAPTER NINE 
EMERGING THEOLOGIES OF RELIGION IN RELATION TO ISLAM 
This chapter will look at certain theological themes that arise from the analyses in 
chapters six and seven on the scholarly discourse and the popular discourse respectively. The 
Kenyan mainline scholars and popular Neo-Pentecostal literature differ in their conclusions 
concerning Islam. However, as will become apparent, they share many similarities in their 
religious approach to Islam, which differs from that traditionally found in Europe and 
America. It is suggested that this difference arises from the African religious and cultural 
heritage. 
9.1 D’Costa on “Tradition-Specific” Approaches 
In The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, D’Costa argues that pluralist theologies of 
religion are in actuality exclusivist positions that depend upon “tradition-specific approaches,” 
usually that of “liberal modernity” born of the Enlightenment.1 He also shows that other 
traditions, such as Hinduism
2
 or Buddhism,
3
 may be used in a tradition-specific manner to 
promote a pluralist theology. 
The interest in D’Costa’s argument for this study is not whether pluralist theologies of 
religion are exclusivist or not, but in the use of his method to understand emerging theologies 
of religion in Kenya as tradition-specific theologies. First, his critique of John Hick’s work 
will be briefly examined, then his analysis of Sarvapelli Radhakrishnan.  
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D’Costa4 says that Hick uses a “Kantian epistemology” that maintains a “distinction 
between the noumenal, which exists independently and outside of human perception, and the 
phenomenal world, which is that world as it appears to our human consciousness.”5 This 
enables him to view all human speech about God, or ultimate reality, as myth, completely 
disconnected from any historical truth. Religions can then be evaluated according to a “set of 
values which are rooted in human nature and modern liberalism,”6 but not in any 
manifestation of a specific religion. D’Costa, therefore, locates the tradition within which 
Hick approaches his theology as Enlightenment modernity with special focus on Kant.  
Radhakrishnan, according to D’Costa, makes use of an argument from mystical 
experience in which the mystic is able to recognise the oneness behind apparent multiplicity. 
The mystical experience that he has in mind is particularly of the Advaita where “the non-
empirical self (ātman) is identical with the divine (Brahman),” meaning that creation is not 
ultimately real, nor the person, “but only pure consciousness of pure being.”7 Radhakrishnan’s 
Hindu pluralist theology is, therefore, not universal but based on a very specific tradition 
within Hinduism. 
These theologies of religion, though claiming to be universal in nature, are in fact born 
within specific, historically formed traditions and could not be imagined without those 
traditions. As MacIntyre writes, “all reasoning takes place within the context of some 
traditional mode of thought.”8 The texts that were analysed in chapters six and seven were 
birthed by two traditions: the Christian tradition and a Kenyan African tradition. Therefore, 
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the emerging theologies of religion to be discussed represent African Christian theologies 
with specific reference to Kenya. 
9.2 Prolegomena to a Kenyan Christian Theology of Religion in Relation to Islam 
Before embarking upon a journey into the emerging theologies of religion in relation 
to Islam, a Kenyan pluralist theology in relation to African Religion will be examined. 
Samuel Kibicho, who was briefly mentioned in chapter 6.2.3, completed his doctoral thesis, 
The Kikuyu Conception of God: Its Continuity into the Christian Era and the Question it 
Raises for the Idea of Christian Revelation,
9
 at Vanderbilt in 1972. This was published much 
later (2006) as God and Revelation in an African Context. Wijsen remarks that it remains one 
of few books by an African scholar on interreligious dialogue.
10
 As head of the Religious 
Studies department at the University of Nairobi for many years, Kibicho has had some 
influence in Kenya,
 11
 though he is less well-known outside the country. His influence is 
especially notable among Kenya’s mainline scholars, but he also carries some influence in 
Neo-Pentecostal circles.
12
 
Kibicho’s principle argument is that Ngai (God in Kikuyu), as worshipped by the 
Gikuyu, was as fully revelatory and salvific as God, worshipped by Christians.
13
 Mugambi 
understands the book to be primarily a defence of the “African cultural and religious heritage” 
                                                          
9
 Kibicho, God and Revelation in an African Context, 15. 
10
 Frans Wijsen, "An Appreciation of Samuel Kibicho's Work," in God and Revelation in an African 
Context (Nairobi: Acton Publishers, 2006), 6. 
11
 Ibid., 7. 
12
 While I was teaching at Nairobi International School of Theology from 2006-2009, the head of my 
department was Dr Sammy Gitaari, who is bishop and founder of Gospel Celebration Church, an 
indigenous Kenyan Neo-Pentecostal denomination similar to those represented by the popular 
Christian magazines. Dr Gitaari has also contributed articles to these magazines. He owned a copy of 
Kibicho’s book and he recommended that I read it in order to understand Kenyan Christianity. 
13
 Kibicho, God and Revelation in an African Context, 171-172. 
288 
 
against misrepresentation by the missionary West,
14
 while Wijsen sees it as a “theology of 
interreligious dialogue.”15 The first chapter is a description of Gikuyu religion and 
understanding of God. The next four chapters describe and analyse the interaction of Gikuyu 
religion with the coming of Christianity from the West, which can be read as a defence of 
Gikuyu religion. The last chapter, The Christian Idea of Revelation and the Gikuyu Concept 
of God, explores more fully the theological questions.  
He uses certain criteria for judging whether a religious claim to revelation is valid, 
which are “the presence of love … hope and courage to be human.”16 Through his analysis of 
Gikuyu religion he concludes that “the same Spirit of God which was manifest in Jesus of 
Nazareth and which alone can elicit True Faith, love, hope, and courage to be human seems to 
have been no less fully present and operative in the Gikuyu community of faith than in the 
Christian community of faith.”17 Two ideas seem to be clear in this statement. One, Jesus is 
used as the ethical and revelatory norm by which other revelations may be judged. Second, 
Christianity and Gikuyu religion are then viewed as equals, both having been revealed by “the 
same Spirit of God.” 
Kibicho then continues by saying that a “true monotheism” should be able to 
encounter another religion, especially another monotheistic one, and “acknowledge readily 
and freely any similarities and differences” or “weaknesses and strengths” in comparing 
them.
18
 Gikuyu religion is found to have performed this task admirably in its encounters with 
other African Religions and with Christianity, while Christianity is seen to have failed in its 
encounters with others by assuming a position of superiority. Thus, after showing that Gikuyu 
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religion is the equal of Christianity through the use of criteria based on Christian teachings, he 
proceeds to demonstrate that Gikuyu religion has proven to be more mature. He comments, 
“A less thorough preoccupation with exclusiveness and distinctiveness might free Christianity 
to discover … the more pleasant uniqueness of similarities of equality,”19 which Gikuyu 
religion has done. 
A close look at his criteria of “love, hope and courage to be human,” as found in Jesus 
of Nazareth, also shows that Jesus is not understood to be the norm but one incarnation of the 
Spirit of God, who “may be incarnate in other communities of faith in different ways.”20 The 
first five chapters of the book seem to have been arranged to demonstrate that Gikuyu religion 
promoted these same values historically in the Gikuyu community as they encountered 
European colonialism, missionary expansion, and liberation. He maintains that Gikuyu 
conversion to Christianity was a movement towards modernity in religious continuity with 
Gikuyu religion.
21
 A Gikuyu could become a Christian without forsaking his/her religion. 
Wijsen critiques Kibicho for not citing more biblical evidence and for not elaborating 
on standard Christian theology of religion categories, “theocentrism, soteriocentrism and 
christocentrism.”22 However, Wijsen seems to read this as uniquely a Christian theology of 
religions, though it may be more insightful to read it as an African theology of religion in 
dialogue with Christianity. Kibicho refers to his position as “pluralistic revelation,”23 
implying that no single revelation is privileged. 
Read as an African theology of religion, Kibicho’s criteria for evaluating true 
revelation can be seen to be found in “social righteousness,” which he understands to be 
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divinely guided establishment of “truth, justice and peace” in the community.24 His 
description of Gikuyu resistance to colonialism and Western missionary misrepresentation 
uses the vocabulary of political and social movements, but the roots are in the Gikuyu 
understanding of God whose greatest blessing was the gift of life.
25
 The Gikuyu believe that 
“what God desired most for humanity was the enhancement of life in the community.”26  
The basic foundation of Kibicho’s “pluralistic revelation” seems to be that God gives 
vital force
27
 to all peoples so that they might form just and human communities that enhance 
life together. When a religion promotes community in this way, then it can be considered a 
recipient of true revelation. The biblical witness to Jesus is understood to be one example of 
this revelation, thus Jesus conforms to the African religious ideal. From this analysis, it can be 
seen that Kibicho’s theology of religion is tradition-specific, grounded in the tradition of 
Gikuyu religion and more broadly within African Religion. The question then becomes: Does 
Islam promote a community that enhances life together (i.e. Kibicho’s criteria)? 
9.3 The Emerging Theological Questions 
The theological questions concerning Islam that arise out of the analyses in chapters 
six and seven are informed by their Kenyan context.
28
 The questions asked are different from 
those asked in Western theological discourse concerning Islam, such as the status of the 
Qur’ān, the identity of Muhammad, the Islamic conception of Allah, or Islamic doctrines. 
Rather, the questions asked concern whether Christians and Muslims worship the same God, 
and if Islam can form a vital and just community (i.e. community that enhances life together).  
                                                          
24
 Ibid., 41. 
25
 Ibid., 20. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 For ‘vital force’ see Tempels, La Philosophie Bantoue. Nkemnkia, African Vitalogy. See also 
chapter 3.2. 
28
 See chapter 1.2.1. 
291 
 
Wijsen comments that Christians from the West are interested in “the truth of religious 
belief,” understood as rational thought being in accord with being.29 Truth is based on an 
“exclusive dualism,” accepting one proposition as true necessarily means the rejection of a 
different proposition.
30
 He contrasts this with African Christians who view “truth in terms of 
interrelation,” where apparent opposites can find “unity at a higher level.”31 This could be 
seen above in Kibicho’s pluralistic revelation, where a Trinitarian revelation in Christianity is 
understood to be completely compatible with Gikuyu revelation of Ngai.
32
 Nkemnkia writes 
that “truth is the recognition of things as they are.”33 He maintains that the movement from 
“concrete reality” to abstraction distances one from truth, which is found in the practical.34 
The question is not: can doctrines be argued well in the abstract, but will they help us to 
overcome our problems?
35
  
Of course, Western Christian thought is not uniquely abstract, as Western Christians 
are concerned with practical matters and African Christians do not ignore doctrine. The 
tendencies of each system of thought, however, bring about different sets of questions that are 
asked in interreligious encounter. Western systems of thought tend to understand that 
religions may be evaluated as similar or distant according to degrees of agreement in 
doctrine.
36
 Therefore, the doctrines of God in Islam and Christianity may be compared to 
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decide if Muslims and Christians worship the same God.
37
 Questions concerning the Qur’ān 
are similar. If the Qur’ān can be determined to contain revelation, then there is truth in 
Islam.
38
  
The African emphasis on concrete reality demands to know what a particular religion 
contributes to life. A hypothetical example may help to explain. The Western questions 
concerning the Qur’ān are inverted; if Islam were found to enhance life (as Christian faith 
does according to African Christians), then there would be reason to believe that the Qur’ān 
contains revelation from God.  
9.3.1 Do Muslims and Christians Worship the Same God? 
Kenyan Christian scholars and the popular Christian literature address the question: 
Do Muslims worship the same God as Christians? This is the same question that Kibicho 
asked concerning Ngai and the Christian God. A corollary to this question is: if Muslims do 
not worship the same God, then who is Allah? The answers provided by the Kenyan Christian 
scholars will be discussed first, then those of the popular Christian literature. 
9.3.1.1  Scholarly Christian Writing 
Kenyan mainline scholars generally affirm that both Christians and Muslims worship 
the same God, though this seems to be assumed rather than argued. Mugambi, for example, 
speaks of Islam, Judaism, Christianity and African Religion as being “Abrahamic faiths,”39 
implying that the four religions share a belief in the same God. Wandera writes of God 
revealing His will and “saving knowledge” in Islam40 as well as in Christian faith, indicating 
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his affirmation that both Christians and Muslims worship the same God. Neither author, 
however, provides any argument to demonstrate why they come to this conclusion.  
Wijsen, who did his field study among the Sukuma of Tanzania, notes that they 
believe that all religions are good, saying “mungu mmoja, dini mbalimbali,” which means one 
God, many religions in Swahili.
41
 It seems possible that Kenyan mainline scholars are making 
a similar assumption, based upon analogous understandings in their own African traditions.
42
 
Both Mugambi
43
 and Wandera
44
 acknowledge the influence of Kibicho on their theology, 
which would confirm an African tradition-specific influence. 
Maina offers an argument to show that Muslims and Christians worship the same God; 
he cites the story of Jesus speaking in the synagogue in Nazareth from Luke 4:16-30. In this 
passage Jesus says that Elijah was sent to a widow in the Gentile city of Zarephath, rather 
than to a widow in Israel. Then he says that though there were many lepers in Israel, God 
healed Naaman, the Syrian. Maina interprets these episodes as examples of Jesus teaching that 
God is equally the God of the Gentiles and of Israel.
45
 It then follows that Christians and 
Muslims are “children of one God.”46 The pragmatic acts of healing and blessing demonstrate 
this truth for Maina, which firmly places his argumentation within a specific tradition 
informed by the African religious heritage. As Wijsen says, the biblical tradition is also 
pragmatic;
47
 therefore, Maina’s argument may be understood to reflect both traditions to 
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42
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which he is part, African and Christian, though it does not reflect a typical Western Christian 
argument. 
A preliminary theological statement can be made about a Kenyan mainline scholarly 
understanding of Allah. Allah is the same as the Father of Jesus Christ, because Allah also 
provides blessing, healing and goodness to Muslims as the Father of Jesus Christ provides 
these for Christians. One might also phrase it as God’s vital force is available to Muslims 
through Allah, as it is available to Christians through the Father of Jesus Christ, and since 
God is the unique source of vital force, which brings healing and enhances life,
48
 then both 
Allah and the Father of Jesus Christ must be one and the same.  
Bennett provides a helpful categorisation for interreligious encounter, classifying them 
as conciliatory or confrontational.
49
 These scholars universally attempt to be conciliatory in 
their approach to Islam.
50
 However, an Islamic understanding of Allah is not used as the basis 
for their approach. Instead, God as known from the African religious heritage (and from 
Christianity) is applied to Allah. This position is open to acceptance of Muslims as fellow 
pilgrims, but it is not necessarily open to acceptance of Islam qua Islam.
51
  
9.3.1.2  Popular Christian Writing 
The writers of the popular Christian literature are not engaged in the same type of 
careful academic reflection as the Kenyan Christian scholars. Yet these authors write from 
certain distinctive theological – albeit less reflective – perspectives. These underlying 
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theological assumptions that form their understandings of Islam and interreligious issues are 
examined. Through rescripting this implicit theology can be elicited and examined.
52
 
In the popular Christian literature, one can detect a type of henotheism in which Allah 
is a subordinate, possibly evil, spiritual power. When referring to Allah, the writers usually 
claim that he is a false god,
53
 which does not seem to mean non-existent (having no 
ontological reality) but an existing god that should not be worshiped. Allah is also understood 
to have spiritual power.
54
 This spiritual power is, however, viewed to be inferior to the 
spiritual power of the Christian God. Prayer, evangelism and worship are the primary means 
used to overcome the spiritual power of Islam. 
Many African ethnic groups have believed in what Idowu called a diffused 
monotheism, meaning that there is one creator God under whom exist various assistant 
divinities.
55
 It is plausible that Allah is understood in a similar manner by the Neo-Pentecostal 
writers of the popular literature. However, within African Pentecostal theology these assistant 
divinities have undergone a transformation, now being generally viewed as demons.
56
 
Therefore, Allah is perceived as a demon of similar rank to the divinities of African 
Religion.
57
 
The above shows how the popular literature views Allah, but it does not explain why 
these writers believe that the God worshiped by Christians and Allah worshiped by Muslims 
are not the same God. Kiragu provides a hint when he discusses the poverty of Muslim 
                                                          
52
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regions in Kenya.
58
 Poverty in North Eastern Province and the Coast Province is understood 
to be caused by the population’s spiritual dedication to Allah. The relative poverty of these 
provinces is not used as proof that Allah is not God, but Kiragu’s statement gives a clearer 
insight into the cosmology that influences the theological point of view.  
In African Religion the spiritual world influences human life.
59
 Demonic or evil spirits 
are not part of the traditional cosmology, but evil happens through the human scheme of 
witchcraft.
60
 However, in the coming of Christianity moral dualism was introduced into the 
spiritual world producing cosmic dualism.
61
 Healing, blessing, prosperity, etc. continue to be 
understood as having their source in the spiritual power (or vital force) of the one God 
through the Holy Spirit, but the dualism – now transferred to the spiritual world – means that 
it is currently understood that there are spiritual forces (or beings) opposed to the one God, 
who have their own, lesser, spiritual power. These spiritual forces rob people and 
communities of power (or vital force), rather than enhance it. Thus the above argument about 
poverty in Muslim provinces of Kenya demonstrates (for its readers) that Allah does not and 
cannot bless these areas and its people, but rather he robs these communities of vital force. 
Allah, therefore, cannot be the true God. If Allah were the true God, then these areas would 
not suffer such poverty.  
One reason that Neo-Pentecostal leaders insist upon such views of Allah is that 
ordinary church members frequently hold polyontological beliefs
62
 (i.e. there are multiple 
ontological sources of blessing). Leaders can discourage members from seeking blessing from 
a known Muslim source of power by the insisting that Allah is demonic and harmful to life.  
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A preliminary theological statement from a Pentecostal perspective on a Kenyan 
Christian understanding of Allah can be made. Allah is not a source of blessing, as there is 
only one true source of blessing, which is the Father of Jesus Christ; all other spirits or gods, 
who claim to bless independently of Christian faith, are in reality demonic in origin. 
Therefore, Allah is not god but of demonic origin.  
According to Bennett’s categorisation the Kenyan Pentecostal position is 
confrontational.
63
 Regarding Allah as demonic must make interreligious dialogue difficult.
64
 
In fact, there is little interest in dialogue, as Muslims remain primarily objects of evangelism, 
or even as people to be avoided on a personal level.
65
  
9.3.1.3  Conclusion. 
Different conclusions are reached based on arguments concerning the concept of being 
blessed by God in community. Mainline scholars have intentionally interacted with their own 
African religious and cultural heritage,
66
 finding continuity between it and the more recently 
arrived Christian faith. This interreligious dialogue with their own religious heritage has 
allowed them to selectively retain elements of the traditional cosmology that permits them to 
view Allah as the same as the Father of Jesus Christ. To put this in another way, they have 
adapted a pluralist (or inclusivist) theology of God based on tradition-specific cosmological 
elements from the African religious heritage. Allah, understood to be capable of blessing and 
creating community, is deemed to be the same as the Christian God. 
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Pentecostalism, as a global movement, has viewed the world “as torn between 
dualistic forces.”67 Kenyan Neo-Pentecostals have thus interacted less positively with their 
own African religious heritage,
68
 where they often find demonic spirits. The dualistic 
cosmology has been reinforced through exposure to Western and African Pentecostal
69
 
literature on spiritual warfare that is widely available in Kenyan Christian bookstores.
70
 The 
dualistic cosmology, grafted into the traditional one, can be seen in the popular literature 
where Allah is understood to be incapable of blessing and creating healthy community; 
therefore, Allah cannot be identical to the Christian God. 
9.3.2 What is the Goal of Religion?  
In this section the goal of religion
71
 will be examined, not necessarily in its general 
sense, but as it relates to an interreligious relationship with Islam. The religious goal is the 
formation of healthy community, by which is meant a community that produces prosperity, 
peace and the general well-being of its people. The other questions to be discussed later are in 
reality subsets of this question concerning the religious goal. The related questions will then 
include a deeper look at what this community is
72
 and the problem that must be overcome to 
form this community.
73
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9.3.2.1 Scholarly Christian Writing 
Only Wandera specifically mentions salvation as a goal of religion,
74
 writing that God 
has left a “saving knowledge” of himself in other faith traditions.75 However, the concept of a 
saving knowledge is not defined any further. In none of the writings is there any hint of 
eschatological salvation as the goal of religious faith. Wachege, a Kenyan Catholic priest, 
acknowledges the eschatological aspect of Christian salvation,
76
 but insists that African 
understandings of salvation emphasize life as it is lived daily in community.
77
 The writers 
examined would most likely agree with Wachege that salvation has a future aspect, but their 
primary concern is “living in salvation.”78 
Maina advocates for interreligious dialogue between Muslims and Christians so that 
they may “work together for the common good” of Kenya.79 This will lead to a better Kenyan 
community.
80
 Wandera also expresses that peace between Muslims and Christians would be 
the result of a pluralist theology.
81
 Kubai is also concerned with “peaceful co-existence.”82 
Mugambi’s theology of reconstruction seeks to include Muslims and Christians working 
together in a nation-building project.
83
  
The religious goal is understood to be the formation of a healthy community that 
enhances the lives of those who participate in the community. Though the writers don’t use 
this exact vocabulary (i.e. healthy community), it accurately reflects their ideas. Mugambi, for 
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example, evaluates the Prophet Muhammad in terms of having created a viable and united 
community out of a tribally divided Arabian society.
84
  
Since both Islam and Christianity are understood as capable of creating healthy 
community, interreligious dialogue contributes to better understanding, which allows 
Muslims and Christians to work together to create a better community in Kenya. They can 
work together for the prosperity of Kenya, because both religions offer the prospect of 
creating healthy community. This is not understood as a practical goal of interreligious 
dialogue in addition to other theological goals, but the creation of healthy community is 
viewed as a primary theological goal. Interreligious dialogue, rather than seeking clarity in 
doctrinal understanding, has the creation of community as its religious goal. Ideally, 
interreligious dialogue becomes palaver, which Bujo explains is a model based on traditional 
African dialogical approaches to resolving new issues that confront the community.
85
 
Therefore, palaver is the concern of the entire community rather than the concern of uniquely 
educated individuals, which tends to be the Western pattern of interreligious dialogue. 
However, interreligious dialogue, as it has been practiced in Kenya
86
 (and in Africa in 
general), is inclined to follow a Western imported pattern in which scholars of each faith 
present papers on topics from their own religion’s perspective. African scholars, rather than 
presenting papers on theological topics, more often speak of the socio-cultural issues involved 
in interreligious relations. As Yahya insightfully claims, each religious group points out the 
need for tolerance as well as the problems that the other religion has caused for their own 
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group.
87
 The goals of interreligious dialogue have corresponded with those of palaver (i.e. 
finding communal solutions to problems, conciliation between Christians and Muslims to 
work together for the common good, etc.); however, the use of non-African methods in 
dialogue has perhaps hindered the achievement of their goals. 
Wijsen indicates that a “theory of interreligious relations from an African perspective” 
will be both “theological and socio-scientific.”88 While Wijsen is undoubtedly correct, 
Kenyan mainline scholars consider the empirical socio-scientific aspect to be a vital 
component of the theological process.
89
 Thus a Kenyan Christian theology of religion in 
regards to Islam empirically examines the (religio-) historical, social, political and economic 
facets of Christian-Muslim relations in Kenya in order to ascertain ways to work together to 
build better community, because authentic, healthy, peaceful, African community is the 
theological goal. 
9.3.2.2. Popular Christian Writing 
Lonsdale has written that evangelical (includes Neo-Pentecostal) churches in Kenya 
are characterised by a concern with personal salvation and life after death.
90
 However, in 
examining the popular Christian literature on Islam, very few references to life after death 
were found. In the most significant such reference Lai says that Muslims and Christians are 
not “all going to heaven using different roads.”91 There are also two references to Muslims 
converting and finding salvation through the Gospel,
92
 though salvation is not further defined. 
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To obtain more perspective on the views found in popular Christian literature on 
personal salvation and life after death, twelve issues of five different magazines were 
randomly selected and examined for references to these teachings.
93
 Articles ranged from 
those promoting healthy lifestyles to advice on marriage and parenting. Advice on steps to 
obtain blessings (e.g. children, success, prosperity) were among the more common types of 
articles. Personal salvation was referred to with relative frequency. Forgiveness of sins and 
personal ethical transformation were normally viewed as the signs of salvation. Only very 
rarely were any references made to any sort of life beyond an earthly one, usually a single 
statement about final judgement. Only one article could be described as having eschatological 
salvation as a major theme.
94
 Personal salvation, which appears to be defined in terms of 
ethical change and receiving blessings, was one important theme in these magazines. It is 
probable that a heavenly life after death was assumed for Christians, though not emphasized. 
The principle emphasis was consistently on receiving some type of blessing in this life. 
Personal salvation and receiving blessing (i.e. vital force) are linked as the religious goal.
95
 
The religious goal in the conversion narratives examined in chapter seven is primarily 
concerned with overcoming difficulties in life to obtain success in some form. The success is 
usually personal, such as Rose Muhando becoming a well-known Gospel singer,
96
 or Joseph 
Njuguna overcoming heroin addiction to become a pastor.
97
 The spiritual power of the Holy 
Spirit is most commonly cited as the reason that one is able to overcome certain obstacles, 
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which include demonic spiritual powers. Christian community may also be portrayed as 
helping one to succeed, such as in the story of Shakira Asia.
98
  
In writings that are not conversion narratives the primary religious goal is the future 
success of Kenya,
99
 sometimes expressed as possessing the land.
100
 Muriithi views national 
unity as a religious goal for Kenya.
101
 In these understandings the socio-economic and 
political advancement of Kenya is sought through spiritual allegiance to Christ
102
 rather than 
through historical and socio-scientific analysis of the situation as was seen in the writings of 
Kenyan mainline scholars.  
As seen in the previous section, mainline scholars view the goal of religion as building 
healthy community. The popular literature demonstrates a similar understanding, though more 
emphasis is often placed on the individual’s success within the community. The successful 
individual is expected to contribute towards the community’s success. There is also a more 
mystical element in the Pentecostal conception found in the popular literature, viewing the 
Holy Spirit as directly enabling health and prosperity. The understanding of community also 
seems to be different, but this will be looked at more in chapter 9.3.3.  
The religious goal is blessing from God, which results in personal and communal 
success.
103
 This blessing is understood to be only available through relationship with Jesus 
Christ. One could, therefore, say that according to the popular Christian literature the religious 
goal in relation to Islam is to assure allegiance to Christ which will ensure that individual and 
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communal success may be obtained. This success may come through the miraculous 
intervention of the Holy Spirit or through the assistance of a caring Christian community. 
Islam may be viewed as either a part of the spiritual background over against which the 
narrative of success is played, or Islam may be understood as an obstacle that must be 
overcome in order for success to be achieved. 
9.3.2.3  Conclusion 
In the scholarly and popular writings the religious goal is practical and related to the 
socio-economic aspect of life in Kenya, which is understood as healthy community from an 
African religious perspective. The mainline scholars generally regard success in terms of 
economic development for the community. The economic position of the individual is 
assumed to fit within the progress of the community. The popular writing speaks more in 
terms of individual success, though personal success is understood to occur within a healthy 
community and to contribute to it. Mainline scholars are able to include Islam as a potential 
partner in developing (or reconstructing) the society to bring about more socio-economic 
progress for all. The popular literature tends to view Islam as primarily a spiritual hindrance 
to success.  
9.3.3 What and Who are Community? 
As was seen earlier (9.3.2) when discussing the religious goal, both the scholarly and 
popular writing view the formation of healthy community as an essential goal. Community is 
broadly understood here as referring to a group or organisation beyond the individual. This 
section will take a closer look at the idea of community, and it will also look at who is 
considered to be a part of the community. While community is emphasized in both types of 
writing, they differ in their understandings of the nature of community and of who belongs in 
the community. 
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9.3.3.1  Scholarly Christian Writing 
A definition of the community envisioned in the religious goals (9.3.2) may be 
ascertained through examining the writings of the Kenyan mainline scholars. Community may 
be defined as people living peacefully and united
104
 so that they are able to work together for 
the common good.
105
 This definition should be viewed in the context of a theology of 
interreligious relations and not in the framework of an ecclesiology.  
Mugambi writes of “the Church as a utopian community,”106 indicating that it is a 
community that is different from the world context in which it is located, but its members are 
also integral parts of the larger societal community to which they belong. In the larger 
community Christians should “provide exemplary leadership”107 and be models of morality 
and justice. He maintains that African churches will need to focus less on their 
denominational and missionary heritage and more on an African-oriented ecumenism in order 
to meet this challenge.
108
 From the point of view of Kenyan mainline scholars the goal of 
religion in interreligious perspective is the building of this larger societal community.  
Mugambi understands religion to play a foundational role in reconstructing society. 
He dismisses the ideology of “secularisation”109 as an “erroneous” European import that 
ignores “the fact that individuals are citizens at the same time that they are worshippers.”110 It 
is in this religious vein that Christians and Muslims are to work together, though being of 
different faiths, in order to reconstruct a better society. 
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Maina, Kubai and Wandera
111
 see a competition in Kenya between Muslim and 
Christian communities, impeding the unity and peaceful relations needed to work together 
that would make for an interreligious national community. The community, as expressed in 
the definition, is therefore a goal to be strived for through better understanding and dialogue. 
However, since the envisioned community is Kenyan society, it does presently exist in reality 
but not in its theologically ideal form.  
As was seen earlier (9.3.2), the religious goal as understood by Kenyan mainline 
scholars is the creation of healthy community, implying socio-economic progress. It has been 
shown that this community consists of more than the church community to include the entire 
Kenyan society, so that the religious goal is to create a better, more socially and economically 
advanced Kenya. The African religious ideal for the local and ethnic community is transferred 
to the nation. The Church is understood to have a role in this process as a “utopian 
community” in Kenyan Protestant thought. The national community, however, being larger 
than the Church also includes Muslims, who are invited to work together with Christians to 
help create this better society. 
Without denying the genuine nature of their invitation towards Muslims, one 
weakness of the position of Kenyan mainline scholars is that their understanding of a healthy 
community is based upon two primary sources: the Christian Bible and African tradition. 
There is very little indication that the Muslim community has been consulted about its vision 
for the future of Kenyan society or its notion of the good society.
112
 Muslims have been 
invited to participate in an African Christian endeavour, and those inviting them do not appear 
to be aware of this contradiction. 
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9.3.3.2. Popular Christian Writing 
The discussion of community takes two primary forms in popular literature. First, 
community is seen as the church community consisting primarily of Pentecostal Christians. 
This community is to expand to the detriment of other communities through evangelism
113
 or 
through building community altars.
114
 Comparisons are also made between the Christian 
community and the Muslim community. For example, in the conversion narratives of Rose 
Muhando,
115
 Shakira Asia
116
 and Veronicah Wanjiru Njoroge
117
 the Christian community is 
portrayed as helping these women, while the Muslim community is depicted as adversely 
affecting their lives. Competition is also found between the Christian community and the 
Muslim community over political issues,
118
 in getting permits for Christian evangelistic 
‘crusades,’119 and even in the growing prosperity among Muslims.120  
The popular literature also seems to perceive more fluidity between the Christian and 
the Muslim community than do mainline scholars.
 121
 The popular literature demonstrates an 
interest in evangelising Muslims and a concern that Christians may convert to Islam.
122
 This 
seems to arise from a polyontological world view, where Islam with spiritual, economic or 
political power may represent an alternative source for those seeking blessing. 
The church as community figures more prominently in the popular literature of Neo-
Pentecostals than in the mainline scholarly writing. Perhaps the best expression of this 
ecclesiology comes from Anderson: “These churches see themselves as the born-again people 
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of God, with a strong sense of belonging to the community of God's people” with an “identity 
as a separated and egalitarian community with democratic access to spiritual power, whose 
primary purpose is to promote their cause to those outside.”123 The church understands itself 
to be in opposition to the world, which includes Islam, and its primary means of relating to 
the world is Christian evangelical witness and mission. Dualistic images of light and darkness 
are often used to reinforce the strong boundaries between the Church and the world.
124
 This 
theological point of view necessitates that the Muslim community be seen as inferior to the 
Neo-Pentecostal Christian community. 
Second, community is also understood in the sense of the larger societal community, 
similar to what is found among mainline scholars. This is sometimes expressed in terms such 
as “possessing the land,”125 where the Neo-Pentecostal community is seen to spiritually take 
the nation in order for the national community to receive blessing. Muriithi’s commentary on 
the Kenyan national anthem is a profound example of this perception of community, as she 
calls upon Kenyans to unite as one community around a Christian conception of God.
126
 
Wanjiru views the Christian and Muslim community to be in competition over the future of 
the greater Kenyan community.
127
 
The blessings of God, usually understood to be in the form of increased economic 
prosperity and geopolitical importance, upon Kenya do not depend upon all Kenyans being 
converted to Pentecostal Christianity. However, an aura of Christian faith, symbols and values 
is expected of government and of the national community as a whole in some non-descript 
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way. For example, Githii’s Exposing and Conquering Satanic Forces over Kenya128 calls for 
the destruction of many non-Christian symbols in government buildings,
129
 the removal of the 
word Harambee from the currency,
130
 etc. Some allegedly Masonic symbols were destroyed 
at Saint Andrew’s Presbyterian Church while Githii was moderator of the Presbyterian 
Church of East Africa.
131
 Githii’s prescriptions for ridding certain physical symbols from 
certain places in Kenya is very specific, and he believes that this will bring about more 
prosperity and better governance by ridding public places of physical (sacramental) 
connections to evil spirits, but he does not have a true plan of action beyond that. 
A brief look at a sermon by Teresia Wairimu in which she uses the story of Nehemiah 
to speak of the rebuilding of Kenya,
132
 using the same biblical story and similar vocabulary to 
Mugambi’s theology of reconstruction,133 will help to clarify the Pentecostal understanding of 
the larger national community and how it receives blessing from God. She speaks of 
rebuilding the nation by calling upon her listeners to build a metaphorical (or spiritual) wall 
around the nation.
134
 The wall symbolises prayer that will end corruption in Kenya and make 
Jesus Christ the “foundation” of the nation. This process also includes the moral cleansing of 
the Kenyan church so that corruption is removed from it.
135
 Other actions included are: 
bringing God into the schools, hospitals and parliament,
136
 and the election of “godly people” 
to political office.
137
 This somewhat theocratic vision is said to be achieved through spiritual 
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warfare.
138
 The economic blessing that Kenya would receive from God comes through the 
mystical power of God. This is all possible because it has been prophesied that God will make 
Kenya “a springboard of revival”139 and missions to the rest of the world.  
Wairimu’s vision of the reconstruction of Kenya is very different from Mugambi’s. 
She does not employ socio-scientific analysis, only speaking of corruption generally. 
Reconstruction (to use Mugambi’s term) occurs through religious purification and the ensuing 
mystical power of God, rather than through the contributions of Kenyans working together 
towards a common goal. Mugambi calls all Kenyans together, irrespective of their faith, to 
integrity, national pride and hard work; whereas, Wairimu calls only Christians of a certain 
type together to pray and act against vices, those perceived to be behind the vices, and 
ultimately against the demons behind it all.  
Wairimu demonstrates what Kalu has called an emerging Pentecostal “theology of 
engagement”140 in which Pentecostals have rejected the old missionary teaching that good 
Christians avoid politics, so that they are now willing to address national issues and even 
participate in democratic elections. Spiritual warfare, the rule of the saints, redemption of the 
land and prayer are the primary methods by which they “act with the vision of a theocracy.”141 
Wairimu and other (Neo)Pentecostal preachers and writers who express similar ideas have 
some theological naivety concerning their theocratic vision. There is not only a lack of any 
sort of programme for instituting or operating a theocratic society, but the full implications of 
this vision have not been examined. It is doubtful that they view themselves as advocates of 
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theocracy.
142
 Their conception seems to be that a healthy community can only be formed if 
certain conditions are met, and these conditions are theocratic in appearance. 
In the Kenyan popular Christian literature there are two notions of community that 
impact upon a theology of religions in relation to Islam. First, the Church is a community of 
born-again Christians who stand in dualistic opposition to the Muslim community, and their 
primary means of interaction with Muslims should be mission-oriented. Second, community 
may also be understood to encompass the entire land of Kenya, whose governing should be 
based upon the foundation of God, the Father of Jesus Christ. There is little expression of 
animosity towards Muslims,
143
 but the place of Muslims in the larger society has not been 
examined. Therefore, one could say that the popular writing shows a rather unfocused 
theocratic vision for the national community that has not yet addressed the issue of living 
together in a religiously plural community. At present there does not seem to be an interest in 
this question. Muslims are perceived, even in this larger sense of a national community, as 
primarily targets of evangelism and mission.
144
 
The cosmic dualism seen earlier (9.3.1.2) renders a religious encounter with the larger, 
religiously plural, national community a difficult puzzle to solve. It raises the question of how 
Neo-Pentecostals (who produce the popular literature) can engage positively with Muslims, 
whom they deem to be influenced by the demonic. If Neo-Pentecostals wish to be politically 
active in Kenya, evangelism can no longer function as the only religiously acceptable means 
by which Neo-Pentecostals may relate to Muslims. Any form of democratic political 
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involvement based on respect for human rights will necessitate a reciprocal relationship that is 
more willing to listen and compromise than it is to preach and dictate.  
Pentecostal theologian, Amos Yong’s argument for “hospitality as interreligious 
praxis that recognizes people of all faiths are aliens and strangers but also neighbours one to 
another,”145 should provide a theological means for Kenyan Neo-Pentecostals to “embrace”146 
the Muslim Other in ways of reconciliation. Hospitality remains a religious and cultural value 
that resonates in African society in general and African Christianity in particular.
147
 Kitavi 
demonstrates this when he writes that people of all religions are welcome to pray at the 
community altar, if they leave their God behind and worship Jesus.
148
 Value is placed upon 
hospitality in a religiously plural neighbourhood; however, it conflicts with his view of 
interfaith prayer and other religions in general. The question becomes: Can Kenyan 
Pentecostals live in hospitality with Muslims in contexts that are not specifically religious?
149
 
The task for Kenyan Neo-Pentecostals is to discover hospitality outside of their 
religious in-group by entering into mutual relationships as both guest and host with Muslims. 
Yong’s theological method offers an advantage – for Kenyan Neo-Pentecostals – over 
pluralist and inclusivist theologies, because Yong maintains a particularist
150
 theology while 
offering a conciliatory approach to the religious Other.
151
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9.3.3.3  Conclusion  
The formation of healthy community is important in the theological perspectives of 
both Kenyan scholars and Neo-Pentecostals. The popular literature emphasizes the place of 
individuals more than the mainline scholars. Both speak of two communities: the church and 
the nation. For Kenyan mainline scholars the church functions within the nation, working for 
the nation by providing moral and competent leaders, by contributing intellectually to social 
and political processes, and by being an example. Since the church is one entity within the 
nation that is working for the nation, Islam is accepted as another community working for the 
nation. 
In the popular Christian writing the church is prioritised. In relation to the nation, the 
church is to assume the role of leadership. Informed by a naïve theocratic vision, the popular 
literature shows a belief that Christian values, symbols, and politicians should govern in 
Kenya. It is thought that God will then reward the nation with prosperity and peace. There is 
no space for Islam within this vision. Some (non-Kenyan) Pentecostal theologians, such as 
Yong, have found theological means to provide space for the religious Other through the 
biblical understanding of hospitality. While Kenyan Neo-Pentecostals (who produce the 
popular literature) have not adapted this approach, it could offer a possibility for improved 
relations with Muslims in the future in theologically acceptable ways. 
9.3.4 What is the Problem? 
In a previous section it was seen that success and economic progress, understood as 
healthy community, are viewed as a principle religious goal. This section will look at the 
problem(s) that makes reaching the religious goal difficult. Again, this will be examined 
especially as it relates to Islam. The source of the problem(s) is viewed as external in both 
scholarly and popular writing, though the actual source differs. 
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9.3.4.1  Scholarly Christian Writing 
For mainline scholars the problems that have prevented Kenya from finding unity and 
socio-economic progress have clearly been colonialism, the missionary movement and neo-
colonial structures.
152
 Concerning Christian-Muslim relations in Kenya, conflicts are 
attributed to these same sources, and occasionally to external circumstances in the Arab 
Muslim world. The tensions and conflicts between Muslims and Christians are viewed as one 
reason that Kenya is not able to unite and progress socially, politically and economically. 
Kubai writes: 
Education in Kenya was in the hands of Christian missionaries and it 
was the most promising instrument of evangelization. The result was the 
creation of a social system where the Christian denominations, buttressing 
their efforts to civilize the natives by providing western education, became 
effective agents of social promotion. In these circumstances, Muslims could 
not take advantage of western education and were left out of jobs, which 
required western educated personnel. Thus the Christians moved ahead and the 
Muslims fell behind.
153
 
It was from among these educated Kenyan Christians that arose the modern political 
and economic elite of Kenya.
154
 This quote provides a good example of how the three 
elements (colonialism, Western missions, and neo-colonialism) are understood to have led to 
conditions that cause estrangement between Muslims and Christians. These external factors 
are understood to be the reasons that Muslims and Christians in Kenya experience tension and 
lack of unity. 
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External Islamic movements are also seen to be a source of the problems between 
Muslims and Christians.
155
 Therefore, aggressive da’wa, such as mihadhara,156 and the 
terrorist acts that have been committed in Kenya are attributed to Arab origins. While not 
stated explicitly it seems to be understood that African Muslims, who are not influenced by 
external Muslim movements, are then able to maintain their Africanness, which enables them 
to work together with African Christians for peace, unity and progress. It is then seen to be 
more difficult to work with Arab-influenced Muslims. Kubai also writes of the traditional 
Arab/savage dichotomy with which coastal Muslims scorned traditional Africans.
157
 The 
quality that needs to be preserved (according to the mainline scholars) is Africanness. 
The mainline scholars, who are not experts on Islam, view the problem similarly but 
with minor differences. For them the problem is that neither Christianity nor Islam properly 
respects African Religion and culture.
158
 Mbiti found it problematic while growing up that 
Akamba Muslims seemed to reject the idea that the Akamba God could be identical to 
Allah.
159
  
The theological problem, therefore, is that external agents, either Europeans or Arabs, 
have entered Africa and distorted the harmony, peace and progression of Africa. One might 
say that the original sin of Africa was colonial invasion (continuing in neo-colonial 
structures), which prevents Africa from reaching its God-given potential as genuinely African. 
The introduction of Christianity and Islam is not perceived negatively, as religion is 
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understood to be good,
160
 but their external, non-African inculturations have brought disunity, 
tensions and conflict, which inhibit the formation of a healthy national community. 
These scholars correctly identify colonialism and the missionary movement as 
external factors that created a situation in which Muslims are marginalised and tensions exist 
between the two communities.
161
 However, the continued marginalisation (and resultant 
tension) is also partially attributable to actions of postcolonial Kenyan Christians in symbolic 
contestation with Islam in public spaces over the identity of Kenya.
162
 This aspect is ignored 
in favour of an African versus foreigner ethical dualism. As might be suggested from the 
writings of Mudimbe,
163
 the Otherness of Africa (or the Invention of Africa) by Europeans 
has been internalised by Kenyan Christians. Difference (i.e. being Other) then becomes the 
defining characteristic of Africanness, which creates a dichotomy opposed to that which is not 
African.  
9.3.4.2. Popular Christian Writing 
In the various conversion narratives the protagonists have a variety of obstacles to 
overcome in order find success: disease,
164
 drug addiction
165
 and rejection.
166
 Though evil 
spiritual powers are not directly mentioned in these narratives, African Pentecostal theology 
generally regards these obstacles to have spiritual origins.
167
 In some narratives, while other 
problems are apparent, such as sinfulness, the primary problem is the presence and activity of 
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evil spirits.
168
 In the non-narrative articles, evil spiritual powers are viewed as the actual 
hindrance to the spread of true Christianity and thus to personal and communal success.
169
  
The external agents that “prevent the Christian from realizing a positive destiny in 
life”170 are spiritual powers opposed to Jesus Christ rather than non-African intruders into 
Africa. Islam is then one of the spiritual powers that is opposed to Jesus Christ that may 
hinder an individual from achieving fulfilment in life. Islam is not necessarily highlighted for 
special consideration, as it often blends into the spiritual background along with other 
religious expressions that are deemed unacceptable, such as African Religion, Hinduism, 
Catholicism, and Mainline Christianity. Kitavi also hints that Muslims are very involved with 
spirits,
171
 thus offering a comparison of Islam with African Religion.  
However, in discussions of the political future of Kenya,
172
 Islam assumes a more 
prominent role as a major hindrance.
173
 The successful future of Kenya is thought to depend 
upon spiritual allegiance to Jesus Christ, as seen for example in Muriithi’s commentary on the 
Kenyan national anthem, which urges unity among all Kenyans based on Christian faith and 
scriptures so that Kenya might prosper.
174
  
Amidst these difficulties caused by evil spiritual powers, it is understood that – for 
those who have faith in Jesus Christ – the power of the Holy Spirit will enable one to 
overcome the difficulties and the opposing spiritual powers. While metaphors from the 
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domain of war are sometimes used, the primary means advocated to ‘combat’ Islam are prayer 
and evangelism.
175
  
Kalu says that African Pentecostals have a “covenant theology,” which contends that 
“human beings and communities relate to spiritual powers through covenants.”176 This 
theology results in understanding “Christian life as a power-encounter and spiritual battle.”177 
The spiritual world is then viewed as determinant of what happens in the physical world.
178
 
Spiritual beings (or forces) that promote the successful life of individuals and the community 
are understood to be from God (e.g. angels and the Holy Spirit), whereas spiritual beings (or 
forces) that obstruct the fulfilment of individual or communal destiny are viewed as demonic. 
The Christian scriptures are used to define the spiritual domain, since only those beings or 
forces specifically mentioned in the Bible are understood to be real and existent. Thus any 
spirit that cannot be identified with God or an angel is necessarily demonic, resulting in the 
association of Islam (and other religions) with the demonic. 
When Islam is associated with spirits, it is also linked with African Religion and the 
ways of the ontological past. Therefore, Islam is seen as retrogressive, incapable of leading 
people into the technologically modern era and modern economic success. Christianity, on the 
other hand, with its long association with Western education and technology is viewed as a 
means towards success in the modern economy. Islam is, therefore, viewed not simply as evil 
or demonic but also as backwards, inhibiting individuals and communities from progressing 
in modern advancement. 
These demonic spirits, against which Pentecostal Christians do spiritual battle, are 
understood to be the problem preventing abundant life, individually and communally. 
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Amongst Kenyan Neo-Pentecostals (as reflected in the popular literature), Islam does not 
always figure prominently in the spiritual battle, but when Islam is included it is understood 
as a spiritual power that is in opposition to God, the Father of Jesus Christ, and therefore 
demonic in nature. Thus the problem is external to human beings, and at least theoretically, 
Muslims are simply deceived and not the problem.
179
 The religious goal of personal success 
in healthy community is accomplished by overcoming opposing spirits, including Islam 
(especially in a national perspective) through the Holy Spirit. 
9.3.4.3  Conclusion 
In both scholarly and popular literature the problem to be overcome has an external 
source. For Kenyan mainline scholars the external source is foreign intrusion into Kenya in 
particular and into Africa in general, so that Western colonialism, the modern missionary 
movement, neo-colonial structures and Arab influence are all regarded as sources of the 
problems that Kenyans face in achieving wholeness in life. Islam is only problematic, if it 
reflects Arabness rather than Africanness. In the popular literature the problem is a demonic 
spiritual world that opposes Christians as they seek wholeness in life, Islam being one part of 
the demonic spiritual world. Healthy community may be found by overcoming these 
problems through either the Holy Spirit for Neo-Pentecostals or through Afrocentric unity for 
mainline scholars. 
9.4  Two Kenyan Christian Responses to Islam 
There are important similarities in the responses to Islam found in the scholarly 
writing and the popular writing. Both affirm that divine blessing in the form of economic 
advancement is a religious goal and a means of testing the authenticity of a religion and its 
god. True religion is understood to have the ability to create healthy community where life is 
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enhanced. Both communities approach the problem to creating healthy community and 
prosperity in dualistic terms, where the bad is external to Kenyan Christianity. 
There are also important differences in their responses. Mainline scholars view the 
divine blessing to work through renewed socio-political structures, whereas Neo-Pentecostals 
(who produce the popular literature) understand economic blessing to happen in mystical 
terms through the power of the Holy Spirit. Islam is understood to be capable of forming 
healthy community and contributing to national well-being among mainline scholars, but in 
the popular literature Islam is viewed as a hindrance to national success. Neo-Pentecostals 
reject the notion that Allah is the same as the Christian God; mainline scholars affirm that 
both Muslims and Christians worship the same God. While both types of literature discuss 
problems to a healthy national community in dualistic terms, mainline scholars employ a 
dualism of African versus foreign, and the popular literature sees the world through a cosmic 
dualism in which good and evil are ultimately found in the spiritual world. 
Two critiques of these Kenyan Christian responses will be made. First, neither 
mainline scholars nor Neo-Pentecostals take Islam qua Islam seriously. Mainline Christian 
scholars study the history of Islam in Kenya and seek to work together for the well-being of 
the nation in a Christian-imagined program, while interacting very little with Islam as religion 
or with Kenyan Muslim visions for the future of Kenya. In the popular literature Islam is 
viewed as an opposing spiritual force, occasionally being associated with African Religion. 
Very little knowledge of Islam as religion is demonstrated. It is plausible that their shared 
approach of evaluating a religion according to its ability to contribute to the enhancement of 
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life – which would seem ‘result oriented’ – does not necessarily motivate one to learn about 
the actual teachings and practices of the religion.
180
 
What has appeared to occur is that once Islam has been determined either to enhance 
life (according to mainline scholars) or to hinder abundant life (in the popular literature), then 
there is very little reason to learn more of Islamic belief, law, culture, etc. This raises a 
question about the nature of the interreligious encounter from the perspective of Kenyan 
Christians. Is the encounter with Muslims primarily utilitarian, or is it relational? Do mainline 
scholars meet Muslims in order to know them and form relationships that may lead to new 
community, or do they encounter Muslims to gain helpers in their nation-building project? 
Without discounting relations that may form at the individual level, the trend from the 
scholarly writing suggests that encounter with Muslims is sought primarily for utilitarian 
purposes (i.e. to enlist helpers for an existing nation-building project). 
Second, both the scholarly writing and the popular writing locate the problem to the 
formation of healthy community outside the community. They operate with an insider versus 
outsider dualism, which seems to inhibit penetrating analysis into their own community. For 
Kenyan mainline scholars the problem is foreignness. Therefore, Kenyan Muslims are 
evaluated according to their Africanness and corresponding lack of Arab-influence. However, 
it is doubtful that Kenyan Muslims understand Africanness and Arabness in the same manner 
as Kenyan Christians. It seems probable that Kenyan Muslims will not value Africanness, nor 
reject Arab-influence, to the satisfaction and definition of Kenyan mainline scholars, which 
could leave most Muslims outside the acceptable community and thus problematic. Despite 
their conciliatory approach, it may be asked if Muslims will ever be able to transcend the 
imposed barriers to be included as insiders in the community.  
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In the popular writing the problem is opposing spiritual powers, normally understood 
to be demonic. Islam is viewed to be a locus of demonic power, which by definition is outside 
the Christian community. From such a viewpoint, Islam must always remain outside the 
acceptable community. The transition from outsider to insider occurs only through religious 
conversion. While this viewpoint, when applied uniquely to concerns of religious adherence, 
may be recognised and accepted, the exclusive position of Kenyan Neo-Pentecostals also 
excludes Muslims socially (in addition to religiously), impeding true inter-human fellowship 
as demonstrated by Jesus in the Gospels. The social exclusion of Muslims violates their own 
theological position concerning love and hospitality towards neighbours and strangers. Neo-
Pentecostal leaders demonstrate some anxiety that their followers could convert to Islam (if 
Muslims were perceived to have power: spiritually, economically or politically), which may 
account for this reticence to extend hospitality to Muslims.  
Kenyan Pentecostal social exclusivism towards Muslims is associated with anxieties 
concerning possibilities of conversion, Islamic political agenda,
181
 supposed ties with evil 
spirits and cultural differences.
182
 The question that this situation poses is: Are these adequate 
justifications for Kenyan Neo-Pentecostals to remain estranged from Kenyan Muslims? 
Miroslav Volf
183
 argues in Exclusion and Embrace that a movement from exclusion to 
embrace is inherent in a Christian life (in)formed by a theology of the cross and an experience 
of grace. If Volf is correct, than social exclusion and estrangement no longer remain viable 
options for Kenyan Neo-Pentecostals.  
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In the scholarly writing an emerging theology of religion is open to Islam and 
Muslims. Allah and the Christian God are seen to be one and the same God, who blesses both 
communities with vital force, enhancing life in viable, healthy communities. The well-being 
of the nation may be served by both faith communities working together with the common 
goals of economic prosperity, democracy, peace and just government. It is understood that 
they are able to work together in such a manner, because both religions are seen to have 
similar goals for its people and the nation. Further dialogue (palaver) with Muslims (i.e. 
learning more about Islam as a religion and Muslim aspirations in Kenya) should lead to 
greater understanding between the communities and to more clarity in the articulation of a 
theology of encounter with Islam. 
The popular Christian literature, as produced by Neo-Pentecostals, demonstrates an 
implicit theology of religion that encounters Islam confrontationally. The religiously 
acceptable means of relating with Muslims is missions, evangelism and spiritual warfare. 
Allah is understood to be either a false god or a demon, who robs the Muslim community of 
true blessing (i.e. vital force). Even political relations within Kenya are strained, as 
Pentecostals advocate a naïve theocratic vision for Kenya.
184
 Pentecostals outside of Kenya 
have found theological means to be more open to the religious Other. Yong has employed the 
biblical notion of hospitality – which should resonate with African social and theological 
values – to reflect upon relations with the religious Other in a more positive fashion.185 
Yong
186
 and other Pentecostal theologians have also used the notion of the Spirit being poured 
                                                          
184
 This is true for Neo-Pentecostals, Classic Pentecostals and Charismatics in mainline churches, such 
as David Githii. 
185
 Yong, Hospitality and the Other. 
186
 Amos Yong, “Discerning the Spirit(s): A Pentecostal-Charismatic Contribution to Christian 
Theology of Religions” (Doctoral Thesis, Boston University, 1999). 
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out on all flesh to signal God’s activity among all religious faiths.187 It is possible (and 
desirable) that Kenyan Neo-Pentecostals may find these, or other, theological means to 
become more open to positively relating with Muslims and learning about Islam, so that they 
may develop a more conciliatory theology of encounter with Islam.  
African Religion is also seen to be demonic, and African Religion is the chronological 
present and the ontological past of Kenyan Neo-Pentecostals. Their families (parents, 
grandparents, siblings, etc.) may be adherents of African Religion, and therefore considered to 
be involved with the demonic. In this way ideas of demonic in Kenya differ from Western 
Pentecostal understandings for whom the demonic is distant and indicates an intentional 
seeking of evil and immorality. Kenyan Pentecostals may more easily overcome the distance 
seemingly implied in the use of demonic imagery in relation to Islam than Western observers 
anticipate.
188
  
                                                          
187
 Amos Yong and Tony Richie, "Missiology and the Interreligious Encounter," in Studying Global 
Pentecostalism: Theories and Methods, ed. Allan Anderson et al., (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2010), 256-260. 
188
 O'Brien, Symbolic Confrontations, 4. He notes that the Mourides calling the government "Satan" 
does not preclude working with them. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSION 
The present study set out to understand and examine the diverse voices of Kenyan 
Christians as they attempt to figure out how to live with and comprehend Muslims in present-
day, pluralist Kenyan society. While Kenyan society has been ethnically and religiously plural 
since the nation’s beginning, it was only after the bombing of the American Embassy in 
Nairobi in 1998 that the issue of religious plurality seemed to gain significant attention. The 
study has shown that Christianity has held a place of relative power from the colonial period 
into the postcolonial period (see 4.3.5 and 5.3.5). Christians in the postcolonial era maintain 
the upper hand over Muslims through symbolic contestation concerning the relative 
legitimacy of Muslim and Christian contributions to defining national identity (see chapter 8). 
Scholarly Christian literature was analysed in chapter six using the theology of 
reconstruction and its emphasis on the priority of African culture as a framework in 
examining the perceptions of Islam of the writers (see 6.1). Popular Christian literature was 
analysed in chapter seven by rescripting the less-reflected implicit theology of the popular 
writers using more scholarly writing on African Pentecostalism and African Religion (see 
1.2.4) and by a close reading of the texts in regard to issues of power, which the popular 
writers understand as spiritual power, but which can also be understood as symbolic power 
(see 1.2.3). It was found that the scholarly literature represented the Kenyan mainline 
Christian community and the popular writing, the Kenyan Neo-Pentecostal community. It was 
seen that Muslims are imagined as less than fully African, especially by scholars of the 
mainline churches (see 8.2.1 and 9.3.4.1). In the Pentecostal imaginary Islam is also linked 
with demonic spirits (see 9.3.1.2 and 9.3.4.2).  
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Due to the above perceptions of Islam, Muslim ability to contribute to Kenyan 
national identity and to healthy national community formation is considered suspect. 
Therefore, the only possibilities for Muslim participation in the nation-building process seem 
to be either by integrating into an African Christian-led process (mainline scholars, see 8.4.1), 
or through conversion (Neo-Pentecostals, see 9.3.3.2). Neither option allows the full 
participation of Kenyan Muslims within their own self-identity as Muslims of Kenyan 
citizenship. These circumstances are mitigated by the fact that Kenyan churches are not as 
politically powerful as they claim. In other words, Christian symbolic contestation in public 
space has not been entirely successful, and Muslims have been able to raise voices in these 
public spaces. 
In chapter nine the study also uncovered the emerging theologies of religion in relation 
to Islam from the two Christian communities. Other studies on Christian-Muslim relations in 
Africa have approached the subject from the perspectives of the disciplines of religious 
studies, history and the social sciences, but very few have examined the theological position 
from which Christians operate in understanding Islam and relating with Muslims.
1
 
10.1 Theories of Interreligious Relations 
As discussed in the introduction, Wijsen has suggested the need for an African theory 
of interreligious relations.
2
 The current study makes a first step in that direction by uncovering 
working – yet not fully developed – theories of interreligious relations from two Kenyan 
Christian communities. The following exposition of the theories of interreligious relations is 
derived from looking at both the theological perspectives on Islam (chapter 9) and the socio-
                                                          
1
 Kalu, African Pentecostalism, Chapter 12, 225-246. Kalu’s chapter on Pentecostal interaction with 
Muslims in Nigeria may be one of very few works to consider the theological position of Christians in 
this encounter. I am also unaware of any studies that examine interreligious relations in Africa from a 
Muslim theological perspective.  
2
 Wijsen, Seeds of Conflict, 241-243. 
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political methods of contesting Islam (chapter 8). These theories appear to be formed around a 
normative model in which values play a significant role. Religions may then be evaluated for 
their effectiveness according to how well they conform to the normative model and produce 
the expected values. As was seen in chapter nine when discussing the emerging theological 
questions, the African emphasis tends to be on concrete reality more than upon abstract 
reasoning,
3
 which lends itself to highlighting values. Religions perceived to promote similar 
values are then understood to be compatible, allowing for dialogue, working together, etc. 
First, the working theory of the mainline scholars and its connection to what was revealed in 
the analyses in chapters eight and nine will be outlined. The same will then be done 
concerning the Neo-Pentecostal community as found in the popular literature.  
The normative model of the Kenyan mainline scholars emphasizes being African. The 
origins of the nation are understood historically and mythically to be African (see 8.2.1). The 
theological goals focus upon the formation of authentic African community (see 9.3.2.1 and 
9.3.3.1), which may be hindered by external non-African influences (see 9.3.4.1). Whether the 
subject is national origins, theology, economic development, social and moral values, etc., it 
must reflect its African nature and its interests for Africa (or, more precisely, for Kenya as a 
part of Africa). Christianity becomes incorporated into this normative model, because 
Christian values are understood to correspond with African values (see 9.2). Incorporated into 
the model, Christian values, such as the fruit of the Spirit,
4
 then may also be perceived to be 
African values.
5
 There is borrowing, loaning and integration – travelling in both directions – 
so that African values are Christian values, and Christian values are African values. Much 
                                                          
3
 See chapter 9.3. It should go without saying that Africans also may reason in the abstract; and 
Americans and Europeans are concerned with practical matters. The difference is principally upon 
where the emphasis lies. 
4
 Galatians 5:22-23 
5
 Wijsen, Seeds of Conflict, 13-14. 
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importance is also placed upon community, which is frequently contrasted with Western 
individualism. Ideally the community should be religious, prosperous and live in peace and 
harmony with each other and with those outside the community (see 8.4.1 and 9.3.2.1).  
Other religions, then, may be evaluated by examining their values (Do they 
correspond with African/Christian values?) and their contributions to forming healthy 
community. As was seen in chapter 9.3.1.1 and 9.3.2.1, these scholars evaluate Islam 
positively as able to contribute towards the building of healthy community. The goal of 
interreligious relations, rather than theological understanding, entails the practical concerns of 
forming healthy community and promoting African values, which are also understood to 
correspond with Christian values. This goal is expressed in terms of ‘working together’ for 
national socio-economic advancement, which in practical terms most likely means 
cooperation in providing social services,
6
 producing citizen leaders of integrity, and in 
advocating for better governance (see 8.4.1). This theory of interreligious relations concerns 
itself with the potential of Muslims (or other religionists) to cooperate with Christians in 
socio-cultural endeavours that promote Kenya’s (and Africa’s) future.   
The second theory, which comes from the Neo-Pentecostal writers in the Kenyan 
popular literature, demonstrates a normative model that stresses being a certain kind of 
Christian. Christians are understood, for example, to be the necessary leaders of the nation 
(see 8.2.2 and 9.3.3.2), and through a theology of possessing the land Pentecostals are 
understood to take the nation spiritually, and eventually politically (see 8.4.2). Much that is 
African is integrated within the model, so that the norm becomes African Pentecostalism. 
African qualities that are incorporated into the model include African community (see 9.3.2.2) 
and spiritual causality, in which blessings from God bring about national unity and prosperity 
                                                          
6
 Gifford, Christianity, Politics and Public Life in Kenya, 46-54. 
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(see 8.2.2 and 9.3.1.2). While social and moral values are deemed important, emphasis lies 
more on spiritual values, which are understood to also represent moral values (see 8.3.2). The 
church, as a separate community of born-again Christians, obtains considerable importance. 
Mutual assistance, escape from poverty (i.e. prosperity), morality, interpersonal relationships, 
healing, etc. are expected within the community. While many of these expectations are 
understood to happen through the community’s social processes,7 much is also anticipated 
from the mystical acts of God through the Holy Spirit (see 9.3.3.2).  
The nation then appears to be viewed as an imperfect extension of this church 
community, so that the nation should exhibit a certain amount of moral righteousness and 
honour for (the Christian) God, which will be rewarded with prosperity and unity, as was seen 
in Wairimu’s sermon in chapter 9.3.3.2. Since this theory of interreligious relations centres on 
a norm of African Pentecostalism and an emphasis on spiritual values, other religions are by 
definition sub-normal and mystically troublesome. For example, Islam is linked with evil 
spirits (see 9.3.4.2), and non-Christians are understood to ‘build’ Satanic altars, while 
Pentecostals erect Godly ones through prayer and worship (see 8.4.2). The normative 
responses to other religions are evangelism (bringing the Other into the Pentecostal 
community) and spiritual warfare (rendering the Other mystically impotent). Concerning the 
nation, as an imperfect extension of the church community, the goal is to perfect it through 
Pentecostal leadership and prayer, which seems to include either the conversion or the 
acquiescence of Muslims (or other religionists). This theory of interreligious relations does 
not seek relationship with the religious Other. The Other is primarily encountered as 
mystically dangerous and as an object of evangelism. 
                                                          
7
 Like mainline Kenyan churches, Kenyan Neo-Pentecostal churches also operate schools, health 
clinics and other social services. 
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These two theories of interreligious relations have a similar weakness due to their 
theoretical positions centring on normative models, which results in little interest being shown 
in the religion of the Other or in the Other as Other. Since the other religion is only seen from 
the perspective of one’s own normative model, the vision of the Other becomes primarily 
utilitarian. The significance of the Other then becomes incorporating the Other (i.e. Muslims) 
into a Christian-imagined nation-building project (mainline scholars) or learning about the 
Other (i.e. Muslims) in order to evangelise them (Neo-Pentecostals). Very little space is 
allowed for the Other (i.e. Muslims) to speak on their own behalf about their own concerns.
8
 
McGrane tells the story of the development of the concept of the Other in Western 
thinking, showing how the West has ‘othered’ people encountered in explorations of other 
lands.
9
 African scholars have reflected on the experience of African peoples being ‘othered’ 
in the processes of colonialism, the missionary movement, neo-colonialism, etc. However, 
there does not appear to be much reflection upon how African peoples have created Otherness 
upon encountering peoples (including other Africans) who are different from themselves. 
When ethnic conflicts have forced this question, the answer is frequently that “it is but a 
product of the development imposed on the continent by colonialism.”10 Or as Katongole says 
of the genocide in Rwanda, they became “people who were willing to kill one another 
because of a story they were first told by Europeans and later learned to tell themselves.”11 
Thus the most frequently provided answer seems to deflect the question as much as answer it. 
It remains a question awaiting a response from Kenyan thinkers. 
                                                          
8
 Kubai recognizes this to some extent when she says that Christians and Muslims don’t agree on their 
understandings of the problems to be discussed during dialogues. Kubai, "Striving in Faith," 12. 
9
 Bernard McGrane, Beyond Anthropology: Society and the Other (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1989). 
10
 Emmanuel Okoth Manyasa, "Ethnicity: An Opportunity or a Bane in Africa's Development," in East 
Africa: In Search of National and Regional Renewal, ed. Felicia Arudo Yieke, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 
2005), 69. 
11
 Emmanuel M. Katongole, Mirror to the Church: Resurrecting the Faith after Genocide in Rwanda 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan 2009), 52. 
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Critiquing a key weakness from each of the above working theories of interreligious 
relations may offer a way forward for each community in improved relations with Muslims in 
Kenya. While each theory is critiqued, the goal is to critique them from within their own 
respective theological and value systems and not by imposing Western or personal views. 
Kenyan mainline scholars express much openness towards Islam and Muslims. 
However, as shown in chapter eight, Muslims are accepted under certain conditions 
(prioritisation of Africanness over Arabness) into a Christian-led nation-building project.
12
 To 
use the metaphor of hospitality, mainline Christian scholars are willing to act as hosts to the 
Muslim community (i.e. welcoming Muslims into their project); however, as Yong proposes, 
interreligious hospitality requires that each party act as both host and guest.
13
 Learning to 
become guests (i.e. receiving hospitality and learning more of Kenyan Muslims, their faith, 
culture, history, etc.) would mark a movement towards mutuality. Becoming the guest entails 
vulnerability, dependence upon the Other and willingness to surrender control for the time 
period of being the guest. More concretely, becoming the guest would entail listening to 
Muslims articulate their desires, visions and goals as Kenyans. The normative model of being 
African can function to exclude; however, by receiving hospitality new understandings of 
being African may be discovered.  
It is also possible to see the effects of habitus in the ‘natural’ assumption made by the 
scholars that a Christian-led nation-building project based on African and Christian 
symbolism will easily incorporate Muslims (see 8.2.1). However, a role of scholars in 
studying society, according to Bourdieu, is exposing the taken-for-granted nature of habitus 
                                                          
12
 See chapter 8.5. 
13
 Yong, Hospitality and the Other, 118-126. 
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that misrecognizes arbitrary classifications and distinctions as natural.
14
 The next task for 
Kenyan scholars in the development of a theory of interreligious relations may be to receive 
hospitality from Muslims while reflecting upon the habitus within which the theory is being 
formed. 
The working theory of interreligious relations uncovered in the popular literature 
shows that African Pentecostalism not only functions as a theological norm determining a 
religiously correct means to spiritual fulfilment and salvation, but it also serves as a socio-
political norm that shapes social and political encounter with Muslims, discouraging true 
relationships with Muslims.
15
 Neo-Pentecostal Christians (who produce this literature) affirm 
cultural, theological and biblical values of community, hospitality and love. Diversity is also 
an expressed value.
16
 The conversion narratives examined in chapter seven showed love for 
Muslim family members and hinted at friendships between Christians and Muslims. This can 
be contrasted with the representation of Islam in a comparable, popular Pentecostal magazine 
from America in which Muslims are almost exclusively portrayed as violent or as terrorists.
17
 
However, despite hints at social openness, this working theory of interreligious relations 
serves primarily to exclude socially and politically as well as religiously. In religiously plural 
Kenya, can Neo-Pentecostal Christians extend hospitality and love socially – not religiously – 
to Muslims?
18
 Since community and relationships (i.e. ubuntu) remain centrally important 
among Kenyans, including Neo-Pentecostals, focusing upon biblical and theological models 
                                                          
14
 Pierre Bourdieu, "The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups," Theory and Society 14, no. 6 
(1985): 734-735. Bourdieu writes of sociologists doing research to expose what he calls doxa, the 
common sense assumptions made about social distinctions. 
15
 While the model may also ideally discourages relationships with adherents of African Religion, the 
fact that these religious adherents are often family members changes the dynamics significantly.  
16
 Mark Kariuki, The First Quarter: Faith Power Works Wonders (Nairobi: Life Celebration Centre 
International, 2008), 57, 118, 126. 
17
 http://www.charismamag.com/. 
18
 I say ‘not religiously’, because religious pluralism is not a viable option for NPCs at this time. 
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of relationship in addition to (rather than?) a normative model of African Pentecostalism 
should furnish more space for interreligious relationships with and understanding of Muslims.  
This study was personally undertaken in the hopes of discovering a better, alternative 
model to Western models of interreligious relations. It has been found that certain distinctions 
between Western models and African models do, in fact, exist. African models emphasize the 
communal and practical results of religion, in contrast to the more typical Western emphasis 
upon individual salvation, doctrine and truth.
19
 It is wise to take heed of Maluleke’s counsel 
that African Christianity is neither better, nor worse, than other Christianities, and that it can 
also be an ally (or a hindrance) in the pursuit of solutions to problems facing the global 
church.
20
 An African model may not have proven to be a radically superior alternative, but it 
adds to the pool of resources for encountering and interacting with the religious Other.  The 
practical emphasis on the ability of Islam to produce healthy communities and individuals 
who live virtuous lives, especially as found among Kenyan mainline scholars, may provide 
more space for mutual recognition, respect and cooperation between Christians and Muslims 
than the Western emphasis on abstract ideas of salvation, doctrines and truth.  
10.2 Questioning Popular Premises Concerning Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa 
Returning to two popular premises concerning Christian-Muslim relations in Africa 
that were mentioned in the introduction, Huntington and Jenkins have popularised the view in 
the West that Africa is the location of fault lines along the clash of civilisations between 
Christians and Muslims. Conflicts between adherents of the two faiths are then seen to be 
                                                          
19
 David Shenk examines world religions from the perspective of the practical social results that they 
have produced in their respective communities. His book is the only study by a Western scholar (that I 
am aware of) that takes this approach. Shenk grew up in Tanzania as the son of Mennonite 
missionaries and has lived as an adult in Tanzania, Somalia and Kenya. David W Shenk, Global Gods: 
Exploring the Role of Religions in Modern Societies (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1995). 
20
 Tinyiko Maluleke, "Of Africanised Bees and Africanised Churches: Ten Theses on African 
Christianity," Missionalia 38, no. 3 (2010): 375, 378. 
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harbingers of religious wars to come. In contrast African writers, such as Sanneh
21
 and 
Mbillah,
22
 idealise the “live and let live” influence of African values upon Christian-Muslim 
relations, proclaiming these religions to be more tolerant in Africa than elsewhere. This thesis 
adds to the literature
23
 that demonstrates that neither popular theory tells the entire story, as 
both welcome and rejection form aspects of the African narrative. While mainline scholars 
tend to be more welcoming and popular Neo-Pentecostal writers rejecting of Islam, there 
remain elements of rejection within the scholarly writing and possibilities of welcome within 
Kenyan Pentecostalism. An understanding of Christian-Muslim relations in Africa must be 
discovered in the nitty-gritty of everyday life, in the routine interactions between peoples and 
in the concrete ways that Christians (and Muslims) speak of the Other, the latter of which was 
attempted in this study. 
 
                                                          
21
 Sanneh, Piety and Power. 
22
 Mbillah, "Inter-Faith Relations and the Quest for Peace in Africa." 
23
 Soares, "Introduction: Muslim-Christian Encounter in Africa," 2-3. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
LIST OF POPULAR MAGAZINES 
 Name of Magazine Issues 
1.  Anointing Flames 1 
2.  Arise Africa 5 
3.  Charismatic Leader 1 
4.  Christian Army 1 
5.  Dove Harvest 1 
6.  End Time Christian News 10 
7.  Fellowship Magazine 1 
8.  Fragrance of Life 1 
9.  God's Champion 7 
10.  It's Time for Grace 2 
11.  Light of the World 1 
12.  Maximum Miracle Times 1 
13.  Mercy Missions 4 
14.  Miracle Magazine 7 
15.  Mount Zion 1 
16.  Revival Springs 96 
17.  The Christian Professional 2 
18.  The Shepherd 3 
19.  The Solid Family 2 
20.  The Voice of Restoration 5 
21.  Today in Africa 5 
22.  Up Up Magazine 1 
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